STUDIES

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The Early Irish Church and The Holy See

by JOHN RYAN

THE APOSTLE of Ireland is St Patrick and there can be no doubt that he, more than any other person, was responsible for the conversion of the island to Christianity. His dates are still slightly in dispute. The ancient Irish sources placed his coming in A.D. 432 and his death a generation later, about A.D. 461. But another date for his death found its way into the Annals, a date that fluctuated round the year A.D. 490. To the Irish public this caused no difficulty : they accepted the year 432 as the beginning of his mission and gave St Patrick sixty years as an evangelist in Ireland. To make matters more interesting, they gave his age in 432 as sixty and thus rounded off neatly his mortal life, sixty years of preparation and another sixty years of active work among the heathen. To have lived to be 120 years old they considered to be an added pearl to his crown. Moses had lived to this age (Deut. XXXIV, 7) and Patrick was to the Irish what Moses was to the Israelites, the giver of their new and perfect law, the leader who guided their steps through the desert of paganism to the gates of the Promised Land.[1]

Modern critics have shown themselves dissatisfied with this too expansive and liberal chronology. Those who accept a year round 490 as the date of St Patrick's death are not inclined to give him a ministry of sixty years. They would therefore place his arrival in Ireland a generation or so after 432. Indeed there have been scholars to whom the chronological difficulty was a Gordian knot to be severed only by the sword.[2] These accepted the dates 432 and 490 as approximately correct but postulated two missionaries named Patrick, one active from 432 to 460 and the other from 460 to 490. This, no doubt, solves the chronological problem but by the crude expedient of cutting the missionary in two, a procedure hardly justified by the actual historical situation. Ireland knows nothing—outside the realm of learned speculation—of such a second missionary following in the footsteps of St Patrick and inheriting both his office and his name. Her people were converted

[1]For the bibliography of St Patrick's life see James F. Kenny : *The Sources for the Early History of Ireland*, Vol. I, Ecclesiastical. New York, 1929. Pp. 165-166. For more recent articles especially those dealing with controversies about the sources, see the Bibliography and Notes in *The Life and Legend of St Patrick* by Ludwig Bieler, Dublin, 1949. For a summary of the controversial issues, see *St Patrick*, a series of Radio essays edited by J. Ryan and published by the Stationery Office, Dublin, 1958.

[2]T. F. O Rahilly : *The Two Patricks*, Dublin, 1942.

by the one missionary, whose writings we still possess and who has ever since been revered as the national apostle. He belonged to the fifth century, probably to its earlier half, though the difference of two or three decades within that century would not be of major significance.[1]

St Patrick was a Roman citizen, having been born in the Roman Province of Britain.[2] In the years of his preparation before his coming to Ireland he was a student in Britain and, almost certainly also, in Gaul. A letter from his pen speaks of the *consuetudo Romanorum Gallorum Christianorum*.[3] Again, when condemning the soldiers of the erring British commander, he proclaims his shame in having to acknowledge common nationhood with them : *non dico civibus meis neque civibus sanctorum Romanorum*.[4] In the Book of Armagh are two sayings of the Apostle, preserved because they were so often on his lips.[5] One reads : ' I had the fear of God to lead me on my way through Gaul and Italy and in the islands of the Tyrrhenian Sea ' ; and the second : ' Church of the Irish, yea of the Romans, be you not [merely] Christians but Romans also.'[6] He was anxious, therefore, that Ireland, which had never been a province of the Empire, should now as a Christian country regard herself as one with the Christians of the Roman Empire, her neighbours to the east.

St Patrick was a Roman of the Romans. It does not, of course, follow that he was sent to Ireland direct from the Holy See, as St Augustine was sent to Canterbury by St Gregory the Great. The bishop first entrusted with the mission, Palladius, was, in fact, sent to Ireland by Pope Celestine I, but when he was unable to make headway, probably because he was cut off by death within a short time, St Patrick was consecrated by a bishop in Gaul and sent to take the vacant place. The purpose of his mission to Ireland was to establish there a church that would be part of the Catholic Church and therefore in its relations with the Holy See like to the churches of Gaul and Britain. That the church in Gaul and the church in Britain were in full communion with the Pope and acknowledged his superiority over them does not need to be demonstrated. St Patrick's attitude towards the Roman See is a simple deduction from the general Catholic attitude towards the Roman See in the century within which he lived.

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[1]It is significant that the one certain date in the ecclesiastical history of Ireland in the fifth century is 431. This is the date given by Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epitoma Chronicorum* (425-455), for the despatch of their first bishop to the Irish who believed in Christ.

[2]St Patrick, before his death, wrote two documents, the *Confessio*, a justification of his acceptance of the offer to become a missionary in Ireland ; and an *Epistle*, against the soldiers of a princeling in northern Britain, who in a raid on Ireland had killed some of St Patrick's converts and carried off others as slaves. These documents show that he was in every sense of the word a ' civis Romanus.'

[3]*Epistle*, § 14.

[4]*Ibid.*, § 2.

[5]The so-called *Dicta Patricii*, Lib. Arm., fol. 9r.

[6]' Ecclesia Scottorum, immo Romanorum, ut Christiani ita ut Romani sitis.'

In St Patrick's cathedral at Armagh there were relics of Saints Peter and Paul, St Laurence and St Stephen.[1] These were regarded as a veritable treasure, worthy of a primatial church. Saints Peter, Paul and Laurence were pre-eminently Roman saints ; and the relics of St Stephen would also, most probably, have come to Ireland from Rome. It is well-known that the finding of St Stephen's body in 415 created immense enthusiasm throughout the Christian world and churches everywhere were anxious to secure some part, however small, as a precious relic.[2]

In the ' Confession ' and ' Letter ' written by St Patrick, the Holy See is not mentioned. But these documents were composed for purposes that had no direct connection with the Holy See. It must further be remembered that circumstances rarely arose when a Catholic bishop would think it necessary to state expressly his dependence on the same Roman See, since the position of that See, particularly in the West, was universally known and understood.

There is evidence, however, that St Patrick did think it advisable to put on record his own, and the Irish church's, subjection to papal authority and to enshrine that teaching in a precept of Irish Canon Law.

For in the Irish collection of canons drawn up about the year 700 there is one attributed to St Patrick and his early episcopal helpers. It runs : ' If any questions [of difficulty] arise, let them be referred to the Apostolic See.' The principle is formulated more at length in the Book of Armagh in the following terms :

> If any difficult question should arise of a kind unknown to all the canonical experts of the Irish people, the right action to take is to refer it to the see of the chief bishop of the Irish, that is to say, the see of Patrick, for examination by the said bishop. If, however, the case proposed is such that a solution cannot easily be found in the said see with its learned staff we decree that the case should be sent to the Apostolic See, that is to say, the see of the Apostle Peter whose authority is exercised in Rome.[3]

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[1] *Lib. Arm.*, ed. Gwynn, p. 17a : et portavit ab illo partem de reliquiis Petri et Pauli, Laurentii et Stefani quae sunt in Machi (i.e. Ard Machae, Armagh).

Ib. 29b : ordinavit ibi Olcanum episcopum, quem nutrivit Patricius et dedit illi partem de reliquiis Petri et Pauli et aliorum, et velum quod custodivit reliquias.

Ib. 41b. ; in the *Liber Angeli*, of 9th century : the prelate in Armagh as successor of St Patrick, is primate of Ireland. ' Nihilominus venerari debet honore summorum martyrum Petri et Pauli, Stefani Laurentii et caeterorum,' whose relics are in the church of Armagh.

[2] Sozomen, H. E. IX. 16. Orosius brought some relics of St Stephen to Minorca. Cf. Severus, Bishop of Minorca : De virtutibus ad Judaeorum conversionem (reliquiis Sancti Stephani) factis. Migne, P.L. XLI, 821-832. St Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XXII, 8 ; Sermo 320, Migne, P.L. XXXVIII, 1442.

[3] Quaecumque causa valde difficilis exorta fuerit atque ignota cunctis Scottorum gentis iudicibus ad cathedram archiepiscopi Hibernensium, id est, Patricii, atque huius antistitis examinationem recte referenda. Si vero in illa (sede) cum suis sapientibus facile sanari non poterit talis causa praedictae negotiationis ad sedem apostolicam decrevimus esse mittendam, id est, ad Petri apostoli cathedram auctoritate Romae urbis habentem. Lib. Arm., 42b.

Is this canon genuine ? The objections raised to it were answered by the Dublin (later Cambridge) historian Bury. He concluded thus : ' the outcome of this investigation is that the case for rejecting the circular letter of the three bishops (Patricius, Auxilius, Iserninus) on internal evidence breaks down ; and otherwise an early date is suggested. . . . Hence the external evidence being in its favour, we need not hesitate to accept the document as authentic.'[1]

It was certainly so regarded before the *Collectio Canonum Hibernensis* was made. In connection with the Paschal controversy, on which more in due course, a letter was despatched by an Irish scholar, Cumméne, to Segéne, abbot of Iona. The year was 632. In this letter the words occur :

> Then it seemed good to our ecclesiastical superiors [when diversity of view had arisen about the Easter date at the synod of Mag Léne] that if one group took one view of a case and another group judged that it was not leprosy, they should go to the place which the Lord had chosen —that, if cases of major difficulty arose they should be sent, *according to the decree of the synod*, to the chief of all cities . . . and coming to the city of Rome . . .

In other words, when an important question was hotly disputed and the correct answer was not known, the solution should be sought, according to the decree of St Patrick and his bishops, in the chief city of the Christian world, Rome.[2] Hence envoys were sent ' as children to their mother ' to use the words of the letter just quoted, to Rome, to discover what the practice there was. The principle is clear : it is the Holy See that should give the final judgment. Hence the decree of St Patrick in synod was known and put into operation in this controversial issue.

* * *

The sixth century saw the rise of great monasteries in every part of Ireland. There were, of course, monks in St Patrick's day, for the Apostle regarded these and the female religious as the fine flower of his flock.[3] But about the year 540 the movement towards monasticism began to proceed at a pace that St Patrick could not have foreseen.[4] By 600

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[1]J. B. Bury, *Life of St Patrick*, London, 1905. P. 245. Cf. *Ib.* 168-171 ; 369-371.

[2]Deinde visum est senioribus nostris ut, si diversitas oborta fuerit inter causam et causam et variaverit iudicium inter lepram et non-lepram, irent ad locum quem elegerit Dominus ; ut, si causae fuerint maiores, *iuxta decretum synodicum*, ad caput urbium sunt referendae . . . et ad Roman urbem venientes . . .

Ussher, *Sylloge*, XI. In *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 442. Cf. Migne, P.L., LXXXVIII, 969 ff. For date of Letter, D. J. K. O'Connell, J.R.S.A.I., LXVI., p. 83. MacCarthy, Annals of Ulster, IV, p.cxxv. In the same Letter Cumméne quotes St. Jerome : Non est alia Romanae urbis ecclesia, alia totius orbis aestimanda est. (Ep. 85 ad Evagrium) ; and Ego interim clamito : Si quis cathedrae Sancti Petri iungatur, meus est ille. (Ep. 58 ad Damasum). Ussher, IV, p. 437.

[3]*Confessio Sancti Patricii*, §§41, §42. *Epistola*, §12 : et filii Scottorum et filiae regulorum monachi et virgines Christi enumerare nequeo.

[4]This movement is traced in detail by J. Ryan, *Irish Monasticism*, Dublin and London, 1931

the multiplication of monasteries had left little room for dioceses in the ordinary sense. Nor was this all. Had the monasteries divided between themselves the whole territory of the island and had each monastic ruler been consecrated a bishop, the situation would be no doubt unusual but it could hardly be called irregular. In other words, the great monastery would be at the same time a see ; the areas that looked to it for spiritual leadership would be its diocese ; and the abbot of the monastic community would add to his responsibilities the government as bishop of large numbers of the laity. Such arrangements were found elsewhere in the Church.[1] In Ireland it was not to be. Too many of the monastic founders had been priests only, not bishops. St Colmcille, for instance, of Derry and Iona, had refused for reasons of humility to accept the episcopal order. All his successors in the abbatial chair followed his example.[2] Other founders, too, were priests, and their successors were quite content to be presbyter-abbots. The tendency, in fact, was all in this direction ; that is to say, the number of priest-abbots grew, the number of bishop-abbots fell.[3] There was no confusion of the two orders, no suggestion that the priest was equal to the bishop in power and function, still less that the priest was above the bishop in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.[4] Only a bishop could ordain clergy ;[5] only a bishop could consecrate a church or an altar ; only a bishop could bless the holy oils.[6] A bishop celebrated Mass alone, while priests con-celebrated.[7] A bishop, as bishop, had the honour-price of a king ; a priest had no corresponding legal privilege.[8] Yet the priest-abbot exercised jurisdiction in the areas, often wide, that belonged to his monastery. This was a peculiar feature of the Irish canon law. It must, I think, be accepted as such, seeing that it was never called in question, as far as can be seen, either by the Holy See or by the self-constituted critics, often clamorous and persistent, of Irish ecclesiastical ways. As no objection was raised (until centuries after 800, and then by reformers from within the country) the conclusion seems to impose itself, that it was a case of extraordinary jurisdiction exercised by priests, an exception that met the needs of the island and was therefore accepted as a legitimate

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[1]For instance, just beyond the Irish Sea in Wales. ' In the case of the four cathedral churches the title of abbot was from the first merged in that of bishop,' J. E. Lloyd, *History of Wales*, I, 207. H. Williams : *Christianity in Early Britain*, pp. 355-359. C. Brooke in *Studies in the Early British Church*, Cambridge, 1958, chap. IV.

[2]Adamnan, *Vita Sancti Columbae*, ed. Reeves, pp. 370-409.

[3]J. Ryan : *Irish Monasticism.* Pp. 186-7.

[4]Ryan : *l.c.* pp. 275-6.

[5]Cf. Adamnan, *Vita Col.*, p.69.

[6]Cf. Sanctus Columbanus, *Epistola IV.*, §4 : qui iuxta altare quod sanctus Aidus episcopus benedixit.

[7]This is the point of Chapter 44, Bk. I, in Adamnan's *Vita Col.*, pp. 85-6.

[8]MacNeill : *Ancient Irish Law* ; the law of status or franchise, PRIA., Vol. XXXVI, 1923, pp. 281, 306. Cf. §137 : ' Which is higher in dignity, a king or a bishop ? A bishop is higher because a king rises to salute him because of religion.'

deviation from the general canon law.[1] When the Irish went abroad, they did not carry this arrangement with them ; they realized that it responded to conditions in their own country, and there alone.[2]

Did this change from ordinary diocesan government to a more native type of organization bring with it a change in the attitude of the church in Ireland towards the Roman See ? Or, to put the question in another form, what was the attitude of the Irish monastic founders and their communities towards Rome ? Was it humble and respectful ? Or was it indifferent ? Or was it, in theory or in fact, hostile ? Our evidence on the point comes chiefly from one person, but he is such a perfect representative of the Irish monastic system that what holds for him may be taken to hold for all. To quote again the Cambridge historian, Bury :

> For the feelings of Irish ecclesiastics towards the Roman see in the sixth century, we can have no better evidence than the letters of St Columbanus, who was born and educated in Ireland. For on the one hand Columbanus identifies his own opinions with those of the Irish ; while, on the other, he admonishes the bishops of Rome with such boldness and plainness that he cannot be accused of Romanizing tendencies. We are therefore justified in taking the spirit which he displays towards the Cathedra Petri as indicative of the spirit of the Irish Church.[3]

Three letters of St Columban to as many Popes have been preserved.[4] The first of these was addressed to St Gregory the Great, probably in the year 600, and begins thus :

> To the holy lord and father in Christ, the fairest ornament of the Roman Church, the flower, as it were, esteemed beyond all others in Europe everywhere in decay, the illustrious bishop skilled in the contemplation of God's Being, I, Bar-Jona, a poor dove, send greeting in Christ.[5]

Whatever may be said of these terms, they have one feature which nobody can overlook : they are meant to do the recipient of the letter high honour.

The writer's main purpose is to ask about the Easter date. Columban, before he had finished dealing with this problem, apologises for burthening the Pope with it.

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[1]Ryan : *Irish Monasticism*, p.187-8.

[2]It is significant that the Irish mission to Northumbria wes led successively by three bishops, Aidan, Finan and Colman. Bede, H.E., III, 17 ; III, 25.

[3]*Life of St Patrick*, p. 369.

[4]Editions of the letters of St Columban : Migne, P.L. LXXX, pp. 259-96. Gundlach, M.G.H., Epistolae III, pp. 154-90. Walker, *Sancti Columbani Opera*, Dublin, 1957. Literature dealing with these letters in Kenny, *Sources*, p. 189 ff.

[5]' Domino sancto et in Christo Patri, Romanae pulcherrimo Ecclesiae decori, totius Europae flaccentis augustissimo quasi cuidam flori, egregio speculatori, theoriae utpote divinae castalitatis perito, ego Bar Iona, vilis Columba, in Christo mitto salutem.' Walker, p. 2. The date is probably A.D. 600, Walker, *ib.* p.XXXVI.

> While I write this more in boldness than in humility I realize that presumption has brought me into dangerous straits, the need to cross which I had not foreseen. For it befits neither place nor station that your great authority should be questioned by raising this matter as if it were something open to debate. Indeed there is an element of ridicule in the sight of me, writing thus from the West about Easter, causing bother to you who lawfully sit in the see of Peter and are the holder of the keys.[1]

Nevertheless he goes on to consult the Pope not only about Easter but about other problems. Are bishops who ordain simoniacally to be regarded as excommunicated ? And what about those bishops who, after their ordination to the major order of deacon, continued to live secretly with their wives ? In Ireland, he says, this was held to be equivalent to adultery. That there were bishops in Gaul who had been guilty of such conduct he knew from their own admissions. And what of monks who had taken vows in a monastery and afterwards, regardless of the obedience due to their abbot, had gone off on the plea that they preferred to live under a stricter rule or to dwell on their own as hermits in the desert ?

There were many other questions which Columban would have liked to put to Pope Gregory but which could not find place properly in a letter. They would, he said, have been asked by him in person

> did not bodily weakness and the care of my fellow-monks from Ireland keep me tied at home, though I do in truth wish to go to you, to drink of that spiritual channel from the living spring and the living stream of true knowledge that gushes upwards to eternal life. Were my body to follow my mind Rome would again have to endure some lack of appreciation for her attractions, since, just as we read in St Jerome how some people came to Rome from the utmost confines of the Hyelinian shore and were not satisfied with what they found but looked for sights beyond, so, too, I would act, for what I want to see is not Rome but you (saving the reverence due to the relics of the saints) for though I confess that I am no scholar but a man athirst for heavenly knowledge, that same thing I would do, if I had the time.[2]

The second letter was written in 604 or 607, at a time when the Holy See was vacant. It was directed to the Pope who in due course would be elected, Sabinian or Boniface III. It begins :

> For a long time now my soul has been anxious to seek consolation in a visit to each occupant of the Apostolic See, prelates most dear to all the faithful and held in the greatest reverence because of the honour due to St Peter,[3] but because of the troubles of the times and turbulent outbreaks in the tribes that lie between here and Rome I have been unable

[1] *Ib.* pp. 6-8.
[2] *Ib.* p.10.
[3] 'Merito apostolici honoris.' *Ib.* p. 22.

> to satisfy my desire . . . Thus more than once Satan hindered the bearers of the letters which I wrote to Pope Gregory of holy memory (from reaching their destination).[1]

He is therefore sending on to Rome a copy of these letters ' not so much in a spirit of pride or presumption, the devil's fault' as to serve a practical purpose, namely to give proof, to the best of his ability, of the solid grounds on which the traditional Irish way of calculating the Easter date was based,

> that you, therefore, [the Pope] may grant to us pilgrims [in Burgundy] in our labours, the fatherly consolation of your judgment, thus confirming, if it is not contrary to faith,[2] our Irish custom, so that we who live here in exile for God's sake may observe the Easter rite as it was observed by our ancestors. For it is obvious that the place where we have settled is to be regarded as our own.[3] We live here in a desert, keeping our own Irish customs, not those of the Gauls, doing no harm to anybody.

He begs the Pope to approve of their way of acting. Why should not, he asks, the Gauls and the Irish live together, side by side, keeping one the Gaulish, the other the Irish customs, in the fulness of charity, as St Polycarp and Pope Anicetus agreed to do, without damage to the faith ? The letter ends :

> Good-bye now, Pope most dear in Christ, and remember us [pilgrims] in your holy prayers, beside the relics of the saints . . .[4]

Very remarkable is Columban's third letter to Rome, written from Milan to Pope Boniface IV in 613. It is a curious compound of love and sorrow, love for the Papacy and the Pope, sorrow that the Pope addressed has not acted with more strength and resolution in a matter of the utmost gravity, the faith itself. He had allowed and was still allowing the schism of the ' Three Chapters ' to continue without providing a remedy.

We may take first the expressions of affection for the Apostolic See and its occupant, the Pope, the successor of St. Peter. The opening is in language almost oriental in its imagery : ' To the fairest head of all the churches of the whole of Europe, the well-beloved Pope, the exalted prelate, the Pastor of Pastors, the most reverend bishop, the lowest to the highest, the [rude] countryman to the [cultured] townsman, the poor in expression to the brilliant speaker, the last to the first, the exile to the native, the poverty stricken creature to the powerful lord, strange to relate and altogether outside the common run of things, a rare bird,

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[1] *Ib.* pp. 22-24.
[2] ' Si non contra fidem est.' *Ib.* p. 24.
[3] ' Constat enim nos in nostra esse patria.' *Ib.* p. 24.
[4] ' Vale, dulcissime in Christo Papa, memor nostri et in sanctis orationibus iusta sanctorum cineres.'

a Dove, presumes to write to Boniface the Pope '.[1] These phrases are the more noteworthy because the letter which follows makes it abundantly clear that the writer is anything but a flatterer and a sycophant.

Nevertheless, the theme of admiration keeps recurring.

> I shall speak as a friend, a disciple, a close follower of yours, not as a stranger.[2] For all we Irish, living on the edge of the world, are disciples of Saints Peter and Paul, and of all those who wrote, by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, the sacred books. We accept nothing beyond what is found in Holy Writ and in the teaching of the apostles. No Irishman has ever been a heretic or a Judaizer or a schismatic, but the Catholic faith, as it was delivered first by you, the successors of the holy apostles, is held intact. Strengthened and, as it were, impelled by this confidence, I have dared to rouse you against those who speak blasphemously of you, crying out that you receive heretics and are therefore in schism. I roused you thus, so that my boasting, my conviction, when I spoke up for you in answer to them, should not be in vain . . . For I promised, on your behalf, as it behoves a worthy pupil to do for his master, that the Church of Rome does not defend a heretic against the Catholic faith.[3]

Nor should the Pope object to his speaking thus, though interference might be misinterpreted as imprudence, since he speaks as a son.

Other expressions have the same note of high respect for the Pope's office and person.

> Then make use, O Pope, of the well-known call and voice of the true shepherd and stand between the sheep and the wolves, so that, losing all fear, they may realize fully that you are indeed their shepherd . . . Do you fulfil with all diligence your pastoral duty ; stand on guard night and day so that you may see the staff of almond-wood hooking in true fruits when the autumn comes. To be worthy, therefore, of your apostolic office maintain the apostolic faith ; bear witness to it and thereby uphold it ; strengthen it by your pen ; give it added solidity by holding a synod, that none may properly oppose you . . . For we [Irish] are bound to the see of Peter. Rome may be great and famous, but her greatness and her fame for us are due solely to that see[4] . . . It may be said that because of Christ's twin apostles you are raised to heights that are almost celestial and Rome is the head of all the churches (saving always the unique privilege of the place of the Lord's resurrection)[5] . . . Let the King [of the Langobards] follow the King [of Kings, Christ] ; do you [the Pope] follow Peter and let the whole Church follow you.[6]

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[1] 'Pulcherrimo omnium totius Europae ecclesiarum capiti, Papae praedulci, praecelso praesuli, pastorum pastori . . . mirum dictu, nova res, rara avis, scribere audet Bonifacio patri Palumbus.' *Ib.* p. 36.

[2] 'Ego enim ut amicus, ut discipulus, ut pedisequus vester, non ut alienus loquar.' *Id.* p. 38.

[3] *Ib.* p. 38.

[4] 'Nos enim, ut ante dixi, devincti sumus cathedrae Sancti Petri ; licet enim Roma magna est et vulgata, per istam cathedram tantum apud nos est magna et clara.' *Ib.* p. 48.

[5] 'Vos prope caelestes estis et Roma orbis terrarum caput est ecclesiarum, salva loci dominici resurrectionis singulari praerogativa.' *Ib.* p. 48.

[6] 'Rex Regem, tu Petrum, te tota sequatur Ecclesia.' *Ib.* p. 56.

These quotations speak for themselves. There is in them a warmth towards the Holy See that is not surpassed, I think, in any contemporary record. The primacy of the Holy See, contained in the formula *Tu Petrum, te tota sequatur Ecclesia* is masterly in its force and brevity.

What is yet more remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that these many expressions of love, loyalty, devotion, subjection, appear in a letter whose main purpose is criticism. The Pope is the Pope, but as the Pope he has his duty to do, and if he fails in it, because of any human weakness, he is to be admonished with all frankness. At times, indeed, the candour of the zealous admonitor takes one's breath away. It must be remembered that Columban had spent many years as an abbot, with a multitude of monks under his rule, all taught to obey his slightest nod. Command had become a habit and from a habit had become second nature. Even the Pope is told how to behave as if he were one of the monastic brethren !

There was an excellent reason why Columban should be able to speak with exceptional freedom : he was not the Pope, with the Pope's heavy responsibilities ; he had but recently arrived in Italy and had little or no understanding of the Pope's difficulties. Not long before the writing of the letter he had been a pilgrim hidden from the world in his Burgundian desert. Expelled by the Merovingian king, he had wandered in various lands. Having arrived in northern Italy, in the Langobard kingdom, he found the church there a prey to external and internal troubles. The king, Agilulf, and the bulk of his subjects were Arian heretics ; the queen, Theudelinda, and her son were Catholics. This was sufficiently confusing, but the situation was rendered infinitely worse by the fact that the Catholics themselves were not a united body. There were bitter divisions among them on what has been called the ' Three Chapters ' controversy. It was an old dispute in which the villain of the piece was the eastern Emperor Justinian. He had condemned on his own authority the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theoderet of Cyrrhus and Ibas of Edessa, in the hope of winning grace with his rebellious Monophysite subjects. Justinian did not scruple to use his imperial power to bend the bishops of the East to his will. Going further, he had summoned Pope Vigilius to Constantinople in 547 and there subjected him to overwhelming pressure. There is no need to relate how the Pope was induced to accept the edict and how he afterwards made efforts to reject it, and deal with each of the three condemned writers on his merits. Africa and the north of Italy lapsed into schism. In 607 the Patriarch of Aquileia had returned to obedience but the bishops of the Langobard kingdom had not followed his example. Then a rival Patriarch was elected and he had nominated bishops. The feelings of St Columban can be imagined when he arrived among the Langobards to find, not merely an Arian church but two Catholic hierarchies, each claiming legitimate rule over the Catholic faithful. It was anarchy unalloyed !

Only the Pope could restore order. Hence his agitated letter to Pope Boniface IV.

Why had the Pope so far remained inactive ? Vigilius had been weak in resisting the violence of the Emperor.[1] Was Boniface likewise erring by neglect in the performance of his duty ? Among the Langobards there were many who were making in a loud voice this very accusation. He was doing nothing ; therefore, they argued shrilly, he was not in his heart a supporter of the three theologians whom the Emperor had condemned; therefore he was an enemy of Chalcedon in sympathy with heterodox doctrine. When St Columban heard people all round him making such accusations against the Pope he was dumbfounded. Hardly had he arrived than a certain person wrote to him to let him know that the Pope was becoming a Monophysite.[2] Columban indignantly denied the charge, believing, as he said, that ' Rome was always the strong pillar of the Church.'[3] Were the charge true, the situation would be simply monstrous : the son would need to correct the father, the tail would precede the head.[4] King Agilulf had also drawn his attention to the schism ; the King was himself an Arian, but if he felt inclined to become a Catholic, he would be faced with the difficulty of discovering which of the two Catholic parties to join.[5] The Pope's silence was therefore unintelligible ; enemies were using it ' to speak disparagingly of the chief see of the Catholic faith.'[6] Boniface should put an end to all contention by stating the truth once for all and expelling from the Catholic Church those who did not profess the Catholic faith.[7]

Dealing with the passages of criticism in this letter it may, I think, with justice be said that the language here and there is vehement to the point of discourtesy. On the other hand, the writer makes it clear that he is repeating accusations brought against the Pope by others, not by himself. He does not accept the allegation that the Holy See has, in fact, fallen into heresy. And though he insists that a Pope who has proved unfaithful to his trust might suffer rightly reproof from his own subjects,[8] he does not counsel any such provocative action. His anxiety, in the concrete, is that the Pope should call a Council and bring the schism to an end.[9] He does not say that this Council—still less a Council convened without the authority of the Pope—would be above the Pope

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[1] *Ib.* p. 40.
[2] *Ib.* p. 50.
[3] ' Ego enim credo semper columnam Ecclesiae firmam esse in Roma.' *Ib.* p. 56.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 46, 48.
[5] *Ib.* p. 44.
[6] ' Quare vel infamare audent fidei orthodoxae sedem principalem.' *Ib.* p. 46.
[7] *Ib.* pp. 44, 46.
[8] *Ib.* pp. 46, 48.
[9] ' Ut caligo suspicionis tollatur de cathedra Sancti Petri. Inde conventum coge, ut ea, quae vobis obiiciuntur, purgetis. Haereticorum enim receptio, ut audio, vobis reputatur quod absit credi verum fuisse, esse vel fore.' *Ib.* p. 46.

and entitled to give him orders. Indeed the tone of the letter, the warm expressions of deep regard for the Papacy as such, the unconditional acceptance of Rome as the chief church of the Christian world, the recognition of the Pope as the successor of St Peter, the holder of the keys, the person in the Church who wields supreme authority,[1] is intrinsically out of harmony with the so-called Conciliar Theory of the dying Middle Ages. St Columban, in his strictures, is in the company rather of St Catherine of Siena than in that of Marsilius of Padua, Gerson, Pierre d'Ailly, and the lawyers who would ascribe the highest authority in the Church to a General Council.

St Columban regarded himself as a representative, in his day, of the Irish Church. His right to do so has never been called in question. It is obvious, therefore, that to Irish ecclesiastics about the year 600, Rome was the chief church and the Pope the chief prelate of the Catholic Church everywhere in the world.

* * *

When St Columban settled in Burgundy he had to face the distressing problem of the Easter date. It was a question that had caused difficulty within the Church from the earliest times.[2] The first General Council, that of Nicaea in 325, had not settled it satisfactorily.[3] It is probable that the method of calculation used in Ireland had come from Roman Britain and that those who brought it were St Patrick and his assistant missionaries. Its principal features were a cycle of 84 years, March 25th as the vernal equinox, Easter limits from the 14th to the 20th of the moon, in terms of dates, from 25th March to 21st April. In Rome the traditional Easter limits were from the 16th to the 22nd of the moon, and from 23rd March to 21st April, while the 84 year cycle was retained until 457 when Victorius of Aquitaine, at the request of Pope Leo the Great, drew up an emended *Cursus Paschalis*. He kept the Roman limits of the moon, 16 to 22, but rejected the 84 year cycle in favour of the Alexandrine cycle of 19 years. In Alexandria the limits of the moon were from the 15th to the 21st, the vernal equinox was 21st March, and the limits, in terms of dates, 22nd March to 25th April. In 525 the Eastern monk, Dionysius Exiguus, drew up at Rome a list of Easters from 532 to 626, in accordance with the Alexandrine rules. When this list was adopted in Rome is not quite certain, but it was the official

[1] 'Vigila primo pro fide, deinde pro operibus fidei iubendis vitiisque calcandis, quia tua vigilantia multorum erit salus, sicut contrario, tua securitas multorum erit vastatio.' *Ib.* p. 40.

[2] Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, I, 133-151 : No less than six councils dealt with this problem in the second century. 'Malheureusement les dissentiments se prolongèrent longtemps, et, au III[e] siècle, une question astronomique vint ajouter une difficulté nouvelle et compliquer le débat.' *Ib.*, p. 451.

[3] 'Les divergences sur la manière de déterminer l'epoque de la Pâque ne disparurent pas, en effet, après le concile de Nicée. Alexandrie et Rome ne purent pas s'entendre, soit que l'une de ces deux églises ait négligé de faire le comput paschal, soit que l'autre l'ait regardé comme inexact.' *Ib.* II, p. 468.

Roman list before 600. By then, in other words, Rome had allowed her traditional system, which for long centuries she had vigorously defended, to lapse. This reform had not yet spread to Gaul, where the Victorian emendation of the old Roman cycle was still in general use. Within Ireland, objections to the traditional native system were raised about the middle of the sixth century. The dispute went on into the next century. St Columban complained of the clergy in Gaul who were trying to compel him to adopt the Victorian cycle. This cycle, he says, was known to Irish scholars and rejected by them.[1]

With the coming of the Roman missionaries to Britain the controversy gathered momentum. Bede cites a letter from Laurentius, the second Archbishop of Canterbury (604-619) to the Irish clergy, complaining that they did not keep Easter at the proper time.[2] He might with equal justice have admonished the Gauls, who, at least in principle, were out of harmony with him, for they had retained the Victorian cycle, with its lunar limits 16 to 22, now abandoned in Rome.[3]

Complaints against the Irish were carried to the Holy See. The result was a letter from Pope Honorius (625-638), exhorting them to change their system.[4] This letter seems to have reached Ireland in 629. In some churches the change was made at once. Others hesitated, reluctant to reject a cycle that was brought to their island probably by the national apostle himself. To resolve the differences, a synod was called, and this had almost reached unanimity when a distinguished abbot rose and defended the conservative position. The decision taken then by the synod was not to order a change immediately but to send an embassy to Rome.[5] The delegates reached the Eternal City in time for the Easter celebrations of 631. Following their report, when they returned to Ireland in 632, the southern half of Ireland adopted the new system. How vaguely things were understood is shown by the fact that a writer in the last-mentioned year thought that the cycle then used in Rome was the Victorian, not the Alexandrine.[6]

The northern half of Ireland still clung to its antiquated system, but evidently with some misgivings, for an embassy was sent by the northern prelates to Pope Severinus, to discover on their arrival that

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[1]Bibliography in Hefele-Leclercq *op. cit.*, II, p. 457 ; Kenney, *Sources*, p. 210. See : O'Connell, *Easter Cycles in the Early Irish Church*, JRSAI., XLVI, pp. 67 ff. ; and, for a valuable commentary on the whole question, P. Grosjean, *Recherches sur les débuts de la controverse paschale chez les Celtes*, Anal. Bollandiana, LXIV, pp. 200 ff.

[2]Bede, *H.E.*, II, 19. Ussher, *Sylloge*, p. 421.

[3]Letter I of Columbanus to Pope Gregory the Great, written in A.D. 600, rejects the Victorian cycle, which the Gallic clergy were forcing him to adopt. Walker, pp. 2 ff. ; O'Connell, *l.c.*, p. 80.

[4]Bede, *H.E.*, II, p. 19. Ussher, *Sylloge*, pp. 427-8.

[5]' Misimus quos novimus sapientes et humiles esse, velut natos ad matrem, et prosperum iter in voluntate Dei habentes, et ad urdem Romam aliqui ex eis pervenientes, tertio anno ad nos usque pervenerunt.' Letter of Cumméne to Segéne of Iona. Ussher, *Sylloge*, p. 442.

[6]Letter of Cumméne, Ussher, *Sylloge*, pp. 432-443. O'Connell, *l.c.*, p. 80.

the Pope had just died. His successor, John IV, before his consecration late in 640, addressed a letter to the primate in Armagh and by name also to four other bishops, five priests and an abbot, exhorting them to accept the Roman rules.[1]

Soon afterwards, the Irish missionaries in England, who had come from Iona in Scotland, a monastery founded from Derry in the north of Ireland, found themselves in trouble because of their archaic cycle. This led to their withdrawal from Northumbria, after a generation of extraordinarily fruitful activity. The Venerable Bede, with engaging simplicity, calls the Alexandrine cycle the 'Catholic Easter,'[2] a remarkable claim, for if it were true, the Holy See itself would have become Catholic only in the sixth century. He says again that the limits 15 to 21 of the moon were approved by the Council of Nicaea,[3] without adverting to the corollary that, if this were so, the Roman See would have paid no attention to the Council for over two centuries.[4] Bede, in a word, through no fault of his own, was not fully acquainted with the early history of the Church. He imagined a uniformity in the calculation of the Easter date which did not, in fact, exist. No doubt, some of the Irish churchmen were obstinate in their adherence to a defective system. They injured their reputation and did damage to their missionary work by remaining faithful to their traditional cycle when the change to the Alexandrine cycle had taken place in Rome itself. But it is well to remember that the intrinsic superiority of the Victorian or of the Alexandrine cycle had not been demonstrated to them, this being a feat of which the mathematical and astronomical science of the day was incapable. When the Irish did abandon their ancient cycle, they did so, not because of a mathematical demonstration, but out of respect for the Holy See, some at once, others after a greater or lesser period of hesitation, but all, ultimately, because of their regard for the authority of Rome.

It is gratifying also to note that, however heatedly strong-willed leaders might argue, students from England repaired to Ireland 'numerous as bees' during all the seventh century[5] and the evidence is that, where a monastic school was eminent for learning, these students did not worry much about the dates of its Lenten fast or the particular Sunday on which it celebrated the feast of the Lord's resurrection.

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[1]To this period belongs the first biography of St Patrick, written by Muirchu moccu Mochtene. Speaking of St Patrick this biographer says : 'Egressus ad sedem apostolicam visitandam et honorandam, ad caput itaque omnium ecclesiarum totius mundi . . .' *Lib. Arm.* ed. Gwynn, p. 3.

[2]Bede, *H.E.*, II, 19 ; III, 29.

[3]Bede, *H.E.*, III, 19.

[4]Hefele-Leclercq, *Hist. des Conciles* II, pp. 471-2. O'Connell, *l.c.*, p. 75.: 'The last and most important attempt to draw up a cycle retaining the traditional Roman luna 16-22 rule is that made by Victorius of Aquitaine in 457. His *Cursus Paschalis* was drawn up at the request of Pope Leo I.'

[5]Bede, *H.E.*, III, 4 ; III, 27 ; IV. 3 ; V, 29.

Perhaps the best commentary on this extremely boring and pathetic dispute is that made by Peter the Venerable in a letter to St Bernard :

> In early times the controversy about the Easter date and in our own time the well-known difference of opinion about the Christian Sacrifice between Greeks and Latins, could not wound charity or bring about schism. . . . The Orientals celebrated the Easter festival on one day, the Churches of the West on another day, while in the same island of Britain the English and the Irish (the latter the earlier converts to Christianity) kept different Easter days :[1]

Before the close of the seventh century the paschal controversy had ended in Ireland ; early in the eighth century it ceased to trouble the great monastery of Iona and its dependent institutions. From that time forward no new controversy arose to agitate the waters, though the Irish bishop of Salzburg, St Vergil, was reproved by St Boniface, then Papal Legate in Germany, for teaching strange doctrine, namely the sphericity of the earth and the existence of Antipodes. The Pope of that day, St Zacharias, was a man of the Greek nation, too conversant with ancient literature to take this complaint tragically. The point of interest is that the Pope was regarded by Vergil as well as by Boniface, obviously as a matter of course, as the authority to whom the question should be submitted.[2]

According to the Lives of the Irish saints, many of the great monastic founders of the sixth century went on pilgrimage to Rome.[3] To control these statements, in each particular case, is impossible. What can be taken as certain is the desire of Irish ecclesiastics to make such visits. St Columban expresses the deep longing of his soul to pray at the tombs of the Apostles, but the privilege had to be sacrificed, since duty held him elsewhere.[4] Others would be more fortunate. From casual references we may conclude that from the sixth century onwards the line of Irish pilgrims was never broken.[5] The journey was hazardous, long and painful, but the reward was abundantly rich. In the scrips of such pilgrims relics of the holy martyrs were brought back from Rome to Ireland. There they were interred with honour in the monastic cemeteries which

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[1]Nec apud antiquos ipsius paschalis temporis dissonantia, nec apud modernos ipsius sacrificii Christiani inter Graecos et Latinos nota varietas, caritatem laedere vel schisma gignere potuerit, . . . Alio tempore Oriens, alio Occidens, alio in eadem Britanniae insula Angli, alio Scotti, Christiani scilicet antiquiores, pascha Domini celebrabant. Migne, *P.L.*, CLXXXII, 403.

[2]Hermann Krabb : *Bischof Virgil von Salzburg und seine kosmologischen Ideen*, in *Mitteilungen d. Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, Innsbruck, 1903, pp. 1-28. Cf. Texts relating to St Virgilius of Salzburg, Kenny, *Sources*, pp. 523 ff. ; Hauck, *Kirchengesch. Deutschlands*, 2nd ed., pp. 427 ff.

[3]*Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae*, ed. Plummer, I, p. 49 : Post haec Sanctus Albeus perrexit Romam ; II, p. 41 : Vulgus dicit quod Sanctus Declanus multis vicibus Roman visitavit ; I, p. 85 : Monachus quidam qui . . . votum emisit peregrinacionis, videlicet quod limina apostolorum noviter visitaret. AA. SS. ex Codice Salm., pp. 285-6. Cf. Plummer, *op. cit.*, p.CXXIII.

[4]*Ep.* I. Walker, p. 10.

[5]Cf. Kenny, *Sources*, pp. 488, 512, 522, 595, 601, 603, 616, 619, 765, 766.

thereby acquired added sanctity. So common was this practice that by the year 800 the word *róim, ruam*, derived direct from *Roma*, had become established in the Irish language as a word for cemetery.[1] The second and older word *reilig*, derived from *reliquiae*, the relics of the saints, is still the ordinary term for cemetery in the Irish tongue.

Similar evidence is forthcoming from liturgical sources. In the Stowe Missal (properly the Lorrha Missal) which dates from about the year 800, the original canon of the Mass was removed almost as soon as the Missal was compiled, and the Gelasian Canon substituted.[2] In Ireland Pope St Gregory the Great enjoyed an extraordinary reputation. Stories about him were current in the schools and found their way into the literature.[3]

To summarize, then, it must be said that the Church in Ireland had of necessity peculiarities due, first of all, to the native Celtic civilization. The country had never been part of the Roman Empire. Its institutions were not Roman. Nevertheless Latin had become the language of its liturgy after the conversion of its people to Christianity. Latin was taught in its schools ; Latin literature was assiduously studied, primarily as a help to the understanding of Holy Scripture, but secondarily for its own sake as well. And the Latin language led direct to Rome. Obstacles, however, were many. First of all came distance. A journey from Ireland to Rome took normally a year or even longer to complete. Then there was the difference in organization : innumerable monasteries instead of a few dioceses, abbot rulers rather than bishop rulers, local dynasties and powerful nobles rather than Frankish or Visigothic kings; a sense, perhaps, of possessing a church within the island second to none ; a feeling therefore of self-sufficiency in the conduct of its own affairs ; a tradition so settled that issues of higher importance rarely occurred—hardly ever indeed an issue that could not be settled in a native synod (in this context the Paschal Controversy is the only exception known to us). Seldom then was there need to appeal to Rome for decisions, though the principle was universally accepted that the See of Peter was the authority to which to turn for such decisions. At all times the respect for that See was boundless ; so, too, the veneration and reverence for the prelate of that See as the successor of St. Peter, first of the apostles. In a word, the Church in Ireland differed in no substantial way in its attitude to Rome from the contemporary churches of the Western world.

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[1]Cf. *Martyrology of Oengus*, ed. Stokes, H.B.S., Vol. XXIX : is ruam iarthair betha Glenn dálach dá locha—the chief cemetery of the west is multitudinous Glenndaloch. *Ib.*, pp. 206, 219. On the word *ruam*, J. Vendryes, *Revue Celtique*, Vol. LI, pp. 301-2.

[2]*The Stowe Missal*, ed. Warner, H.B.S., Vols. XXI and XXII. Cf. T. F. O'Rahilly, *Ériu*, vol. X, pp. 95-109.

[3]Cf. *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, vol. III, pp. 30, 36 ; XII, pp. 367-374. Revue Celtique, vol. XLVI, pp. 223-251 ; XLIX, pp. 182-188. *Life of St Gregory in the Irish language*, edited by Vendryes, *R.C.*, vol. XLII, pp. 119 ff.

Coexistence: The Other Side

by M. B. CROWE

'PEACEFUL coexistence' has in recent years become the central theme of Soviet propaganda and policy, replacing the 'peace offensive' of the Warsaw petition. Stalin launched the campaign in the foreign affairs debate of April 1952; after his death the slogan was associated with the 'Geneva spirit' exploited by his successors in their first meeting with the Western Heads of State; and since Mr Khrushchev achieved supreme power he has not wearied of insisting upon the advantages of peaceful coexistence. His recent American tour was remarkable for a number of ebullient references to peaceful economic competition and to the inevitability of final victory for the Soviet kind of society. But 'peaceful coexistence' is not something new in the Marxist ideology. On the contrary it is now claimed that it is the genuine doctrine of Lenin—and, indeed, of Stalin. (Since Khrushchev's dramatic discrediting of Stalin in February 1956, Leninist orthodoxy has been the more important.) The concept is one that will repay close scrutiny. Three pertinent questions suggest themselves: (i) What meaning can any term like 'peaceful coexistence' have for a Marxist? (ii) What meaning have Marxists, from Lenin onwards, attached to the term? (iii) What has been the Soviet practice in the matter of coexistence?

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What meaning can 'peaceful coexistence' have for a Marxist? Marxism is a dialectical materialism whose dialectic comes from Hegel. For Hegel all reality is the development of Idea through a series of successive theses, antitheses and syntheses; nothing can be fixed or unchangeable, for everything is a stage in the universal development. Marx took the Hegelian dialectic and, as he claimed, stood it right way up by making it a materialist instead of an idealist dialectic. This materialist dialectic is the key to history, whose course is determined by the economic factor. No stage in historical development, short of the final synthesis of communist society, can be anything but a transition stage. (It is not explained how the final synthesis can be final and the end of the dialectic.) At any stage society is determined by the economic factor, the forces of production, upon which basis a superstructure is erected. The superstructure includes politics, law, philosophy, literature, art, etc. Moral codes, then, or political systems, merely reflect the economic realities of the society in which they are found and, like the society

itself, are no more than a stage in an evolution. This is, in a word, the theoretical justification of the Machiavellianism in politics and the relativism in morals practised by communists. One consequence is that any action or any campaign judged useful for hastening the advent of the ' final synthesis of the classless society ' is good ; and this, in fact, is the only meaning for ' goodness ' in the communist system. If a campaign concerning ' coexistence ' is judged good in this sense, then that is a sufficient reason for its adoption. Any argument that there is something inherently good about coexistence is incidental and put in merely to make a more effective appeal.

To put the same point in another way, what a Marxist really means by a term like ' coexistence ' is certain to be different from what a non-Marxist means. One thinks of the gross misuse of such terms as ' justice ', ' democracy ', ' popular ', and so on in the propaganda of Marxism. What have the ' Peoples' Democracies ' of Eastern Europe in common with Western popular democracies apart from the name ? Such terms are employed for their favourable associations with an utter disregard for their genuine meaning. The extent of the process can be gauged from a book like R. N. Carew Hunt's *Guide to Communist Jargon* which studies fifty terms, including ' coexistence ', whose real meaning for Marxists can be discovered only from a wide knowledge of the writings and activities of communists over the years. It is a guide to the Double-talk and the Double-think of George Orwell's 1984.

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What meaning have Marxists actually given to the term ' peaceful coexistence ' ? This question can, to some extent, be answered from the literature and the pronouncements of the leading figures in Russia since the Revolution of 1917.

In 1917 there was not today's dichotomy of the world into two evenly matched camps. Russia was then the only communist country ; its régime was anything but firmly established and there was every expectation of opposition from other countries when the European War came to an end. For the rest of Europe, which greatly underestimated the importance of the changes in Russia, there was no major problem of coexistence ; but for the communists the problem of coexisting with the rest of the world was a very pressing problem. Lenin was a realist. His régime needed time to consolidate itself and needed commercial relations with other countries to make its economy viable. In his pronouncements he tried to allay the suspicions of those who thought a communist régime a danger to the rest of the world ; he insisted that the victorious revolution did not seek to impose its system by force on other nations—it had not the means to do this—although it would, if necessary, defend itself

against what he called the intrigues of the capitalist powers. In February 1919 he denounced, in *Pravda*, the diehards who said that no peace with capitalists was possible :

> A Socialist Republic among imperialist powers would not be able, taking its stand on such views, to conclude any economic treaties, and could not exist without flying away to the moon.[1]

The age of sputniks and luniks has given the last clause an unexpected topicality. In 1920, in an interview with an American journalist, Lenin said :

> Let the American capitalists not touch us. We shall not touch them. We are even prepared to pay them gold for machinery useful for transport and industry and other equipment. And not only gold but raw materials as well.

In 1922, in an interview with the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Observer*, Lenin spoke of the prospects of co-operation between Russia on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. ' We believe ', he said, ' that really friendly relations with both powers are quite possible ; and that is our aim.'

Pronouncements of this kind from Lenin could be multiplied—and are by the apologists of the present Soviet policy of ' coexistence '. But only a very careful selection of texts will justify coexistence as pure Leninism. It is clear enough that coexistence was regarded by Lenin as a temporary expedient forced upon him by circumstances. And, even so, some of his peaceful utterances are significantly qualified. When, in February 1920, the *New York Evening Journal* asked him about Soviet plans in Asia, Lenin replied : ' The same as in Europe ; peaceful co-existence with the peoples, with the workers and peasants of all nations. ' The phrasing of the reply, as Carew Hunt has pointed out, exhibits the distinction made by communists between the masses (whose goodwill towards the Soviet Union is taken for granted) and the governments of their countries (which are ' hostile ' and ' bourgeois '). Coexistence with the peoples is, thus, not incompatible with subversion of their governments and does not imply any rejection of Marx's teaching. Furthermore, there are some statements of Lenin's not emphasized in current Soviet propaganda, which make his mind on coexistence clear. In April 1919 he was saying : ' World imperialism cannot live side by side with a victorious Soviet revolution ; ' and, in November 1920 : ' As long as

[1] The various pronouncements of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and other Russian leaders on coexistence are well-known and frequently rehearsed by writers on the subject, Marxist and non-Marxist. Most will be found in A. Rothstein, *Peaceful Coexistence* (Penguin Special, 1955), R. N. Carew Hunt, *A Guide to Communist Jargon*, Bles, London, 1957, or A. Piettre, *Marx et Marxisme*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1957. Rothstein's book is written from the Marxist point of view.

capitalism and socialism remain side by side we cannot live peacefully —the one or the other will be victor in the end.'[1] And, still more emphatically, in his Report to the Eighth Congress of March 1919 : ' The existence over any long period of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes a series of frightful collisions will be inevitable.' There was little of the pacifist in Lenin. Like Clausewitz he saw in war no more than the pursuit of policy by other, namely violent, means. He regarded any peace-campaign divorced from revolutionary agitation as a betrayal of the people.[2]

* * *

Stalin was associated with Lenin in the early years of the Soviet régime and shared Lenin's fear of a ' warlike and revengeful bourgeoisie ' in the capitalist countries. They had hoped for a series of revolutions in the capitalist countries after the first World War. When the revolutions did not materialize, coexistence became the necessary expedient. Time wore on and as yet the communist régime had not been overthrown. In 1924, the Comintern recognized a ' temporary re-stabilization ' of capitalism. And, in his address to the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in December 1925, Stalin said that ' what we at one time regarded as a brief respite, after the war, has become a whole period of respite.' The circumstance led Stalin to formulate his characteristic contribution to the communist ideology, the theory of ' socialism in one country '. On this matter he broke with Trotsky, adroitly contriving to represent Trotsky's doctrine of ' permanent revolution ' as an assertion that the dictatorship of the proletariat could not save Russia unless supported by revolutions in other countries.

The idea of ' socialism in one country ' was developed by Stalin in his *Problems of Leninism* (1926). Two distinct issues were involved : the possibility of building up socialism by the efforts of one country (which he affirmed) and the question whether any single country could regard itself as ' fully guaranteed against counter-revolution ' without a victorious revolution in several other countries (which he denied). The same doctrine was laid down in 1938 when Stalin settled the Ivanov controversy. Ivanov, a young instructor in the Kursk region, had been dismissed and denounced as a Trotskyite for teaching that internally socialism had triumphed in Russia but that the final victory was possible only on the international field. The regional secretary who dismissed Ivanov took the view that ' we now have the final victory of socialism and complete security from intervention and the restoration of capitalism '. Ivanov

[1] Cf. R. N. Carew Hunt, *Theory and Practice of Communism*, Bles, London, 1951, p. 173.
[2] J. M. Bochenski and G. Niemeyer, *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, Freiburg-München, 1958, p. 202.

wrote to Stalin for a ruling and was entirely vindicated. The building up of socialism, Stalin said, was not only possible but it had actually been achieved despite the protests of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and others ' who afterwards became the agents of Fascism ' and had used the doctrine of permanent revolution to conceal their counter-revolutionary designs. On the other hand, the victory of socialism could not be complete as long as Russia was encircled by capitalist states. Hence the need for Soviet rearmament and for the fomenting of agitation by the international proletariat.[1]

It is against this bleak background that Stalin's sundry conciliatory statements and admissions about coexistence must be viewed. In 1927 he referred to the possibility of limited agreements between the opposing systems, capitalist and socialist. But he was frank enough to admit that the agreements could only be temporary ones, lasting only ' until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe, or until colonial revolutions come fully to a head, or, finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves '. Later Stalin became more expansive and not a little disingenuous in his references to coexistence. He told the Sixteenth Party Congress of the policy of ' peace and of building up trade relations with all countries ' and added : ' We do not want a single foot of foreign soil.' In November 1930, when asked by Walter Duranty whether the capitalist and communist systems might not exist side by side without fighting, he replied : ' They have not fought for ten years, which means they can coexist. We don't want to fight, and some of their people don't want to fight either. ' In March 1936, in an interview with Roy Howard of the *New York Times*, Stalin denied that Russia wished to impose her system forcefully upon her neighbours. And, when further asked whether this clarification meant that the Soviet Union had abandoned its plans and intentions of bringing about a world revolution, he replied : ' We have never had such plans and intentions.'

It is significant that Stalin's most forthright statements on coexistence should have been made in the period following the second World War while the Soviet Union, under his leadership, was by its policy and its action dissipating the fund of goodwill built up during the war. When asked by Alexander Werth of the *Sunday Times*, in September 1946, whether he believed that, despite ideological discord, the Western democracies and the Soviet Union could live in friendly competition and in friendly and lasting collaboration, he answered : ' I do, unconditionally. ' In December 1946, Stalin told Elliott Roosevelt that living in peace with a communist form of government like that of the Soviet Union was ' not only possible, but wise and entirely within the bounds of realization.' Finally, in April 1947, Stalin told Harold Stassen that the

[1] Cf. R. N. Carew Hunt, *Theory and Practice of Communism*, pp. 172–178.

difference between the American and the Russian economic systems was ' not of essential importance where collaboration was concerned '.

These statements, it must be recalled, were made at a time when relations between Russia and the West were steadily deteriorating. The deterioration seems at last to be reflected in the qualifications (aimed at the policy of the Western powers) introduced by Stalin in April 1952 :

> The peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism is quite possible provided that there is a mutual desire to co-operate, readiness to carry out undertaken commitments, observance of the principles of equality and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

These qualifications were reiterated by Malenkov, in Stalin's presence, at the Nineteenth Party Congress of October 1952.

* * *

At Stalin's funeral, in March 1953, Malenkov reaffirmed ' Lenin's and Stalin's principle of the prolonged coexistence and peaceful emulation of the two different systems, the capitalist and the socialist. ' It did not go unnoticed that Malenkov spoke of ' prolonged ' coexistence although Lenin had never admitted that coexistence could be prolonged, nor had Stalin done so in the inter-war years. Malenkov announced a policy of liquidating the cold war and endeavoured to lay the blame for existing international tension on the Western powers ; provided they were prepared to change their policy, coexistence was possible. Coexistence was even to become a principle of international law. The jurist G. P. Zadorozhni argued that it had been such ' at least from the date of the recognition of the Soviet Union by capitalist countries. ' And the principle was not merely legal—it included ' the development of comprehensive political, economic, social and cultural collaboration or, more shortly, the ensuring of friendly competition in the course of which the question of the superiority of one of the two systems would be decided. ' There was, thus, no foundation for the belief entertained by certain circles in the West that the absence of a common principle underlying the Soviet and western conceptions of international law rendered peaceful coexistence impossible.[1]

This was the heritage, in the matter of coexistence, into which Khrushchev entered. He lost no time in enhancing it with his own contributions. In September 1955 he told an Eastern German delegation that

> the Soviet delegation at Geneva smiled, and that was not an artificial smile, but a natural one. We honestly and sincerely desire friendly

[1] G. P. Zadorozhni in *Soviet State and Law*, n. 8, 1955, cited by R. N. Carew Hunt, *Guide to Communist Jargon*, p. 31. Cf. also R. S. Schlesinger, ' Soviet Theories of International Law ' in *Soviet Studies*, 4 (1952–3), n. 3, pp. 334–338.

> relations with all countries. But if anyone expects us to abandon our aims and our conviction that the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are correct, then he is making a serious mistake. We can only assure those who expect this that they will have to wait until Easter and Whitsun fall on the same day. . . . We are for coexistence because there are two social orders, capitalism and socialism. We suggest that peaceful competition will show which is right.

There was not quite so long to wait until some of the teachings of Stalin had to be abandoned ; Khrushchev's famous denunciation of Stalin took place at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. He used the same occasion to remark that

> some people are trying to apply the absolutely correct thesis of the possibility of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems to the ideological sphere. This is a harmful mistake. It does not at all follow from the fact that we stand for peaceful coexistence and economic competition with capitalism that the struggle against bourgeois ideology, against bourgeois survivals, can be relaxed. Our task is tirelessly to expose bourgeois ideology, to reveal how inimical it is to the people and to show up its reactionary nature.

The year 1956 was also the year of the limited and successful Polish stand, in September, against Russia and of the catastrophic Hungarian rising, in October. These events must have confirmed Khrushchev in his view that coexistence must not be allowed to contaminate ideological purity. The first issue of *Partinaya Zhizn* for 1957 was quite explicit :

> It is necessary to recognize clearly that the peaceful coexistence of countries with different economic systems does not mean ideological disarmament. Under conditions of economic competition between the socialist and the capitalist systems, the ideological war between them will not die down but will be intensified.[1]

With this proviso about keeping the communist ideology intact, Khrushchev repeats and extends what his predecessors had said about peaceful coexistence. He loses no opportunity of professing his belief that, in the competition between the two systems, socialism will win over capitalism ; and he has had some difficulty in making it clear that he is not speaking of a military victory.

> We do not in the least mean [he said at the 1956 Party Congress] that the victory will be achieved by armed intervention of the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries. . . . We have already stressed, and now stress once again, that the establishment of a new social order in this or that country is an internal affair for the people of that country.

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[1] Cited in E. Crankshaw, *Khrushchev's Russia*, Penguin Special, 1959, p. 117.

At the time of his American tour, September 1959, he had to explain away a notorious phrase about ' burying capitalism ' ; and quite recently he has been complaining that he has been misrepresented, or misquoted, as saying that communism will conquer the world, when what, in fact, he said was that communism would win the world. Does Khrushchev ' protest too much ' ? The Marxist background of his utterances does little to reassure us. His ' Geneva smile ' is the smile on the face of the tiger ; or, if one prefers to vary the metaphor, his tactic of being conciliatory is the *reculer pour mieux sauter* of the predator in the presence of his intended victim.

* * *

Communist leaders since Lenin have spoken with divers voices on the subject of coexistence. But what if peaceful coexistence be, not a changing tactic, but part of the master strategy of Marxism? What if peaceful coexistence be, not Lenin's measure of political expediency, but a clear deduction from Leninist principles ? It has been argued by A. Leontiev that peaceful coexistence is a conclusion drawn from Lenin's ' law of the unequal development of capitalist countries '.[1] This law means that, while under industrial capitalism countries developed gradually in competition, it has now become possible, under colonialism or economic imperialism, to force the pace of development by pouring money into under-developed countries. The process means that the relative strength of capitalist powers changes according as the countries they exploit prove profitable or unprofitable investments. This, in turn, makes any stable or lasting agreement between capitalist powers impossible. Lenin drew the conclusion that ' economic imperialism ' inevitably led to war ; and orthodox communism points to the two World Wars as confirmation.

Now the unequal development of capitalist countries means their unequal ripening for the socialist revolution ; it means that there cannot be a simultaneous triumph of socialism the world over ; it means, in a word, coexistence. A further conclusion is drawn by Leontiev in the shape of

> a clear and precise answer to the question about what principles should regulate the relations between countries during the period of coexistence. . . . It is established that the Soviet Union should in no way use force to impose the communist revolution upon any people.

If in the matter of revolution ' ripeness is all ', it is, in the last analysis, the masses who decide when conditions are ripe. Any passage from one

[1] In *Communist*, 1954, n. 13, pp. 45 ff. Cf. G. A. Wetter, ' El Concepto Sovietico de Coexistencia ', in *Mensaje*, (Chile), 1959, n. 82, pp. 344–350, 392. The original text of this capital article—a lecture delivered in Bonn in August 1958—was unobtainable. On the ' law of unequal development ' cf. A. Pietre, *Marx et Marxisme*, Annexe XV, p. 200 ; R. N. Carew Hunt, *Theory and Practice of Communism*, pp. 161–167.

social system to another is decided by them, above all the vital transition from capitalism to socialism. Present day Soviet propagandists can, then, console themselves with the thought that peaceful coexistence is not a mask for aggressiveness and expansionism but rather the practical recognition of the fact that capitalism is not an eternal and immutable form of society.

So far Leontiev. Wetter, however, shows that a diametrically opposed conclusion is more consonant with Lenin's law of unequal development. Lenin, notwithstanding the peaceful expressions already noted, was a firm believer in violence. He was not prepared to wait patiently for the arrival of socialism as the inevitable fruit of a necessary historical and economic development. Marx, too, had been impatient with the slow grinding of the mills of history and spoke of shortening the birth-pangs of the new society. One would have expected the first successful revolution in the country most advanced industrially, for there the contrast between the classes should be greatest and the struggle sharpest. In fact the revolution came first in Russia, in 1917 one of the most backward countries economically ; industrialization had to wait until later. Here the birth-pangs were shortened with a vengeance—and the society so abruptly and abortively brought forth has shown, as premature babies often do, a remarkable stamina and resistence in later life. The events of the October Revolution of 1917 have influenced the communist ideology, as one would expect when that ideology has been ever since in the keeping of the architects of the revolution. It is explained that the revolution results not so much from the accentuation of class-differences, important though this be, as from conscious provocation of the class-struggle. ' What is it ', asked Stalin, ' that determines the weakness of capitalism in a country ? A certain minimum of industrial development, the presence of a minimum of industrialized proletariat as the vanguard of revolution and an ally (e.g. the peasantry) in the struggle with imperialism.' The special reasons for the triumph of the revolution in Russia were given by Stalin as firstly the particular violence of the revolutionary effort and, secondly, the particular hatefulness of the Tsardom it overthrew.[1]

The degree of economic development, then, is not decisive. The contradictions of capitalism were most clearly shown in Russia despite its comparative state of undevelopment. Revolution succeeds, in fact, not where capitalism is strongest but where it is weakest. The advantage of the ' law of unequal development ' was not merely that it provided an argument for ' socialism in one country ' but also that it rendered capitalism more vulnerable by creating a chain of unequally developed countries, which could always be attacked at its weakest link. Who is to be the ally counted upon by Stalin for the struggle ? Perhaps the peasant.

[1] Cf. A. Pietre, *Marx et Marxisme*, p. 201.

But might it not equally well be the victorious proletariat of a neighbouring country ? That possibility, which makes nonsense of protestations of peaceful coexistence, is not excluded by the ' law of unequal development ' ; on the contrary, it is even envisaged. ' Socialism in one country ' has, as has been seen, an obverse side, namely opposition to capitalism on the international level. World proletarian solidarity is invoked as a defence against alleged capitalist encirclement. The Comintern and its successor the Cominform existed to give effect to this solidarity.[1] Hence the sense of mission felt by Russia, as the first socialist nation, to hasten, in her own interests, other countries' paths to socialism. So Stalin could send his notorious telegram to the Spanish communist leader, José Diaz, in November 1936 :

> The toilers of the Soviet Union are doing but their duty in giving all possible assistance to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They are conscious that Spain's liberation from the yoke of Fascist reactionaries is not the private task of Spaniards, but the common cause of all advanced and progressive people.[2]

What does ' all possible assistance ' mean ? That it can mean military intervention is what the current peace propaganda vehemently denies. But forceful intervention in other countries to unleash a world revolution was very much in the minds of Lenin and Stalin in the early twenties, in the period when they saw coexistence less as peaceful than as an interlocking of contending forces. For Lenin the unification of the nations in socialism was possible only after a savage struggle between the socialist and reactionary (i.e. capitalist) countries. In his *Theses on the National and Colonial Questions* he said : ' All communist parties must give direct support to revolutionary movements of dependent nations or those whose rights are attacked (Ireland, for example, or the American negroes) and to colonies. . . . '[3] The October Revolution, according to Stalin, had ushered in a new age, the age of world revolution and of colonial revolution. For the revolution force was approved in principle. Force was justified when used by ' the progressive forces of society ' against the ' reactionaries and their political institutions '. In his *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* Stalin clarifies the distinction between a just and an unjust war. Unjust war is the war of aggression and rapine waged by capitalism ; just war is the people's self-defence against such attack, or their war of liberation from ' capitalist slavery ' represented by

[1] The Comintern was founded in March 1919 and abolished in May 1943 ; the Cominform was founded in September 1947 and abolished in 1956. It has been pointed out that in 1919 and again in 1947 the Soviet Union embarked upon an all-out campaign for the overthrow of the ' bourgeois ' world, while 1943 and 1956 mark tactical changes to a policy of collaboration and coexistence. Cf. J. M. Bochenski and G. Niemeyer, *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, pp. 245–6.

[2] Cf. W. Gottlieb and E. H. Carr in *Soviet Studies*, 3 (1951–2), n. 2, p. 196.

[3] G. A. Wetter, op. cit., p. 347 ; A. Piettre, op. cit., p. 205.

colonial status or some other condition of dependence. One of the contemporary Soviet commentators on this distinction, E. Konstantinov, points out that of just wars the most just of all are the civil wars of liberation from ' capitalist bondage '. Lenin, indeed, had sung a veritable paean of civil strife—' the only legitimate, just, holy (not in the priestly but in the humanist sense of the word) war. '[1] There can be little doubt that the violent conclusion follows more naturally from Lenin's ' law of unequal development ' than the pacific one. This is confirmed by communist practice.

* * *

This brings us to the third of the questions posed at the outset of this article : What has been the Soviet practice in the matter of coexistence ? What has been said so far might be said to be theory. But Marxism cannot remain on the theoretical level ; it is essentially an activist philosophy. Borrowing a phrase from Feuerbach, Marx called his philosophy a philosophy of *praxis*. ' Ideas alone ', he said in his work *The Holy Family*, ' can never take one beyond the old condition of the the world ; they can only take one beyond the *ideas* of the old condition of the world. To put ideas into practice men are required to execute them '. And the famous Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach runs : ' The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways ; the point, however, is to change it.'[2] In a word philosophy can no longer be merely descriptive ; action becomes the key to thought. Hegel, too, Marx's mentor, had said that the veritable being of a man was his action. Action for Marx meant revolutionary agitation.

The conception of *praxis* is important for Marx, for it provides an escape from an otherwise serious difficulty. If the course of history is determined, one might ask, what is the point in trying to do anything about it ? Why not be a fatalist rather than an agitator ? How can the birth-pangs of the new society be shortened ? Marxists now point out that, while the general pattern of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is determined, its rate is not ; and that certain points in the development are of especial importance. Every thesis, be it institution or stage of society, bears within itself the seeds of its own dissolution ; it ' secretes ' its own opposite or antithesis. And from the conflict of thesis and antithesis there is born a synthesis which preserves and elevates to a higher degree of actuality all that is of value in the stages that preceded it. The barley-grain (thesis) falling into the ground dies and grows into the stalk (antithesis) ; and from both comes the new ear (synthesis) multiplying the original grain tenfold. The French monarchy provoked its own opposite, Revolution ; and the Empire

[1] Cf. G. A. Wetter, op. cit., pp. 348–9.
[2] Cf. J. Hommes, *Koexistenz -philosophisch beleuchtet*, Bonn, 1957, p. 21.

which followed was the synthesis of both. Feudalism grows into its opposite, capitalism ; and communism is to be the final synthesis, preserving all that is good in both. Assuming that this dialectic really operates, it is clear that the important points are those at which thesis gives way to antithesis and antithesis to synthesis.

The thesis, it is explained, goes through a series of quantitative changes in the direction of the antithesis until, when a certain critical point is reached, the qualitative change into antithesis occurs. A vessel of water may be progressively heated, receiving, as it were, quantitatively more units of heat, without appearing to change radically. The advance from one degree of temperature to another is of a quantitative kind until the advance from 99°C to 100°C at which water changes its quality and becomes steam. So in the historical process a long series of imperceptible changes in, say, capitalism, will, at a given moment, yield to a violent upheaval, the transition to, say, socialism. The point, then, of agitation is that it accentuates the internal contradictions of capitalism and brings closer the ' dialectical leap ' of the communist revolution. The agitator is working with the historical process ; the reactionary is in futile opposition to it. It is better to be the aviator who acts in consonance with, and in fact makes use of, the absolutely determined laws of aerodynamics than to be the fool who thinks he is not subject to those laws. Liberty is, Hegel said, to understand the laws of historical development. The ancient Stoics had said much the same thing, meeting an objection similar to that put to Marx—*ducunt fata volentem, nolentem trahunt.*

Violence is of the very warp and woof of dialectical materialism ; it produces the critical ' dialectical leaps ' in the transition from one kind of society to another. The decree setting up the Red Army in 1918 recognized ' the necessity of creating a new army to be the bulwark of the present Soviet power and to serve as a support for future socialist revolutions in Europe.' The Austria and Germany of 1918 seemed to offer an opportunity of using the Red Army—at least Lenin wrote in that sense, on 4 October 1918, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party—but the occasion proved unpropitious. In 1921 there was armed intervention in Georgia in answer, it was said, to the appeal of the proletariat struggling in a ' war of revolution ' against the mensheviks. The Red Army was, the argument ran, performing the benevolent function of a midwife without whose offices the old society could not give birth to the new already formed in its womb.[1] This function of the Red Army has hardly changed with the passage of time. The ' Peoples' Democracies ' of Eastern Europe owe their existence to the Red Army and their continued existence to its abiding presence.

[1] Cf. G. A. Wetter, op. cit., p. 349 giving the text of the decree setting up the Red Army and Lenin's letter of 4 October 1918.

So much is admitted even by the official apologists like Konstantinov. (The latter says that Poland and Roumania at least were not ripe for the revolution. Excessive capitalism had not brought socialism to the gates ; on the contrary, strong vestiges of feudalism remained with an agrarian problem.) The Red Army enabled ' popular-democratic ' régimes to be set up without uprisings or major civil war.[1] The rape of Hungary in 1956 is too recent and too notorious an example of armed intervention and the use of the Red Army to be forgotten. All this, it must be insisted, can be justified in the Marxist ideology ; ultimately, perhaps, it is traceable to Hegel's glorification of war—' men ', he said, ' in peacetime sink into a decline.' It cannot be an accident that Hegel should figure prominently in the ancestry of both of the violent philosophies of our time, fascism and communism.

* * *

Peace is so evidently a good thing and the desire for it so basic a human desire that one is slow to accuse a fellow-man of the depravity of professing peaceful intentions without meaning them. None better than the communists know how to exploit such admirable human sentiments for their own ends—in this case to efface the memory of their past duplicity or to gain an important advantage for the future struggle. The considerations brought forward in this article suggest at the very least a prudent reserve with regard to the peaceful coexistence offered by communism—particularly when that coexistence is framed with conditions to consolidate the gains made by it in the past in defiance of every principle of law and morality.

One can conclude with G. A. Wetter that the present day official exposition of ' peaceful coexistence ' is quite inadequate as an account of the Soviet teaching and practice in the matter. It must be corrected and completed by, at least, these three propositions which are part of the Soviet ideology : (i) the era of peaceful coexistence is to be an era of political revolutions in the capitalist countries and of uprisings in colonial countries ; (ii) these revolutions will be unleashed with the support and help of ' victorious socialism '; and (iii) such help and support can, if necessary, extend to armed intervention.

There seems no good reason for thinking that Khrushchev has abandoned any of these propositions.

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[1] Ibid., p. 350.

Wars and Rumours of War

REFLECTIONS ON TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN TEACHING

by JOHN MURRAY

CHRISTIANITY is a religion of peace in spite of the title of militant Church on earth and even though many Christians have not shown themselves particularly peaceful. John the Baptist, the precursor, was to direct the feet of his people along the paths of peace, to prepare them for the advent of Christ, the Prince of peace. The first Christmas greetings were those of peace, peace to men of good will, and peacemakers have a special mark of honour among the Beatitudes. This Christmas peace is a peace of the spirit, in the first place, a serenity of mind and heart which finds expression in a loyal trust in and reliance on the Divine goodness, through a conscience dedicated to God's will and in communion with Jesus Christ. And it is a peace which ultimately only God can bestow. Yet it is intended to lead to a habit of peaceful relations with our fellow-men, whether these be considered individually or in their various groups. Christ's second commandment, second only to the paramount obligation of loving God, is that of love of the neighbour and, when challenged to say more explicitly who that neighbour was, Christ answered with the parable of the Good Samaritan, no slight essay in international relationship. The Kingdom of God, St Paul reminds us (Romans, xiv. 1–7), is not meat nor drink ; but it is justice, peace and joy in the Lord. ' Justice ' and ' peace ' are words that are intimately linked, whether we understand them theologically as justice through justification and peace through reconciliation with God, or as the justice that consists in right human behaviour and the harmony built upon it.

The purpose of Christ's teaching was to initiate men into the Kingdom of God, to open their eyes to truth and to raise them to a new and supernatural life and to a new status as adopted children of the Eternal Father. It threw fresh light on their human problems, detached them from imprisonment within or too great dependence on the world and caught them up in a continuous rhythm of charity which issued from and finally returned to God Himself. But it did not provide any hard and fast solution for many human situations. While it insisted that slaves must be treated humanely and with charity, it did not abolish slavery ; it established no form of human society or government though it proclaimed justice as its necessary foundation ; and, in particular, it did not prohibit the use of force as an instrument of justice, despite all its spirit and ideal of peace. Isolated texts can serve little purpose. The statement that

they who take the sword shall perish by the sword can be properly applied to men who deliberately resort to violence, and the celebrated counsel 'to turn the other cheek' provides one possibility of Christian perfection in accepting a personal humiliation but it by no means exempts a man from his duty of defending or protecting others. In fact, what is surprising in the New Testament, especially in the Epistles which record the era of maximum Christian detachment from the κόσμος or world, is the insistence that Christians are not only citizens of God's kingdom but citizens also of the world, with their civic duties and responsibilities which, as Christians, they must fulfil. Obedience to authority is a Christian duty, regardless of the character of those who wield it, unless of course authority would oblige them to some sin. Soldiers are told (Luke, iii. 12–4) they must not act violently, must not speak ill of their fellowmen and not grumble about their pay. They have a far more honourable mention in the New Testament than do the *publicani* and the Pharisees. St Augustine had a hatred of war which he accepted only as a necessary evil due to the general degradation of fallen mankind but he did not dismiss all employment of force as wrong. 'If the Christian religion [he wrote] condemned wars of every kind, the command given in the gospel to soldiers asking counsel about salvation would have been rather to cast away their arms, and withdraw wholly from military service ; whereas the words actually used were these : " Do violence to no man, neither accuse any man falsely, and be content with your pay ", the command to be content with their pay manifestly implying no prohibition to continue in the service.'[1]

TRADITIONAL TEACHING

There exists a traditional Christian teaching about war and peace. It may be discovered in St Augustine and the medieval Scholastics but, in greater detail, in sixteenth-century jurists such as Vitoria and Suarez. It derives in part from the New Testament with its insistence on justice and charity as the twin principles which should determine and guide a Christian's behaviour but it comes also from the attempt to subordinate the use of force to moral considerations. It has always been the Catholic contention that deliberate human action is subject to moral principles, that there exists in the nature of man a *lex naturalis*, an awareness of right and wrong with a knowledge of the basic laws of right and wrong, and that man is essentially subordinate to God as supreme Lord and Lawgiver. In other words, man is a *rational* and *responsible* person who may be expected to act both rationally and responsibly. Violence is irrational and irresponsible ; the proper manner to resolve differences and settle difficulties is through reason—discussion, negotiation, arbitration. If

[1] *Ep. ad Marcellinum*, ii. 9.

force has ever to be employed, this must be done *rationally* and *responsibly*, that is to protect men against violence or to remedy injustice. Catholic teaching will not accept the assumption that when a man acts in a public capacity or when a group of men act in the name of a community they are exempted from moral judgment.

My intention in this article is not merely to analyse this traditional teaching, though that in itself would serve a useful purpose, but to point out how various elements from this teaching are being re-asserted and re-emphasized in modern thinking, particularly in connection with the United Nations' Organization.

Briefly, we may say that, in this teaching, war is regarded as evil on account of the consequences it inevitably brings with it and the opportunities it offers for sin. Not that the use of force is in itself wrong ; we have come to accept it as necessary within the State ; it will always be necessary, in some form or other, in international relations. There are circumstances in which the use of force is justified. It should, however, be restricted in every possible way. And this applies, not only to an initial justification of its use but throughout the whole period of its employment ; to use legal terms, there is a *jus in bello* as well as a *jus ad bellum*.

Clearly, then, two extreme positions are excluded. The first, a complete pacifism, which regards all use of force in international affairs as wrong. The second, the fear that war has now become so vast and all-inclusive a phenomenon that it is useless to think of limiting or containing it by moral considerations. I say ' fear ' rather than ' belief ' for the vast majority of people are frightened by the possible consequences of this view. There are distinctions, once clearly accepted, e.g. between the civil population and military forces, which it is much more difficult to draw nowadays, and atomic weapons seem to render limitation or discrimination a purely academic matter.

This opinion is found or at least hinted at in the writings of specialists on international law. Lauterpacht has written : ' There are many who believe that the advent of aircraft and aerial bombing has, so far as their use is concerned, obliterated the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and that, as has often happened in the past, restraints of humanity and chivalry must yield to military necessity and to the potentialities of newly discovered weapons of offence.' [1] Schwarzenberger adds that ' at present, the principle of the protection of the enemy civilian population appears to apply at the most in favour of a residue of persons who fulfil two conditions. They must not be connected with the war effort and be remote from important target areas.'[2] Two pages

[1] *Oppenheim's International Law*, II, pp. 347 sqq.
[2] *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 22. My attention was drawn to this and the previous passage by my friend, Canon G. B. Bentley.

subsequently, Schwarzenberger comments upon what he considers a dangerous passage in Lauterpacht, namely : ' As laws are made not only for the protection of human life but also for the preservation of ultimate values of society, it is possible that should those values be imperilled by an aggressor intent upon dominating the world, the nations thus threatened might consider themselves bound to assume the responsibility of exercising the supreme right of self-preservation in a manner which, while contrary to a specific prohibition of International Law, they alone deem to be decisive for the ultimate vindication of the law of nations. '

JUS BELLI ODIOSUM

The traditional doctrine opens with a recognition that war is an unpleasant and horrible business. *Jus belli est odiosum*, declares Suarez, *et poena ejus est gravissima.* Therefore, *restringenda est quoad fieri potest.*[1] It must be subjected to as much limitation and restriction as possible. War is a *penal* operation, to be resorted to only when justice cannot be secured by any less drastic means and only as long as it remains the means necessary to secure that justice. The doctrine supposes that it is right to employ force under given circumstances and that occasions will arise in which justice cannot be maintained or injustice repressed in any other way. It permits this penal exercise to sovereign princes for the preservation of order in society since there exists no higher political tribunal that can enforce it. Suarez lays emphasis on this penal character of war :

> The power of waging war is *a kind of power of jurisdiction*, the exercise of which belongs to vindicative justice, which is most necessary within the commonwealth for the constraint of evil-doers. Thus, just as the supreme ruler can punish his subjects when they do harm to others, so he can exact satisfaction from another ruler or State which, by reason of an injustice committed, is subject to him. But this satisfaction cannot be sought from another judge, since the ruler of whom we are speaking has, in temporal matters, no superior : therefore, if the other ruler is not ready to give satisfaction, he can be forced to do so by war.[2]

The ruler who suffers injustice is therefore not only a victim but he becomes a judge in his own case. And it is the justice of his position which elevates him to this status. Vitoria makes this clear when he declares that, if there existed any judge competent to deal with the two adversaries, he would condemn the aggressive party and compel him to restore the land and property he had seized and to make good the expenses of the other side. But, he adds, ' a prince who is carrying on a just war is, *as it were*, his own judge in matters touching the war . . .

[1] *De Caritate*, xiii, 7, 4.
[2] *De Legibus ac de Deo Legislatore*, xiii, sect. ii, 2.

therefore he can enforce all these claims upon his enemy.'[1] I have italicized the two phrases 'a kind of power of jurisdiction' and 'as it were' to show that both Suarez and Vitoria were aware that they were arguing from analogy but the line of argument is sufficiently evident. Since there exists (or at the time existed) no higher international authority capable of deciding international disputes, the nation or country making a justified use of force against an enemy clearly in the wrong receives a kind of delegated authority from the *jus gentium*, which itself derives from the *lex naturalis*. It is thus in a privileged position and constituted judge in its own dispute. And this authority derives ultimately from *society* as a whole, that is, from the natural commonwealth of human beings. Vitoria declares that what is necessary for the government and preservation of society exists by natural law. The State may punish its citizens who are dangerous to it. But if a State can exercise this authority over its own citizens, 'society at large *no doubt* [italics again mine] can do it to all wicked and dangerous persons, and this can only be through the instrumentality of princes. It is therefore certain that princes can punish enemies who have done a wrong to their State, and that after a war has been duly and justly undertaken the enemy are just as much within the jurisdiction of the prince who undertakes it as if he were their proper judge.'[2]

In this Christian teaching only a legitimate ruler could resort to war. This outlawed private hostilities but it did not put the sovereign into an absolute position. The ruler remained subject to God and to the law. War was not recognized as an instrument of policy ; it was the last resort to prevent injustice or establish justice. With the growth of national States the older attitude was gradually modified.[3] The sovereign was

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[1] *De Jure Belli*, 431, 17.

[2] *De Jure Belli*, 431, 19. This principle is closely linked with the concept, adumbrated by Suarez and more fully analysed by Taparelli d'Azeglio in the nineteenth century, of a natural society of peoples, embracing all the human family, for which attempts have now been made to provide a positive structure by the League of Nations and U.N.O. In *De Legibus ac de Deo Legislatore*, II, xix, par. 9, Suarez insists that, in spite of every difference, the human race has a certain unity, not merely physical but also moral and political. Even though an individual State is a perfect community, in the technical sense that it has no political superior, it 'is also a member, *in a certain manner*, of the world, so far as the human race is concerned. . . . For this reason therefore they need some law whereby they may be directed and rightly ruled in this kind of communication and society (that is, in their mutual relationship).' Suarez adds that this law derives in great measure from the *lex naturalis* but that it includes also 'special laws arising from the various customs of different peoples.' It is this law which gives its sanction to the right use of force by sovereign princes, and the sanction depends upon the justice of their cause.

[3] Maurice Bourquin, in *Grotius est-il le Père du droit des gens ?* Geneva, 1948, p. 92, comments on this change of position : 'A la distinction entre les guerres justes et les guerres injustes, Grotius superpose, en effet, une autre distinction—toute différente—entre les guerres régulières et celles qui ne le sont pas. La régularité de la guerre, telle qu'il la comprend, est complètement indépendante de sa cause. Les conditions qu'elle exige ne sont plus des conditions de fond. Ce sont simplement des conditions de compétence et de forme. La guerre est régulière, dit-il, quand elle a lieu entre peuples différents, qu'elle est soutenue par le pouvoir souverain et qu'elle a fait l'objet d'une déclaration préalable. Rien de commun, par conséquent, entre cette distinction et celle du bellum justum. Nous sommes sur un tout autre terrain.'

considered to have the *jus belli et pacis* and to be capable of waging war on his own initiative. The idea of a *bellum justum* was not entirely abandoned and war was defined as a defence of a legal right. But in practice the ethics of war came to be restricted to the conduct of war ; they no longer centred round its causes. Both parties or several parties to a war were regarded as proper combatants, if they conformed to certain rules, for instance, a formal declaration of war and respect for neutral countries and to certain limiting conditions established by international conventions.

The traditional doctrine did not let rulers off so lightly. Vitoria maintains that a ruler's belief in the justice of his cause is not sufficient. For a war to be just, an ' exceedingly careful examination ' must have been made into the causes that might lead to war and the opinions of those who oppose it must be listened to. Should the war be doubtful or unjust, men of position in the State must do all they can to prevent it. A subject convinced of a war's injustice may not serve in it and soldiers are not excused if they fight in bad faith. Vitoria finds a place for the conscientious objector, in asserting that those whose conscience is against the justice of a war may not engage in it, whether their judgment of it be right or wrong.

The more recent attitude to war which has evolved in consequence of the two world wars and which receives its framework in the United Nations approximates closely, though with some differences, to the traditional teaching. The *jus ad bellum* has become a *jus contra bellum*. War is no longer regarded as a state of things that has to be accepted and then controlled through a number of conventions ; it is recognized as a danger and threat to the whole world. Men are learning that the only legitimate use of force will be to prevent it or, when it has actually developed, to bring it to an end.

AGGRESSIVE WAR

The distinction was formerly drawn between a just and an unjust war but the terms ' aggressive ' and ' defensive ' are also found. The injustice in question must be very serious and it must be aggressive in character, either as a direct attack of one country upon another, a grave infringement of essential rights or a severe act of injustice with far-reaching effects for the people and welfare of the injured country. The aggressor is the man or the nation that resorts to violence to secure what is not his or more than belongs to him by right or, in anger or embitterment, seeks to inflict grave damage upon a neighbour. It has been suggested that aggression is no longer a suitable term because all parties to a quarrel easily persuade themselves they are in the right or partially in the right and because, in human affairs, neither side is likely to be 100 per cent right or 100 per cent wrong, or for the reason that what appears to be

an aggressive act may be a justified tactical move on the part of a defender. This may well be true, but similar objections might be raised against the expressions, just and unjust. We are left with the rough and ready calculations which have to be adopted in assessing human behaviour and that, for all their lack of preciseness, serve reasonably well.

The term ' aggression ' is used in many recent statements. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles based Germany's obligation to pay reparations on the grounds that the Allies had been forced into war by German aggression. The Geneva protocol of 1924, article 10, defined aggression as an act of force which was either unlawful under international law or had been declared illegitimate through international arbitration. In the article it was stated that ' any State shall be presumed to be an aggressor if it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement . . . or to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award '. Granted that this is a legal, not an ethical conception, it none the less recognizes a distinction between two potential belligerents in terms of their attitude towards international law. The post-war trials at Nuremberg and Tokio made the initiation of aggressive wars a crime. The Charter of the United Nations is more explicit than was the covenant of the League. Its first agreed purpose is ' to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective action for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the *suppression of acts of aggression* or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and *in conformity with the principles of justice and international law*, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.'

The Charter aimed at something more radical than deciding which party was the aggressor in a given conflict ; the intention was to deal with the ' threat to peace ', if possible before it materialized. Further, in article 2, paragraph 4, the members of U.N.O. had agreed that they would ' refrain in their international relations from the *threat or use of force* against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations '—a considerable advance upon the situation under the League of Nations, when member States retained their right of armed intervention short of actual war. It is at this point, unfortunately, that the structure of U.N.O. has broken down. For the body entrusted with the task of determining the existence of ' any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or *act of aggression* ' and deciding what measures should be adopted to maintain or restore international peace and security was the Security Council, and this, because of the opposed interests of the Great Powers and their power of veto, has proved an ineffective and as yet nnworkable instrument. More recently, the General Assembly has made efforts to fill the lacuna created by the Council with a certain measure,

but only a partial measure, of success. M. Bourquin, in the article already quoted, finds in this altered attitude towards threats to and breaches of international peace a revival of the old doctrine of *bellum justum*, though the justice in question is a matter of legality and not ethics.

> La Chartre des Nations Unies, comme le Pacte de la Société des Nations, établit, en effet, une distinction fondamentale entre les belligérants, suivant qu'ils ont respecté ou non les règles de la Sécurité collective. L'etat qui viole ces règles fait une guerre illicite et les membres de l'organisation s'engagent à unir contre lui leurs efforts.
>
> Sans doute ce système diffère-t-il, à maints égards, du Bellum Justum. Il en diffère notamment en ce sens que, pour lui, ce ne sont plus les causes de la guerre qui constituent le facteur décisif, main bien la rupture de la paix. On distingue les belligérants, non d'après la justice intrinsèque de leurs prétentions, mais en tenant compte que l'un d'eux a pris l'initiative des hostilités, qu'il est l'aggresseur, tandis que son adversaire ne fait que riposter à l'attaque dont il est l'objet. N'empêche que les affinités sont évidentes. La doctrine du Bellum Justum réapparaît donc sous un nouveau visage, dans le droit positif de nos jours.[1]

The Charter originally envisaged a condition in international affairs in which the United Nations would be capable of dealing with these ' threats ' and ' breaches '—wars and rumours of wars, as I have referred to them in the title of this article. This would have meant that force could be employed only by the United Nations or in their name. War on the initiative of a national State would have been ruled out altogether. This may have influenced Pope Pius XII when he stated that recourse to force is not ' a legitimate solution for international controversies and a means for the realization of national aspirations. ' The statement appeared to involve some modification of the traditional doctrine which left the *bellum justum* as the last resort for repelling grave injustice. Yet, the Charter theory would maintain that abundant means exist to-day for negotiation and arbitration in international disputes so that a refusal to negotiate or accept an arbitral decision could be looked upon as tantamount to an aggressive attitude.

There is none the less one serious problem that arises from this doctrine of the United Nations, apart from the fact, already noted, that it has proved impossible to realize it adequately because of Great Power tension in the world and within the Security Council. The doctrine rests, of course, on a presumed community of interests, if not of principles, between the Great Powers since they alone can provide the pressure necessary to prevent these threats to war. The intervention proposed is based upon expediency rather than justice. It must look for a practical settlement, which means inevitably compromise, and it will assess the attitude of disputing parties in terms of their willingness to conform with

[1] op. cit., p. 91.

such a compromise and not in those of right and wrong. In other words, it has the weakness of any practical arrangement which does not coincide reasonably well with a just solution. Justice and peace are so intimately linked that it is impossible to have the latter without as large a measure of the former as can be achieved within the limits of human frailty and shortsightedness. The Eastern European countries cannot be said to enjoy peace under the Communist governments thrust upon them, and there are not a few peoples in Asia and Africa who think they have just claims to fuller independence. Even a United Nations' Organization, able to function without interior stress and strain, would find it no easy matter to deal with the justified claims of such countries for freedom and independence. It would not be sufficient—or even just—to threaten them with penalties for a breach of the peace unless there existed some flexible machinery at U.N.O. to deal with these demands and provide eventually a just solution.

There remains naturally an inherent right of self-defence in the event, not of a dispute but of direct attack. This is guaranteed to all members of U.N.O. and laid down in article 51 of the Charter. But any member of U.N.O. that is engaged in self-defence has to make two declarations, the first of fact, admitting that it is engaged in warfare, the second in terms of law, stating its claim to wage a legitimate war.

LIMITING CONDITIONS

The traditional teaching does not rest content with the discrimination between just and unjust or between aggression and defence. It lays down a number of strictly limiting conditions. We must now examine the more important of these.

In the first place, since war is a *res odiosa*, it may be envisaged only as a *last resort*, to be employed when all possibilities of a peaceful settlement have been exhausted. If, as we have seen, the *jus gentium* puts the ruler of the injured country in a privileged position, making him judge precisely because he has been made victim, the same *lex gentium* supposes that serious efforts have been made to settle the dispute that may have given rise to the unjust action. Vitoria declares that the prince is obliged before having recourse to war, ' to propound the just cause of his making war to the State with which he stands in dispute and to ask for adequate restitution. If that State offers restitution, *he is obliged to accept it* and to desist from war ; and if he does not do so the war which he wages *is an unjust war.*'[1]

The opportunities for negotiation and arbitration have now been so abundantly provided—through U.N.O., the International Court of Justice and other bodies—that it is difficult to imagine a situation, short

[1] *De Legibus ac de Deo Legislatore*, xiii. sect. 7, 3.

of direct attack, in which disputes could not be settled with a modicum of good will on either side. So many emotional elements enter into international questions, for instance, *amour propre*, sensitiveness, undue self-importance, that governments find it hard to take a detached view of a difficulty with another country and, even if they were capable of doing so, might not have sufficient moral courage in an atmosphere of popular sentiment or indignation. But negotiation is a rational process in which there will be arguments and claims put forward by both parties and where reason should be able to arrive at a fair settlement. And arbitration presupposes a similar rational approach to the question. They are an assertion that, as man is a *rational* and *responsible* being, he may be expected to behave *rationally* and *responsibly* in a public and representative capacity as well as in his personal conduct. A rational and responsible approach to international questions supposes implicitly the quality of justice, for it is the function of reason to discover, and that of responsibility, to realize it.

It should be noted that the Pact of Paris, proposed by M. Briand and Mr Kellogg in 1928 and signed by fifteen nations, goes even further than admitting war as a *last resort* : it professes to outlaw it altogether, at least on behalf of the governments who signed the pact. Article I states that the contracting parties ' condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of policy in their relations with one another. ' The number of signatories has since been considerably extended and some sixty nations have subscribed to it.

The Charter of U.N.O. treats naturally of breaches of the peace as they affect the world rather than individual nations that might be engaged in them. It is assumed that any war and war anywhere are harmful to international peace and security. It is interesting to find that a similar notion, with some obvious limitations, is presented in the traditional teaching. This is expressed in the statement that the general interests of Christendom or international society may take precedence over and invalidate an otherwise just cause of war or, in other words, that there may be reasons why a ruler justified in employing force against an adversary may have to refrain from this action because of its wider implications. Vitoria is very explicit :

> Now much attention must be paid to the admitted fact that a war may be just and lawful in itself and yet owing to some collateral circumstance may be unlawful. For it is admitted that one may be entitled to recapture a city or a province and yet that, because of some scandal, this may become quite unlawful. For, inasmuch as wars ought [only] to be waged for the common good, if some one city cannot be recaptured without greater evils befalling the commonweal, such as the devastation of many great cities, great slaughter of human beings, provocation of princes, occasions

> for new wars for the destruction of the Church . . . it is indubitable that the prince is bound rather to give up his own rights and abstain from war.[1]

A further passage indicates that Vitoria, while assessing in the first place the harm such wars could bring to Christendom or to countries with a Christian population, is also thinking in terms of human society and the world as a whole :

> Since any one State is part of the world as a whole, and since especially a Christian province is part of the State, if war is made with advantage to one province or republic but with loss to the world or to Christendom, *I think that the war would be unjust.*[2]

PROPORTIONS

The Charter of U.N.O. harmonizes with the older Christian teaching in treating war as a last resort and finding it just or justified only when it is carried out on behalf of and with the approval of U.N.O. It emphasizes as does the traditional outlook, the consequences of war between individual nations or groups of nations as a threat to society as a whole.

The classical doctrine puts forward a number of ratios or proportions which have to be borne in mind in assessing the legitimacy of a recourse to arms. Behind this is a simple philosophy. Weapons may not be employed for aggrandizement or violence or made to serve emotions or national feeling. Their one justification takes account of man's rational and responsible nature ; they may be used to repel an unjust attack, to repair injustice or preserve justice. To take up arms should presuppose a careful, objective and honest enquiry into the justice of one's action. But as a rational decision, it must include other considerations apart from that of the just cause. This calls for certain ratios or proportions.

To begin with, there must be a proportion between the harm inflicted upon the injured party by the injustice and the damages likely to be incurred in a war to redress it. Vitoria's opinion on this point has already been quoted as far as wider interests are concerned. We pass here from the *jus ad bellum*, the conditions which may justify recourse to arms, to the *jus belli*, the principles to which warfare is still to be subordinated. If a war, however justified because of the infliction of a grave injury, is certain or likely to result in wholesale damage and destruction, there is a want of proportion between the rectification of the injustice and the inevitable costs of its rectification. Since the use of force—to remain justified—must be rational, it demands some such proportion, and accordingly, in this instance, the war, despite the justice of its original cause, becomes unjustified because of its certain or at least very likely

[1] *De Jure Belli*, 446, 33.
[2] *De Potestate Civili*, 135.

results. This is, in effect, the doctrine proposed by Vitoria. At once the objection occurs to mind that, if this condition be postulated, a smaller country would never be able to defend itself against unjust treatment by a stronger neighbour for the damage involved in warfare against that State, even should it prove successful, would be enormous, and out of all proportion to the affront. The answer is, I think, that this may well be so when the injury is in the political or economic order, but that where moral and spiritual values are at stake, the proportion is not to be assessed solely in material terms. Otherwise, many an heroic struggle against great odds—from Thermopylae to Finland—would be excluded as unjustified. Love of liberty and independence has not infrequently forced its way through seemingly impossible odds to be crowned with an eventual victory out of all proportion to material assessments.

A second proportion has to be found between the appeal to force and the objective against which that force is directed. A just cause and a defensive war do not provide *carte blanche* for indiscriminate methods of warfare or for the total destruction of the enemy. Again, the simple philosophy behind this reminds us that the purpose of a just war is to remove injustice or defend justice : when the injustice has been removed and the justice maintained, that purpose has been accomplished. A continuation of hostilities is unjustified. Further, the amount of force employed should be adequate and sufficient to achieve its legitimate object. It is here that the principle of limitation and discrimination is most evident. War as a lawful procedure has a definite objective which and which alone it is entitled to reach. This principle underlies the various attempts to distinguish between categories of persons, combatants and non-combatants, guilty and innocent, and to provide some protection for hospitals and the Red Cross, and for prisoners of war. It is again from this principle that the grave doubt arises whether atomic weapons could be employed legitimately precisely because their consequences cannot apparently be restricted but escape from human control. This reference to human control takes us back to the philosophy behind this older teaching. If war is the rational exercise of force for a just purpose, then not only must the cause be subject to reasonable assessment but the means employed during hostilities must be reasonably directed against their proper objective. Indiscrimination is as irrational as it is irresponsible.

Vitoria lays down two canons for the ethics of warfare. When a just war has broken out it must not be waged in such a way that it will ruin the people against whom it is being legitimately directed but only to the extent that is required to secure one's rights and the defence of one's country, and with the purpose that from war peace and security may arise once again. A little reflection will show that a policy like that of unconditional surrender goes far beyond—and contradicts—what is

proposed in these sentences. And how far removed from our wartime propaganda are the gentle warning words of St Augustine :

> Think, then, of this first of all, when you are arming for the battle, that even your bodily strength is a gift of God : for considering this, you will not employ the gift of God against God Himself. . . . Peace should be the object of your desire ; war should be waged only as a necessity and waged only that God may deliver men from that necessity and preserve them in peace. For peace is not sought in order to the kindling of war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained.[1]

Vitoria's second canon advises that, when the war has been won, the victory should be used with moderation and Christian humility, and the victor should consider himself in the position of a judge between two States—the first that has committed the injury, the second that has been its victim, so that the verdict he delivers will be that of a judge rather than an accuser ; it will afford due satisfaction to the State offended and yet involve the offending country ' in the least degree of calamity and misfortune ', though individual offenders may be punished ' within lawful means '. The notion of war criminals, that is that individuals may be held responsible and punished for their part in initiating aggression and employing unjust methods of war is by no means new.

A further balance has to be sought between the damage likely to ensue from military operations and the reasonable prospect of successful defence. If the latter is very slight, the teaching suggests that it is wrong to have recourse to force, even though the cause be sound. The prospects of victory or resistance are slender ; the damage clearly outweighs those all too vague hopes. That this is a commonsense attitude no one would question. But there remains the *caveat* that in the final instance there is no obvious proportion between material and spiritual values, and that, as has been said before, there are human treasures of the spirit of man which it would be cowardly to abandon even when confronted with the greatest odds. I am not advocating a gospel of suicide rather than surrender or opening a school of ' last-ditch ' thinking but merely warning that spiritual and material factors cannot ultimately be weighed in the same balance.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted in these pages to analyse the traditional Christian teaching on peace and war. It did not reject all use of force in dealings between States but it insisted that force should be employed only in a just cause, in what may be termed generally a defensive, not an aggressive

[1] *Ep. ad Bonifatium*, 189, 6.

war. Even this permitted use of force was restricted by a number of proportions that had to be borne in mind and which called for a reasonable appraisal of the consequences of warlike action in the light of the injustice that had occasioned them. Additional limits were placed on the methods that might be adopted in warfare and the extent to which operations might be prolonged. I have also endeavoured to show how the doctrine of peace and war, enshrined in the Charter of U.N.O., approximates quite closely to this traditional teaching. The older doctrine makes it clear that approval was given to a just war only because there existed no higher political tribunal to which disputes between countries might be referred, and the effects of all wars on the entire world were carefully considered. U.N.O. was established after the second world war to provide such a higher tribunal.

Unfortunately, the hopes aroused by the establishment of U.N.O. have been only partially realized, and this was perhaps inevitable. But it should not be forgotten that much of the work directed from U.N.O. headquarters has been most valuable. The International Labour Office continues to function effectively—the one important link with the older League of Nations. The World Health Service and the various financial and economic committees have already given very generous aid to underdeveloped lands. Close co-operation between men and women from so many different countries has created not only friendliness and understanding between individuals but an international mentality—with a detachment and objectivity that are wholly admirable. The irony is that U.N.O. has failed at the precise point where it took such pains to insure against failure, the failure of the older League. In the view of the men who elaborated the U.N.O. structure, the League had failed because it lacked a strong executive body that would act on its behalf in an international emergency. The Security Council, consisting of the five Great Powers and of six other countries elected for a two year period, was to provide this energetic and executive arm. The architects of the scheme took for granted far too easily that the Great Powers, on which action must inevitably depend, would have, if not common principles, at least interests sufficiently in common, that they would collectively deal with threats to and breaches of international peace. The division between the Western Powers and Russia, with Communist China looming mysteriously in the background, and the right of veto accorded to the Great Powers have made it impossible for the Security Council to take action in a serious situation. The one occasion when such action could be and was actually taken was in the Korean crisis, and then only because the Soviet representative had withdrawn from the Council. As a result, schemes of collective defence action have been initiated, not properly by U.N.O. but through regional alliances, for which incidentally provision is made in the Charter, such as N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. in Asia.

The problem of war and peace has become in practice the problem of how Western countries are to organize protection for themselves against possible Communist aggression, and it has been immensely complicated by the development of atomic weapons and the more recent balance in such weapons achieved by Soviet Russia. Of these topics I hope to say something in a subsequent article.

A final word. I have noted how the doctrine of a just war is made dependent in the traditional teaching upon the *jus gentium*, a body of laws or basic principles inherent in the minds of men as rational and responsible beings and that find positive expression in the customary laws of States. Vitoria declares that the *jus gentium* has behind it the authority of the entire world, that is of all men, that is of man's rational mind. The world, he states, which is, *in a way* (he is arguing, as always in this matter, from analogy), a single commonwealth, has the power to make laws that are binding on all men : the laws of the *jus gentium* are of this kind. No State can contract out from its obligations under the *jus gentium*, for 'it has been established by the authority of the whole world'.

Taparelli d'Azeglio, in the nineteenth century, developed this notion of an international society or world community in considerable detail ; the natural term of man's development must be this society. Man's nature impels him towards it, as do his various interests and requirements. As individuals, men and women are mutually interdependent : so also, argues Taparelli, are different peoples, The final term of this natural tendency will be the international society, in which order will be maintained and peace secured as is the case within national societies.

> Such [he writes] is the natural development of the nations ; they all tend towards a certain community of interests which must be regulated according to the principles of order and of justice. Thence comes a definite international society, in which each nation has an interest in desiring the maintenance of order. This society is the outcome of a tendency common to all peoples ; and unless nature is accidentally and violently frustrated in its proper evolution, all the nations cannot fail to come and take their place in this international society. The community of interests, the communication of ideas, the sympathy of human characters—all these are real, positive benefits which unite the nations in so close a union that any one of them, even the most remote and the least important, cannot be disturbed with political disorders, without all the others feeling in greater or less measure the reactions of this disturbance.[1]

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[1] *Saggio Teorico di Diritto Naturale*, bk. vi, chap. iii, art. I, 1360–1361.

Mr. John Eppstein's work on *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*, published in 1935, deals with the Christian teaching on the Natural Society of Nations, the history of international arbitration and the expression of these ideas in the League of Nations, the structure and activities of which are treated in great detail. The book considers also the Christian attitude to war and peace. It is a most valuable work, the best that I know on the subject in the English language.

Tragic Picaresque:

OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE BIOGRAPHICAL ASPECT[1]

by JOHN MONTAGUE

By his own art who justly died,
A blundering, artless suicide ;
Share, earth-worms share, since now he's dead,
His megrim, maggot-ridden head.[2]

THE usual biographical portrait of Goldsmith is a sad travesty : there must be few cases where biographical irrelevancies have distorted the qualities of a writer as much. It is partly the fault of the Johnsonian idolators ; by the time Percy's long delayed *Memoir* of Goldsmith appeared in 1801, Goldsmith had already been cast in his rôle of foil for Dr Johnson by Hester Thrale Piozzi, Sir John Hawkins and Boswell. And not merely foil but fool as well : anecdotes illustrating Goldsmith's absurdity, his voluble simple-mindedness abound in memoirs of the period. Among his distinguished contemporaries, only Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his recently discovered prose portrait of Goldsmith, manages to create a consistently fair portrait of someone who was, after all, to use Johnson's expression, ' a very great man '.

To make it more painful, this melancholy process of distortion had already begun during Goldsmith's lifetime. And not merely in the relative privacy of saloon or coffeehouse, but in the brutality of print. There was the open letter in the *London Packet* of 24 March 1773, ridiculing Goldsmith's affection for Mary Horneck, the pretty daughter of a Devonshire lady to whom he had been introduced by Reynolds.

> The happy knack which you have learned of puffing your own compositions provokes me to come forth. You have not been the editor of newspapers and magazines, not to discover the trick of literary *humbug*. But the gauze is so thin, that the very foolish part of the world see through it, and discover the Doctor's monkey face and cloven foot. Your poetic vanity is as unpardonable as your personal ; would man believe it, and

[1] This 'reading' of Goldsmith's life is based upon Dr R. M. Wardle's *Oliver Goldsmith* (Constable : London, 1958. 25s.) of which it is, obliquely, a review. The majority of the contemporary quotations are therefore via Dr Wardle.

[2] By William Kenrick, a Grub-Street writer of the period, who pursued Goldsmith with extraordinary viciousness throughout his life (quoted by Wardle from Prior's *Life of Oliver Goldsmith*). He attacked his first book, *The Enquiry* ; his second, *The Bee* ; the *Essays* of 1765. He even attacked him under the anonymity of a *History of England in a Series of Letters from a Nobleman*. He was probably responsible for the charge of plagiarism from Percy's *Reliques* (*St James Chronicle*, July 18–21, 1767), and for the *London Packet* attack. It is very much a Conradian and *Secret Sharer* relationship and shows that Goldsmith was capable of inspiring extreme malevolence and hatred.

> will woman bear it, to be told, that, for hours, the *great* Goldsmith will stand surveying his grotesque orang-outang figure in a pier glass. Was but the lovely H——k so much enamoured, you would not sigh, my gentle swain, in vain.

This is pure Paul Slickey, of course, and despite Dr Johnson, Goldsmith was right to protest. His reply makes honourable reading, and marks one of the first recorded protests against the activities of the gossip columnist in modern journalism.

Other articles were less openly vicious, but equally damaging in their creation of an image of Goldsmith as an absurd, i.e., essentially non-serious figure. *The Westminster Magazine* which had published ' Humorous Anecdotes of Dr Goldsmith', in which he was described as the ' Sancho Panza of English literature ', printed a second instalment in the month of his death. Even his friends collaborated in the distortion : there is more than just petulance in Goldsmith's protest against Johnson's familiarity—' I have often desired him not to call me *Goldy*. ' Goldsmith could not but be aware that the public picture of him as an eccentric was partly obscuring his real achievement.

Goldsmith's ill luck is particularly noticeable in the period immediately after his death, those years in which memoirs, collected editions and biographies begin to create the basis of a writer's subsequent reputation. He was excluded from the major critical survey of the century, Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, on technical grounds : how unlucky he was may be judged from the fact that *The Lives* ends with Lyttleton, who died in 1773, the year before Goldsmith. As Macaulay said, ' the line seems to have been drawn expressly for the purpose of excluding the person whose portrait would have most fitly closed the series.' The ' official ' biography planned by Percy, and designed to preface an edition of Goldsmith's works, was delayed repeatedly, although Percy had shown Boswell the materials as early as 1775. At one time, Percy transferred the task to Johnson, but the latter postponed the work for the same reason as he had excluded Goldsmith from *The Lives of the Poets*, i.e., the non-availability of certain of Goldsmith's writings, held by the publisher Carnan. Johnson died, and as we have seen, his first biographers created the picture of Goldsmith as ' Dr Minor ', one of Johnson's many satellites. When Percy's *Memoir* finally appeared—after many further technical delays and disputes—it had been suitably ' doctored ' by the publisher in order to cater to the already powerful popular image of Goldsmith as picaresque clown. And Reynold's intelligent and friendly character sketch was never finished : Goldsmith was, clearly, to be as unlucky in death as he was in life.

The efforts of nineteenth century writers like Thackeray, Macaulay and Scott to redress the balance in favour of Goldsmith are equally unsatisfactory. From amusement at the absurdity of the ' gooseberry

fool ' to pity for the gentle romantic, is only another stage in condescension. Thackeray's bubbling essay in *English Humourists of the Eighteenth Century* rivals MacKenzie in its portrait of ' a man of feeling ' :

> What is the charm of his verse, of his style, and humour ? His sweet regrets, his delicate compassion, his soft smile, his tremulous sympathy, the weakness which he owns ? Your love for him is half pity. . . . He carries no weapon—save the harp on which he plays to you ; and with which he delights great and humble, young and old, the captains in the tents, or the soldiers around the fire, or the women and children in the villages, at whose porches he stops and sings his simple songs of love and beauty.

' Simple songs of love and beauty ' seems hardly an accurate description of *The Traveller* and *The Deserted Village*. But the Goldsmith of the nineteenth century is mainly the Goldsmith of *The Vicar of Wakefield*, which Thackeray calls ' that sweet story ' and which Goethe described as one of the best novels ever written, although in terms more appropriate to a religious tract than a serious novel.

> The delineation of this character on his course of life through joys and sorrows, the ever-increasing interest of the story, by the combination of the entirely natural with the strange and the singular, makes this novel one of the best which has ever been written ; besides this, it has the great advantage that it is quite moral, nay, in a pure sense, Christian —represents the reward of a goodwill and perseverance in the right, strengthens an unconditional confidence in God, and attests the final triumph of good over evil. . . .

Scott recommends *The Vicar* in similar terms, describing it as 'one of the most delicious morsels of fictitious composition on which the human mind was ever employed '. What strikes Macaulay—and the average modern reader—i.e. the confusions and absurdities of the latter part of the narrative, indicating a considerable division of purpose in the author's mind, seems to Scott artistically, and more important, for the nineteenth century mind, *morally* perfect.

> We read the *Vicar of Wakefield* in youth and age. We return to it again and again, and bless the memory of an author who contrives so well to reconcile us to human nature. . . . In too many works of this class the critics must apologize for or censure particular passages in the narrative as unfit to be perused by youth and innocence. But the wreath of Goldsmith is unsullied ; he wrote to exalt virtue and expose vice . . .

If the nineteenth century picture of Goldsmith is correct, then he is the most diaphanous figure in English literature.[1]

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[1] My wife informs me that there is an expurgated French schools' edition of *The Vicar of Wakefield*. All Victorians are moral, but some are more moral than others ! A modest prize is offered to anyone who can guess the expurgated passage.

The prime fact is, surely, that during the period from 1759 (the date of publication of Goldsmith's first book, *An Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe*) to his death in 1774—a period of twenty-five years—Goldsmith was producing the best work in England in three different literary forms : poetry, the drama and the essay. During those twenty-five years, Samuel Johnson, the acknowledged dictator of English literature, produced little or nothing (*Rasselas* appeared in 1759, and the *Lives of the Poets* in 1779–81 ; only the edition of Shakespeare and a few minor pamphlets appeared during Goldsmith's creative career). Gray's best work was already published, *The Elegy in a Country Churchyard* in 1751, his *Pindaric Odes* in 1757. The novel, of course, was thriving, but it was not as fully respectable and accepted a literary form. Goldsmith was therefore, to all intents and purposes, the foremost *practising* writer in England, for nearly twenty-five years.

A brief chart will illustrate the comparative vacuum in which Goldsmith worked. It will also show the peculiar position he found himself in as an adherent to Augustan critical standards. The majority of the poets usually regarded as signifying a transition to the poetry of 'sentiment', like Thomson, Young, Gray and Collins, had already published their work. In terms of technique, therefore, Goldsmith was a reactionary ; his two major poems, *The Traveller* and *The Deserted Village*, are the last in the neo-classical tradition which stretches from Dryden onwards, through Pope and Johnson. Johnson's *Lives of the Poets* is, of course, the classic statement of reactionary Augustanism, but his poetry had appeared in the first half of the century. Although a chart may appear a drastically simplified method of argument, it exposes precisely those conditions and influences of which a working creative writer might be most conscious.

1742 Collins, *Persian Eclogues.*
1742–47 Young, *Night Thoughts.*
1743 Blair, *The Grave.*
1747 Collins, *Odes.*
1748 Thomson, *The Castle of Indolence.*
1749 Johnson, *The Vanity of Human Wishes.*
1750 Johnson, *Rambler* began.
1751 Gray, *Elegy in a Country Churchyard.*
1755 Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language.*
1757 Gray, *Odes* ; Collins, *Oriental Eclogues.*
1758 Johnson, *The Idler* began.

1759 Johnson, *Rasselas* ; Goldsmith, *Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe.*
1761 Churchill, *The Rosciad* ; Colman, *Jealous Wife.*

1762 Goldsmith, *The Citizen of the World* ; Macpherson, *Fingal.*
1763 Smart, *A Song To David.*
1764 Goldsmith, *The Traveller* ; Churchill, *Gotham.*
1765 Goldsmith, *Essays* ; Percy's *Reliques.*
1766 Goldsmith, *The Vicar of Wakefield.*
1768 Goldsmith, *The Goodnatur'd Man.*
1770 Goldsmith, *The Deserted Village.*
1771 Beattie, *The Minstrel.*
1773 Goldsmith, *She Stoops to Conquer* ; John Byrom, *Miscellaneous Poems.*
1774 Goldsmith, *Retaliation.*

There is little evidence that Goldsmith's contemporaries really appreciated the extraordinary nature of his achievements, his clear predominance in so many fields. The main reason, to judge by Dr Wardle's biography, was personal ; his appearance and character were too much against him. Small in stature, he had a persistent stammer, and his face was pitted with smallpox. Socially, he had no advantages either ; he was Irish, a poor parson's son, with no friends or relatives to assist him in an artistic career. And both appearance and background were important in eighteenth century England, as the lives of Johnson and Pope demonstrate. But they might have been overlooked, in view of his considerable talents, had Goldsmith's character not seemed permanently marked by powerful feelings of inferiority. The disparity between gifts and behaviour was too strong ; Goldsmith's extravagant clothes, his vanity, his chatter were taken as outward signs of vulgarity of mind. He was in short both ugly and a fool, and some of his contemporaries, like Horace Walpole and Boswell, did not scruple about saying so.

Goldsmith's life, therefore, as seen in Dr Wardle's new biography, appears under two aspects. On the surface it seems pure eighteenth century picaresque—the misspent youth, the misfortunes and hilarious pranks, the period of unorthodox travel in search of adventure and fortune. And, as in *Roderick Random* or *Peregrine Pickle*, the hero finally makes good and wins his rightful place in society. On that level, Goldsmith's life seems only to testify to the accuracy of the eighteenth century novelist in depicting the career of the ' outsider '. But the final impression is more tragic than comic, for Goldsmith was never really accepted. He was never offered a pension, like Johnson, or—to point the moral more obviously—like James Beattie, author of *The Minstrel.* It was his countryman Hugh Kelly, not Goldsmith, who was the acclaimed dramatist of the period. Nor was he accepted socially : he was the continual butt of class conscious remarks about his appearance (he looked like ' a low mechanic . . . a journeyman tailor ', said Frances Reynolds, Sir Joshua's sister, a typical remark) and behaviour.

Goldsmith's envy of others came in for particular comment. On closer examination, however, many of the incidents told to illustrate Goldsmith's jealous nature seem to return, like boomerangs, against the teller. Mrs Thrale, for instance, reports that on hearing people speak of the great success of Hugh Kelly's appalling sentimental comedies Goldsmith consoled himself by gazing into a mirror, murmuring audibly, 'A handsomer fellow than Kelly, however'. This delicious piece of doubled self-mockery (for Goldsmith does not, despite his gaudy clothes, seem to have been under any illusion about his looks) is read as envy ! And considering Goldsmith's critical views on comedy, his lifelong war for an improvement in the English theatre, his bitter personal disappointments in that field (*The Good Natur'd Man* only ran briefly, and was censured as 'low', while *She Stoops To Conquer* was delayed in production for several years by the stupidity of the theatre manager) it shows great restraint. If, as Topham Beauclark claimed, the success of Kelly's *The School for Wives* 'almost killed Goldsmith with envy', there was very good reason for it, and his friends should have understood.

The most outstanding and brutal example of impercipience on the part of Goldsmith's friends is credited to Johnson. When Goldsmith, who had only recently been severely ill and was heavily in debt, demanded why James Beattie should receive a pension for one book, while he, Goldsmith, received nothing, despite his many publications, Johnson answered : 'Ah, Doctor, there go many Sixpences to make one Guinea.' Considering that the 'Sixpences' include *The Traveller*, *The Vicar of Wakefield*, *The Deserted Village*, and *She Stoops to Conquer*, all Goldsmith's best work, in fact, and that Johnson was himself a pensioner, and creatively comatose, the remark is unforgiveably vicious.

Much of Goldsmith's envy, therefore, is clearly due to his strong sense of unrewarded merit. If, as we have shown, he was the foremost practising writer of his period, it was quite natural that he should be enraged at seeing bad writers, like Kelly and Beattie, whose work contravened the critical principles he had so clearly advocated from *The Enquiry* onwards, gain great and unmerited success. Similarly, many of the anecdotes concerning Goldsmith's absurdity can be attributed to an ebullient and rather Irish sense of humour, which was not appreciated at the Literary Club. When Goldsmith descended from his work, he was looking for relaxation ; but he came into a company dominated by Dr Johnson, whose full creative force was now reserved for conversational effect. There is the anecdote of William Cooke, meant to illustrate Goldsmith's idiocy, but in reality, as any Irish reader will immediately see, showing Goldsmith's use of absurd country humour to offset Johnson's heavy T.V. pundit's approach.

Goldsmith and Johnson were dining on rumps and kidneys at the King's Head Tavern in Holborn and Johnson observed :

'Sir, these rumps are pretty little things, but then a man must eat a great many of them before he fills his belly.'

'Aye,' said Goldsmith, 'but how many of these would reach to the moon?'

'To the moon! aye, Goldy, I fear that exceeds your calculation.'

'Not at all, Sir, I think I could tell.'

'Pray then, Sir,' said Johnson, growing interested, 'let us hear.'

'Why, one if it were long enough.'

Johnson was deeply displeased and murmured to himself for a while, before declaring: 'Well, Sir, I have deserved it; I should not have provoked so foolish an answer by so foolish a question.'

Again, Goldsmith is reported as saying, after an argument at the Club: ''Tis strange now . . . that I should be defeated so in this argument; for I have talked it over all morning by myself and had the better of you all to nothing.' This, surely, was intended to be ironic, but it is taken seriously by Mrs Thrale. The basis of the trouble seems to have been differing ideals of company and conversation. 'It was agreed', said Sir Joshua Reynolds of his conversations with Goldsmith, 'that it was not superior parts, or wisdom, or knowledge that made men beloved—that men do not go into company with a desire of receiving instruction, but to be amused—that people naturally avoid that society where their minds are to be kept on the stretch.' And Goldsmith was condemned to a literary society where the mind was kept 'on the stretch'. It had not always been so; there is a suggestion of nostalgia in Goldsmith's account of the Scribblers' Club in his essay on Parnell.[1]

> The friends to whom, during the latter part of his life, he was chiefly attached were Pope, Swift, Arbuthnot, Jervas and Gay. Among these he was particularly happy, his mind was entirely at ease, and gave a loose to every harmless folly that came uppermost. Indeed, it was a society, in which of all others, a wise man might be foolish without incurring any danger or contempt.

Goldsmith's main failure, therefore, was personal. His contemporaries did not recognize in him that combination of moral weight and scholarly seriousness which they expected in a leading man of letters, and of which Johnson was a living example.[4] And, however great one's sympathy for Goldsmith, there is a residual impression of insecurity and confusion, amounting almost to the pathological. He needed money to maintain his position as a leading man of letters, but he did not need *that* much;

[1] Donald Davie has some very acute comments on the change in 'sensibility' in the eighteenth century as reflected in diction (*Purity of Diction in English Verse*, pp. 13–17). He typifies Johnson's diction as 'bourgeois' and 'pious'.

by the time he achieved fame he was already fixed in habits of extravagance and waste. Exhausted by hackwork, by mounting debts, probably also by the whole pattern of humiliation and loneliness in which his life seemed cast, he died in his mid-forties, to the surprise of his relatively secure and sensible friends. When the Doctor attending asked if his mind was at ease, he said, 'No, it is not'. While avoiding the sentimentality of Thackeray ('one's anger is aroused . . . at the notion that a creature so very gentle and weak, and full of love, should have had to suffer so') one can still see it as a particularly pointless end.

The biographical is of final interest, however, only in so far as it has hindered a true picture of Goldsmith's achievement. Goldsmith's contemporaries did tend to transfer something of their judgment of his character to his work, and the practice continued, in an entirely opposite way, throughout the nineteenth century. But there were also purely literary reasons for Goldsmith's relative failure. When Johnson commented that Goldsmith could make natural history read like a Persian tale, he was clarifying a general impression of Goldsmith as a fluent and agreeable writer who could work up an interesting volume out of miscellaneous material. His efforts were scattered over so many fields that a full view of his activity was rarely taken or suggested to the minds of his contemporaries. And many of his major efforts were in the less obviously serious areas of literature—light essays, comedies, a comic novel. As Goldsmith complained in his first book, the *Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe*, the Comic Muse was in exile; 'on my conscience, I believe we have all forgot to laugh these days'. Goldsmith's war against managers and the prevailing sentimental comedy was a matter of literary integrity, but his contemporaries regarded it mainly as envy and literary jealousy.

The Comic Muse, then, was partly to blame for the misunderstanding; the period was not noticeable for its lightness of touch, either in behaviour or creative work. But there was a more serious source of misinterpretation operating between Goldsmith and his contemporaries. For Goldsmith was a highly *serious* writer: but in a way they did not fully understand. The doctrines of Augustan classicism were complicated in his case by his admiration for French literature. He was not merely a late Augustan, but a literary cosmopolitan, who idolized Voltaire and Montesquieu. His first essay was a survey, not merely of English literature, but of French and European literature generally; his first biography was of Voltaire; his first major poem was called *The Traveller*. This line of development in his work, based on the gradually clarifying *persona* of 'the Citizen of the World' (the phrase is first applied to Voltaire, indicating an aim for Goldsmith, as well) represents a remarkably conscious counterpoint of ideas and literary ideals.

Even in his later work, when, to an extent, he had modified his

cosmopolitanism in favour of a more conservative literary Augustanism, the pressure behind his most serious work still comes from deeply held philosophical conclusions about the nature of society, its health and decay. *The Traveller* and *The Deserted Village* are closely linked ; the later poem is, in fact, implicit in lines 397–412 of *The Traveller* :

> Have we not seen, round Britain's peopled shore,
> Her useful sons exchang'd for useless ore ?
> Seen all her triumphs but destruction haste,
> Like flaring tapers bright'ning as they waste ;
> Seen opulence, her grandeur to maintain,
> Lead stern depopulation in her train,
> And over fields where scatter'd hamlets rose
> In barren solitary pomp repose ?
> Have we not seen, at pleasure's lordly call,
> The smiling long frequented village fall ?

For Goldsmith was, through travel, and his continuing interest in French literature, the most considerable English literary representative of the powerful current of ideas then prevalent in Europe. As M. Cazamian says : 'très au courant de la littérature et de la pensée françaises, il est un " philosophe " à sa manière. ' And it is his modification of these ideas which creates a pattern of unity throughout his miscellaneous work, culminating in his project for an elaborate Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, in which his distinguished contemporaries were to collaborate.

These complex literary intentions combined to restrict a proper understanding of Goldsmith's work in what was, after all, a particularly insular society. It is only in our own time, in fact, through the work of Goldsmith specialists like Sells, Seitz, Friedman and Crane, that a more satisfactory picture of Goldsmith's work has begun to emerge. In particular, the work of Professors Crane and Friedman on the essays enables us to see Goldsmith's ideas creating a rough thematic unity even in his miscellaneous work.[1] Dr Wardle's biography, the first full scale critical biography in this century, utilizes their investigations, and carries the process of clarification a step further, providing a sound biographical basis for future criticism. It is curious that a writer of Goldsmith's stature should have remained so long without textual and biographical analysis : now that the work has been undertaken, a critical revaluation becomes increasingly possible.

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[1] Cf. Crane, *New Essays by Oliver Goldsmith*, University of Chicago, 1927. Professor Friedman has published several essays on Goldsmith's contributions to magazines, and is working on an edition of the essays. Prior to this, however, the canon of the essays has been in confusion and critics regularly quote from essays misattributed to Goldsmith. Kindness forbids mention of names.

Profile of Mestrovic

by GEORGE A. CEVASCO

FEW contemporary sculptors can ever hope to receive the adulation that has been heaped upon Ivan Mestrovic. His work was universally acclaimed as ranking with the greatest the world has ever seen when he was only thirty. While other young artists were hoping for the slighest recognition, he was being compared favourably with Michelangelo. Rodin labelled Mestrovic 'the greatest phenomenon in sculpture.' Eager critics echoed Rodin's judgment.

Thousands flocked to Mestrovic's shows in Vienna, Paris, Rome, and other principal cities of Europe. In 1915, his exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum made art history : it was the first time that this famous London Museum honoured a living artist with a one-man show. His reputation continued to grow rapidly, and museums sought his works.

Even New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art broke a seventy-five year tradition against allowing any one-man shows of living artists when, in 1947, it invited Mestrovic to exhibit. Art history was again being made, but there was some grumbling over the fact that Mestrovic was not an American-born artist. Mestrovic's anti-Communistic reputation was responsible for a scathing review that appeared in New York's *Daily Worker*, now defunct. Museum authorities were of the opinion, however, that art transcends all political and national considerations. Serious critics, honestly impressed with the exhibition, analyzed and praised Mestrovic's work.

Of the generation of Bourdelle, Maillol, Milles, Zorach, and Epstein, Mestrovic, like them, has been somewhat overshadowed by the recent 'progress' made in art. Many basic traditional concepts of sculpture have suffered radical change. There has been a drift toward abstraction. Welded metal structures are built up with blowtorches. Mobiles give actual physical motion to a heretofore stabile art. Such ingenious innovations possibly widen the horizons of sculpture, but directly proportionate to the amount of interest in abstract sculpture and eccentric experimentalizing is the present reputation of the older contemporaries.

With all due respect to the modern innovators and their work, there is reason to believe that the representational art Mestrovic is still giving to the world will be vigorous and flourishing when non-representational pieces are matter mainly for art historians. To his credit, his works have an emotional content far above the cold, inexpressive and remote pieces of all too many abstract sculptors. A supreme master

of materials with a devout respect for the integrity of his subjects, his chief desire has always been to communicate. Art for him has always been more than a personal creative outlet.

Philosophers have argued hard and long over just what constitutes the beautiful. Mestrovic prefers to avoid the fray. As an artist he is not especially taken up with philosophical abstractions ; rather he is concerned with the concrete expression of beauty. Consistently he has aspired toward a simple, more direct form of expression, a form understandable by men of all races, all creeds, of all times. ' Sculpture and art in general,' Mestrovic holds, ' should contribute to human civilization, to human progress and mankind's spiritual development.'

A recent cartoon in a popular magazine serves to emphasize the current confusion in sculpture. In the first panel, a sculptor—who looks very much like Mestrovic, adorned as he was with beard and beret—had selected a large stone for a carving. In the second and third panels he is depicted chiseling away, removing the excess stone, striving to bring out his figure. In the last panel, the sculptor is shown in a museum looking at his own finished figure which has been placed alongside the entry that has been awarded a ribbon reading First Prize. If you have not yet guessed, the First Prize label has been hung on a large stone the same in size and shape as that which the bearded sculptor first selected for his representational carving.

In a day when artistic experimentation has broken the boundaries of form, when formlessness and subjectivism are achieving a vogue that precludes traditional forms of artistic expression, it is an aesthetic experience to feast one's eyes upon Mestrovic's work. The art of this great traditionalist demonstrates clearly that he has always assumed a responsibility to his fellow man, that he has always been concerned with his viewer. Mestrovic's art, consequently, is far removed from the more extreme contemporary forms.

Abstract sculpture may at present be in rather a favourable position, promoted as it is by some critics and imitated by so many younger artists, but Mestrovic prefers to shun this trend. He has little interest in bent wire, wire meshes, and welded junk. Seldom will he concern himself with the polemics of modern versus traditional. If an artist is sincere, Mestrovic respects him. Artists should experiment, he agrees, but let them be cautious about exhibiting experiments as final art forms. He has frequently experimented himself ; always within reasonable bounds, however. As he sees it : ' Abstract in Art ' is only another slogan. All great art must be expressed within the limits of form.

To the great sculptors of the past he accords all the honour that is due them. His special admiration for Egyptian and Greek sculpture does not blind him to the work of contemporary artists. A reverence for tradition serves him as an aid in his appreciation of what may come

in the future ; but he insists that just as thought must be expressed in form, so too, the craftsmanship of the artist must be subjected to the discipline of honest workmanship.

Now in his seventy-seventh year Mestrovic is still going strong. As a sculptor of the old school he always keeps his chisel busy. At a pace that would exhaust most young men he will frequently carve away furiously at a whole array of statues. In a single year he has been known to execute as many as a dozen major works and a score of minor pieces. Both a carver and a modeller, he has produced every kind of sculpture from portrait busts to huge architectural schemes. He has built churches, chapels, and mausoleums. In addition to sculpturing in wood, stone, marble, and bronze, he paints in fresco and oil. He has also written excellent poetry and stories in Serbo-Croatian, as well as numerous political essays. A book of his, in German, *Despite All, I Will Hope*, was published in Switzerland. A study of Michelangelo and two volumes of memoirs are still to be published.

Such multiple activity might be too much for some artists, but Mestrovic thrives on it. To call him prolific is almost an understatement, for every creation seems only to whet his vigour and his artistry. ' Among your countless creations, Mr Mestrovic,' I asked him recently, ' have you any special favourites ? ' With characteristic modesty and intensity he replied : ' Those which I have not yet executed.'

* * *

Born in 1883 at Vrpolje in the plains of Croatia, Mestrovic when a child went with his parents to their native Otavice on the Croatian plateau overlooking the Adriatic Sea. He spent his youth in the Dinaric Alps tending sheep. His father, who constructed stone buildings, encouraged him to carve domestic implements and small figures of wood and stone as he, too, had done when he was a boy. The first noteworthy figures young Mestrovic carved were religious figures, crucifixes and Madonnas. These soon aroused such comment that ' the carving boy of the mountains ' was featured in local papers.

At fifteen he was apprenticed to a stonecarver in the small Croatian city of Split. He astonished his teacher with his innate artistic instincts, and after rudimentary training he excelled the more experienced master. His first commission came from some neighbouring monks to do a devotional piece. They were well pleased with the result, but Mestrovic was not. In spite of lavish praise that proclaimed him a born artist who needed no academic instruction, he felt there was much to learn.

In 1900 he left home to seek admission to the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts. Mestrovic was an eager pupil but his best endeavours were not those completed in the rigid atmosphere of the Academy. The

Pietà [*carrara marble ; Metropolitan Museum of Art, N.Y.*]

St. Anthony [*Plaster*]

works he produced on his own attracted attention. One pompous art instructor greeted his individual efforts with the remark : ' We want no Balkan prodigies here.' His fellow students, however, were enthusiastic and encouraged him to exhibit. At eighteen he had his first show, which, incidentally, attracted wide attention throughout Austria.

At twenty-four he set out for Paris. It was not long before he caught the eye of Auguste Rodin. Rodin, who was then sixty-seven, took a fatherly interest in Mestrovic. Aside from seeing Rodin and one or two other good friends, Mestrovic spent all his time in work. Within two years he had completed a whole series of sculptures based on religious and Serbo-Croatian national themes. An exhibition of this work caused a Paris sensation and rocketed him to European fame.

The Austro-Hungarian government, learning of his success in Paris, invited him to exhibit at its National Gallery. Mestrovic—not without sufficient reason—refused. Aware that his own people were suffering under the Austro-Hungarian domination he agreed to show in Vienna, but only under his conditions. To point up the oppression of his countrymen he chose to exhibit sixty pieces in Vienna's Secession Gallery. His stand against the Austro-Hungarian government, coupled with the patriotic themes of so many of his works, made him a national Slav hero. Upon his return home to Zagreb after the show, he was met by wildly cheering crowds.

In 1911 he received acclaim for his exhibits in the Serbian Pavilion at an International Exhibition held in Rome, where he was awarded first prize for his sculpture. Although a spirit of individuality characterizes Mestrovic's art, most of these works reflect the explosive nationalism of Europe before the First World War. During the War he spent time in Rome, Paris, and London, working on his sculpture while helping to organize a committee for the liberation of the South Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy and their union with Serbia and Montenegro. The work of his committee proved so successful that its efforts were largely responsible for the creation of an independent Yugoslavia after the war.

Mestrovic was chosen member of the Provisional National Assembly in 1919, but he declined the honour. Preferring to take his place as a plain citizen, he also refused a subsequent appointment to his country's Senate. Having helped his people achieve national independence, he resisted all efforts to drag him into political life. Several times he rejected offers to be Minister of Education. In the early 1930's he graciously refused King Alexander's offer to appoint him Prime Minister and Croat member of the three-man Regency Council. Events have continually raised Mestrovic to the stature of a major political figure.

Passionately devoted to the cause of freedom, he was always the patriot, never the politician. He was, of course, a very prominent citizen

of Yugoslavia and occasionally an outspoken one. Never did he hesitate to express his beliefs. In sculpture he continued to sing the heroic songs of his people, feeling that such was his task, not politics.

His heroic sculptures have been shaped by the leading figures from Serbo-Croatian history, many of which are from pre-Ottoman Balkan history. For casual viewers these figures are the remarkable works of an inspired artist. For his people they are expressions in epic form of the constant struggle of the Serbian and Croatian peoples for freedom. Anyone moderately familiar with the turbulent history of the Balkans knows of the conflicts which the native people has had with various foreign overlords. Tradition has it that the artist's grandfather was the first-known man of the Mestrovic family who did not die fighting against an oppressor, though he too was famous as a fighter and a leader in the cause of liberty.

When World War I ended Mestrovic tried to be just another Yugoslav citizen. He worked on his own commissions, giving freely of his time to all national monuments. As Rector of the Academy of Art in Zagreb he also taught his techniques to sculpture students who came from all over the world to study under him. And so he worked and taught for some twenty-five years. When his country was taken over by Fascists he was jailed, in 1941, for pro-allied sympathies.

Mestrovic could not remain neutral or compromise his beliefs. Unequivocally he rejected all offers to collaborate with the Fascist authorities. Hitler was questioned about Mestrovic's imprisonment ' He is against us,' the dictator said of the artist, ' and he has always been against us. A few years ago when I invited him to an exhibit in Berlin he refused to come.' Hitler would neither order his execution nor consider his release.

It was in a Zagreb prison cell that Mestrovic first contemplated his famous *Pietà*. Sympathetic guards smuggled some brown wrapping paper to him on which he drew several sketches. Through the intercession of the Vatican, Mestrovic was released after four-and-a-half-months' imprisonment. He fled to Rome; there he sculptured the *Pietà* in clay. In 1943 he took refuge in Switzerland. Three years later he returned to Rome and carved the *Pietà* from a piece of Carrara marble that weighed over six tons.

Over eight feet high, Mestrovic's *Pietà* is one that actually rivals Michelangelo's famous piece. Mestrovic's *Pietà* represents all the human suffering of the Second World War symbolized under the meaningful suffering of the Mother who holds her Son in her arms after the Crucifixion. Three supporting figures are part of a common lamentation, yet each appears individually withdrawn. In beholding the dead body of the ever-living God, each gives the impression of being struck by a personal inner grief. Nicodemus, supporting Christ under the arms,

looks down with awe and reverence upon the Galilean. St John, hugging Christ's body, looks with compassion and adoration upon his Beloved Master. Mary is in a transport of grief as she gazes up at her Divine Son.

The heads of John, Nicodemus, and Mary are equilaterally distant one from the other. Their eyes converge on the pain-racked face of the Crucified. Relaxed by death, His body lies outstretched except for the bent knees. His lank arms virtually embrace Mary and John. Suggestive of the awfulness of death through crucifixion, there is, nevertheless, nothing ghastly or repugnant about this work of art. Aesthetically, it pleases ; theologically, it recalls that though Christ died on the cross it was His death that vanquished death.

At its exhibition in New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, it won universal acclaim. ' The greatest piece of religious sculpture since Michelangelo,' exclaimed one critic. At the time, Tito sent a representative to call on Mestrovic with offers to purchase the *Pietà*.

' I've been to the Metropolitan,' the representative said, ' and I asked them to place a value on the *Pietà*. They said £150,000. I'm authorized to pay you that and to have the statue sent to Yugoslavia.'

' But your government does not approve of religion, Mestrovic protested, ' and this is a religious subject.'

' We will look on it as a work of art,' the representative answered.

' Your aren't interested in it as art either,' Mestrovic countered. ' You are interested in having the people believe that I approve of the régime. I don't ; and I don't want to use the *Pietà* as propaganda. I refuse to sell it.'

With the liberation of Yugoslavia in 1945 the Communist minority headed by Tito had seized power. Communism was too much like Fascism, so Mestrovic chose exile. Despite Tito's warm invitations to return to Yugoslavia, the artist refused. In his native country Mestrovic is still regarded as one of the chief architects of the Yugoslav state. His homes and studio have been turned into national museums. One American tourist upon his return from Split remarked : ' I went to the Mestrovic museum . . . It is wonderful. Mestrovic is sort of a deity there . . .'

After he was persuaded to come to the United States to teach at Syracuse University, he determined to become an American citizen. He did so in 1954. After his oath of Allegiance he was received by President Eisenhower at a ceremony in the White House : a tribute to Mestrovic the artist and foe of Communism.

Mestrovic, of course, cannot forget his homeland, to Yugoslavia his beloved Croatia. Following an exhibition at Syracuse he shipped twenty-nine wooden panels depicting the life of Christ. This was a gift from him to his people. For them these panels record not only the basic

truths of Christianity, but they are meant to recall that the spirit of liberty can endure even under the yoke of Communism.

In 1955, when Notre Dame University's Distinguished Professors Programme began to seek out some leading figures in the world of arts and science, Mestrovic was immediately considered. Now after just a few years at South Bend, his teaching and creating—plus his beard and beret—have made him one of the most familiar figures on the Notre Dame campus. As sculptor-in-residence he conducts a graduate course in a specially designed studio. If not instructing his class he is hard at work on one of his own projects.

For the past decade or so he has been drawing almost exclusively upon the great religious themes that have been his greatest inspiration through life, his interest in patriotic themes having been somewhat stifled by disillusionment. Thoroughly imbued with the spiritual significance of art, he is firmly convinced that religion and the human spirit surpass all barriers of nationality. Though not given to writing or speaking about the spiritual phase of his art, a significant statement occurs in a short monograph he wrote on Michelangelo. ' The artist must have a profound and slowly ripening conviction,' he noted, ' and no work of art can live without some religious conception.'

Mestrovic's sculpture is a consequence of his theocentricity. Art for him is the expression of man's spiritual nature. His credo : ' One must be enraptured of the Eternal in order that his artistic creation may be the reflection thereof. Immortality is enclosed in us as in a prison ; it must soar freely in full flight, harmoniously in tune with all that is immortal around us and above us . . . It is written that the Word was from the beginning and that it came from God. But it is not revealed whether the Word was spoken or carved.'

The spiritual quality of his art demonstrates quite clearly that he has always had a concern for his viewer. Under traditional influences, he has continually sought to create in a manner suitable for our age. Foremost is his regard for the Hellenic tradition. In many of his works he preserves the fine technical tradition of the Renaissance, and here and there the influence of Michelangelo is apparent. A good number of his wood panels, on the other hand, originate in the folk art of Eastern Europe. The art of Egypt, Assyria, and the Baroque have also been blended and newly experienced through his individual expression. Some of his daring conceptions reflect the mysticism and poetic tradition of the East. Like most great art his is difficult to classify ; yet each of his works bears the imprint of a single creator.

Meticulous concentration on virtually every line, overstylized hands and feet, and the extreme torsion beyond the limits of physical possibility of so many of his figures have been adduced as aesthetic imperfections by some captious critics. Mestrovic himself has been the severest critic

of his work for his objectives have been high. ' I have the feeling,' he once said, ' that my best work will remain forever hidden and unhewn in the pure granite which lies at the heart of the mountain.' Possibly he has not been able to accomplish all he has set out do do, but while some sculptors may revel in a few works he has completed almost a thousand major pieces.

His sculptures are found in a dozen countries. In the land of his adoption he is represented at museums in Brooklyn, Rochester, Syracuse, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, San Diego, and Los Angeles. About a dozen of his works are at Notre Dame, including his famous *Pietà*, which is now in a church on the campus. The bulk of his work is in Yugoslavia, but he is represented in virtually every important museum on the Continent. In England his sculptures are in the Tate Gallery, the Victoria and Albert Museum, as well as in several private collections.

Noteworthy among his latest commissions are the following : a bust of the conductor Leo Barzun ; a twenty-eight foot bronze called *Man and Freedom* for the entrance of the Mayo Clinic of Minnesota ; *The Madonna of the Immaculate Conception* for the new Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Washington, D.C. ; a sitting statue of the late Pope Pius XII for St. Louis University, Missouri ; a bust of the famed Croatian scholar Vatroslav (1838-1923) ; a six foot bronze of St. Anthony for Oxford University. Significantly, Mestrovic is producing at a rate virtually equal to the revolutionary success of his earlier periods.

In a life of artistic creation that finds few parallels in our day, his work speaks for itself. Yet it would not be amiss to note that he is the subject of a half dozen monographs that have been published in several languages. The bibliography of articles, criticisms and news items about him runs into the thousands. An excellent book whose two hundred illustrations give an opportunity of appreciating of Mestrovic's ideas and style is Laurence Schmeckebier's *Ivan Mestrovic : Sculptor and Patriot* (Syracuse University Press, 1959).

Art lovers the world over respect and admire him. He is frequently spoken of as the ' sculptor's sculptor.' Artists of all schools revere him as one of the greatest living sculptors. He is an honorary member of art academies in various European cities. Several countries have bestowed upon him their highest honours. In 1940, for example, he was named by France Grand Officier de la Legion d'Honneur. Interestingly enough, he preferred not to receive the decoration during the usual public ceremony. The French Ambassador to Yugoslavia had to bring it to Mestrovic's home in Zagreb. A thoroughly unassuming and humble individual, Mestrovic, when in Europe, refused to wear any of his decorations to public functions though doing so was considered mandatory.

Time after time he has been honoured with the highest awards. The exclusive American Academy of Letters recently presented him with its coveted Award of Merit. There is little need, however, to extend any list of honours and tributes. When he looks back over the many awards and distinctions that have come to him over the past fifty years, there is one that he prizes over all others. ' When I saw children, during my exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, kneel in prayer in front of my *Pietà*,' he says, ' that was the greatest tribute my work ever received.'

THE COMPROMISE

Let's not try to explain further.
Let's pretend we've clinched the matter.

This completely false agreement
Seems the only sane appeasement

Of our private dispositions
In this game of admonitions.

Let us lie and just pretend
That we'll dutifully mend

One another's tears and breaks
Like two honest, sincere fakes.

Then—though not really—we can follow
Safe and peacefully whatever

We might publically call
Our most recent protocol.

DESMOND O'GRADY

Unity and the Irish Theatre

by ROBERT W. CASWELL

AN undated entry in Emerson's *Journal* for 1841 reads : ' People do not deserve to have good writing, they are so pleased with bad.' Whenever a country's art enters or remains for any length of time in an arid state, Emerson's remark is sure to be restated in one form or another. Equally inevitable at such times are the attempts to reassess the importance and function of art and to formulate contemporary solutions for its revitalization. Mr Thomas Kilroy, in his article entitled, ' Groundwork for an Irish Theatre ' (*Studies*, Summer 1959), asserts that the Irish drama is in a sluggish condition and suggests ways in which it might be brought to vigorous life. The touchstone of Mr Kilroy's solution is the concept of communal endeavour as it is embodied in the theatre workshop. Mr Gabriel Fallon, in his article, ' All This and The Abbey Too ' (*Studies*, Winter 1959), agrees with Mr Kilroy on the state of the drama in Ireland. He then devotes himself to protecting the reputation of the Abbey Theatre and ends by implying that only an upsurge of Irish dramatic talent will effect the rebirth of Irish theatre. As for a theatre workshop, Mr Fallon is reticent in his views. He rightly points out the function of the Abbey Experimental Theatre, 1937–1951, but he says nothing about any attempts to find it an interim home after the fire of 1951. Were the Experimental Theatre a vital part of the Abbey set-up, surely this should have been done. Later in the article, Mr Fallon seems to dismiss the importance of such a theatre with the example of Seán O'Casey. This is an instance of the two-edged sword with a vengeance. Finally, Mr Fallon is a little uneasy at the idea that a theatre workshop can have a ' marked social bias '.

It is extremely tempting to take sharp issue with Mr Fallon's many suspect statements, such as that concerning the Abbey production of Eugene O'Neill's, *A Long Day's Journey into Night*, ' in which a group of players stepped right out of so-called " characterless comedy " and with apparent ease scaled the peaks of modern tragedy. . . .' There is no mention that for this play the Abbey had the services of one of the finest directors in the British Isles, Mr Frank Dermody. Nor is it mentioned that the players were subjected to about twelve weeks of the most severe rehearsal many of them had known. Nor is it suggested that the potential dramatic ability of the players might have been so long undernourished by the Abbey bill of fare that the O'Neill play came as a welcome tonic for some of them. However,it is more fruitful to extend Mr Kilroy's vein of suggestive criticism, for the Abbey Theatre is only a part of the

theatrical scene. Its success or failure at this date can no longer have the far-reaching effect granted to it in the days when it stood alone.

What characterizes so much of Dublin theatre, apart from the Abbey, is the confusion and chaos which are at the core of almost everything it does. What strikes the outsider most forcibly is the utter waste of such persons as Cyril Cusack and Eithne Dunne, and the scarcity of Siobháin McKenna and Micheál MacLiammóir. Equally as striking as this waste or scarcity is the vast reservoir of acting material from which are recruited the actors and actresses for the occasional big productions headed by Cusack, Dunne, McKenna or MacLiammóir. Whatever merits there may be in such a system, there is also the insuperable handicap that seldom do the big productions result in a unified presentation. There are almost as many styles of acting as there are persons upon the stage, and this confusion is all too frequently apparent in the relationship of the actor or the actress to the play. In short, a novel Hamlet receives traditional support ; Mother Courage seems to be the only one who understands what Brecht is trying to do ; *Saint Joan* becomes a general free-for-all. These difficulties are part of the recruiting system for acquiring enough persons to stage a large production and cannot be attributed solely to the director, whoever he may happen to be.

There are various theatres in Dublin which maintain a more or less homogenous group of actors and actresses, such as the Globe, the Orion, 37 Theatre Club and the Studio. It is an amazing feat that from two of these theatres, little more than holes in the ground, issued extremely fine productions of Arthur Miller's *The Crucible* and *The Death of a Salesman*. The productions of the Globe and Orion afford Dublin audiences the opportunity to see a fair number of modern plays. But it must be frankly admitted that the enterprise of these groups is seldom matched by their limited abilities. Godfrey Quigley stands almost alone, while Maurice Good seems one of the few actors in Dublin who really understands the workings of the American mind in the theatre : the result was his superb performance in Clifford Odets' *The Big Knife*. In spite of the successes or failures of these groups, the peculiar mixture of the professional and the amateur places them in a state of perpetual possibility.

The logical question to ask at this point is why do not these groups unite in some effective way ? This is a problem close to many who are involved in the theatre. Although it is endlessly debated, nothing concrete seems ever to be accomplished. No doubt there are very real and very large obstacles in the way. What is far more discouraging is the endless theatrical feuds which are usually petty beyond belief, but which retain enough basis in truth to paralyze effective action. Certainly such conflicts are in the very blood of any activity involving more than one person. That the problems such conflicts present are not insuperable, even in

theatrical circles, is proved by the histories of the Moscow Art Theatre, the Théâtre Libre, the Independent Theatre, the Freie Bühne, the Group Theatre, the Berliner Ensemble and the Abbey Theatre. An effective unity in the Dublin theatre would most certainly place the professional on a more stable and productive basis, while at the same time the large number of amateurs could be controlled and shaped into something more than a gang. It does not seem unreasonable to expect that such theatrical unity, consistent with Irish genius and indigenous to Irish dramatic history, would help to stop the continuous waste of talent and ensure a sustained measure of success.

Would the high level of theatre made possible by this marshalling of forces appeal to an audience ? The appalling losses sustained by *Mother Courage* and *A Long Day's Journey into Night* would seem to require a negative answer. There is, however, no reason to believe that Dublin audiences are much different from audiences anywhere else in the world, and these are generally created and won rather than found waiting. To win an audience is more likely to be a process of years rather than of one or two seasons. Competition with the cinema and warmed-over West End productions must always be severe, but with persistence—perhaps heroic persistence—a substantial audience could be created. Dublin, as a capital city with two universities, should have the potential to fill week after week a theatre devoted to the production of the very best in drama.

It would be helpful in these matters if there existed in Dublin theatre or drama, critics, as distinct from reviewers, who would act as something of a sounding-board for both the theatre and the public. Time and again the actor is hampered because he does not receive an intelligent and objective criticism of his performance. What the public is generally presented with is little more than a pseudo-clever résumé of an evening at the theatre. Such descriptions must really help to alienate the public from the drama. It is not necessary here to become involved in the precise validity of the critic or his position in the artistic world. Whether he is a moulder of standards, a guardian of taste or a parasitic growth on the body of art, can be a matter of opinion or of one's profession in relationship to him. However, it is from the critic, or the man of letters, that one may reasonably expect an informed and objective appraisal of art and its makers. When the opinions of such a person are felt to be valid, his influence is of consequence and beneficially effective. If they are not, he is ignored or ridiculed. The result of the latter is to throw the artists concerned back upon themselves, which frequently produces a state of self-indulgence and ingrowth. In a large measure, this is the condition of Dublin theatre ; the more intelligent members are only too painfully aware of it.

In the days of the so-called Irish Renaissance, it was said by Yeats

that Dublin was the one place where the artist could not have a swelled head. No doubt this was a serious, though not necessarily conscious, function of criticism at the time. One feels frequently that the attitude which caused Yeats to speak as he did is still present in Dublin but in a dreadfully shallow manner. There is very little blood in the criticism of theatre or drama. What is needed in this instance is the equivalent of Austin Clarke, Denis Donoghue and John Montague. At present there is only the infrequent observations of A. J. Leventhal. It is surprising that for all the interest in drama and theatre in Ireland, there is no magazine on the subject in existence even on the small scale of *Samhain*, *Beltaine* or *The Arrow*. There is, in effect, no clearing house of ideas for things dramatic except the public house. Something far more substantial is needed and should have arisen long ago from the ferment of supposed interest in Irish Drama.

An exciting theatre, a theatre where one feels that something dynamic and important is happening, is bound to stimulate writers to try the dramatic form. Perhaps it was such excitement which drew O'Casey to the theatre. A relationship between the potential writer and the performers can be maintained in spite of the intervention of the footlights. But any actor or director will most readily admit that things look far different from one side of the footlights than they do from the other. Sooner or later the dramatist must be familiar in some manner with all the elements involved in his craft. To suggest in whatever manner, as Mr Fallon does, that the craft may be learned simply by observation from the public side of the proscenium is a damaging fallacy. Certainly natural talent or genius may carry a writer a long way. However, like the musical prodigy, there comes a time when he must be able to understand why certain things must be done and not others. If the transition is successfully made there is the possibility of a mature and sustained art. If it is not made, the talent will become truncated. Perhaps this accounts for the large number of good first plays in Ireland and the far larger number of bad successors.

The present day Irish dramatist seldom turns to the best in his own tradition. From at least the time of Padraic Colum's play, *Broken Soil* (*The Fiddler's House*) and Lady Gregory's *Twenty-Five* (*Hyacinth Halvey*), both produced in 1903, the young writer has been too prone to use a successful formula. Without Colum's aims or Lady Gregory's gifts, the result has been anything but good. O'Casey opened newer ground, but writers have taken from him only the more superficial elements of his comedy. A marked exception to this is James Plunkett's *The Risen People* and, even more important, Hugh Leonard's *Madigan's Lock*. The consequence of this long deluge of innocuous imitation is that there is very little in the way of a vital dramatic tradition from which the writer can learn.

Should the dramatist's first play indicate talent, his general fate is to suffer from dramatic haemorrhage from which there is little prospect of

relief. The usual remark in such instances is that others as good as he have suffered the same fate. But it is at this point that a unified Irish theatre could be of most help. It could present and sustain a high level of production which would best reveal the potentiality of the dramatic methods born in the last fifty years outside of Ireland. In general the young writer is ignorant of these, but some of the actors and directors and designers are more enlightened. These persons should be, must be, brought together. The possibilities of such a union are great, both for the individuals concerned and for the community at large. Some drastic reorganization is necessary, for the present state of things is far too dissipated to be effective on even a minor scale. The writer would no doubt stand to benefit more from such a union simply because his position is so much lower at present than that of the actor.

Una Ellis-Fermor was very much taken with the workshop atmosphere of the early Abbey. She felt that only in the Elizabethan and Jacobean days of the theatre had such an atmosphere existed in any vital manner. Certainly those early days found the Abbey as something of a crucible. Necessity dictated a great deal of this: plays had to be within the compass of the actors and they, in turn, had to meet the mercurial demands of the new plays. The point is that there was a direct and vital connection between most everyone concerned. One of the results, as Andrew Malone points out, was that people all over the place began writing plays. No doubt most of the products delivered up to the directors were rubbish, but they were the fertilizer which enabled the impressive list of good and great dramatists to survive. To think of the theatre as a workshop is merely to think of it as a living and important house of creation. If the inhabitants are dead, or half alive, no amount of ' instruction ' in dramatic writing will be of any avail. But when the theatre is more than a place where the worker punches in and out, when it is a way of life—as well as a job—and that to lead it with any hope of sanity it is necessary to comply with its demands, then the theatre will be able to communicate *with* as well as *to* the public. What the dramatist needs under such circumstances is a ready and familiar access to such a theatre, not as a curious observer but as a necessary ingredient in all that the theatre does. There is no mystique in this, for close observation of readings, auditions, above all, rehearsals, would greatly enhance his familiarity with the structure of the world he has chosen to inhabit.

The occasional airing of opinions on Irish theatre cannot be very effective or lasting. Far more substantial would be a symposium, both written and oral, which would bring to the surface the ideas of those most concerned with the subject. Such a symposium, based on the concerted determination to achieve something concrete, could be the starting point for effectively uniting the various splinter groups. In the event that unity is not desired, the only alternative is the amateur theatre. The possibilities in this direction are large and varied, but they are beyond the scope of the present article.

The Greeks and Reunion up to the Fall of Constantinople

by PATRICK O'CONNELL

THE Fourth Crusade, which resulted in the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders and the setting up of a Latin Empire in 1204, effectively meant the end of the Byzantine Empire, as it had been known to history. Not all of the old Empire was taken by the Latins ; the result was the emergence of a number of small states, each with its own problems, which were too weak to present an effective resistance to the Turks. The wonder is that the Turks did not finally triumph until 1453. Among the new kingdoms, the Latin Empire, based on Constantinople, balanced precariously on both sides of the Dardanelles, was from the beginning opposed by the remnant of the old Greek Empire, the so-called Greek Empire of Nicaea, in the north-west corner of Asia Minor. Nor was the Greek Empire of Trebizond, along a narrow coastal strip on the south of the Black Sea, any more friendly to the survival of the new Latin Empire. The Kingdom of Thessalonica, extending from the Gulf of Corinth along the northern coast of the Aegean, was nominally dependent on the Latin Empire, but was in reality a prey to the diplomatic and military manoeuvres of the Greek Empire of Nicaea and the independent Despotate of Epirus which looked towards the Adriatic. Nor could the independent Latin Principate of Achaia in the Peloponese, or the islands and settlements under the control of Venice and other Italian mercantile powers, be counted on. It came as no surprise, therefore, that Michael VIII Palaeologus, the Greek Emperor of Nicaea, occupied Constantinople in 1261 and put an end to the Latin Empire.

* * *

This short description of the political background will help to set the religious problem of reunion in correct perspective. It must be borne in mind that political considerations take first place in any subsequent overtures for union of the Churches. It was never purely an ecclesiastical problem.

While the Latin Empire survived, there was no question of union of the Churches. Pope Innocent III, while deploring the manner in which Constantinople fell in 1204, was inclined to take advantage of the situation for the benefit of the Church, as he thought. A Latin

Patriarch was established in Constantinople and the schism was held to be at an end. But the contrary was true. The Greek Patriarch had taken refuge in Nicaea, and the intolerant attitude of the Latins towards the Greek rites completed the work which their brutalities in the sack of the city had achieved: the complete alienation of popular support. Mutual prejudice and rancour more than any dogmatic differences divided both parties, but neither side allowed dogmatic, ritualistic and even dietetic differences to be forgotten. This was the situation in 1261.

The newly established Byzantine Empire was dangerously isolated. The Latin princes, in particular, Charles of Anjou, ruler of Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples, allied by marriage to the Pretender to the old Latin Empire, menaced its existence. Venice, with a view to gaining trading concessions, formed an alliance with Charles of Anjou and the Latin Pretender. A counter-balance would have to be found. So it was that Michael Palaeologus turned to the Pope. The bait of Reunion was offered as the price of the Pope's protection. Legates and ambassadors travelled frequently between Rome and Constantinople.

It became clear that Rome was not prepared to discuss the differences which divided the two Churches. Pope Clement IV, in 1267, presented a formula of faith to the Greeks. It was a renewal of the formula composed in 1250 by Innocent IV. Again in 1270 the same formula was presented by the Cardinals, before the election of Blessed Gregory X. Apart from minor, verbal changes, this coincides with the profession of faith drawn up by the second oecumenical Council of Lyons, 1274. The new Pope was whole-hearted in his devotion to the work of union. And the Byzantine Emperor realized that union was necessary for his survival. Accordingly, guarantees were given, and a Council was summoned to meet at Lyons in 1274. The Turkish menace and the reform of the Latin Church were problems to be provided for, but the Greek problem was seen merely as the submission of the Greeks. We have an indication of this in the fact that the Council opened on 7th May and the burning question of the addition to the Creed and its theological implications was discussed and settled before the arrival of the Greeks on 24th June.

The Greek delegation was a small party of five, consisting of Germanus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Theophanes, metropolitan of Nicaea, George Acropolita, Senator and Grand Logothete, and two officers of the Court. They had letters empowering them to act on behalf of the Emperor, his son, Andronicus, who was associated with him in the Empire, and the Greek bishops. What had already been enacted in the council was communicated to them, and they accepted it. Indeed it was no more than they claimed to have already accepted. Accordingly, on the 6th July the solemn session was held during which the Greeks made their formal submission ; a week previously they had already joined with the Latins in a solemn High Mass, during which the Gospel and

the Creed were sung in Latin and Greek. The phrase, ' Who proceeds from the Father and the Son ', had been sung three times by the Greeks, and St. Bonaventure had preached a moving sermon. The doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit and the Roman Primacy were the main dogmatic points underlined in the agreement. It remained now to give effect to this act of Union in the Byzantine Empire.

In the period which followed the Council of Lyons, the difficulties of Michael Palaeologus in dealing with his bishops were not properly appreciated in Rome. In truth, the letter of the Greek bishops which was read at Lyons was rather vague on the Primacy. Besides, the ex-Patriarch, Joseph,[1] was a centre of resistance ; and the bishops, in fact had agreed to union only because it was forced on them by the Emperor. The old prejudices were still alive. It was a situation which needed very careful handling. In John Beccus, who became Patriarch on the death of Germanus, Michael had a very willing ally. It might be said that Beccus, one of the ablest of the Greek theologians, is one of the few Greeks at this period who were genuinely converted to the Latin dogmatic position. He was a man who was prepared to suffer for his convictions, as he had already shown and was to show again. The Union was solemnly proclaimed in Constantinople in 1277, after much insistence by Rome, but the bishops refused to sanction the addition to the Creed in their liturgy, as being contrary to their usages. The Popes, Innocent V and John XXI, kept insisting on full submission, and any delay was attributed to the Emperor's bad faith. On another score, suspicion was aroused. For the Emperor was intriguing with Peter of Aragon and John of Procida, the great minister of the Hohenstaufen interest in Sicily, against Charles of Anjou. Michael was not one to waste the time which he had gained at Lyons.

Nicholas III, who became Pope in 1277, was not over-friendly to the interests of Charles of Anjou, but he did not want a latter-day revival of the Hohenstauffen menace in the person of Peter of Aragon[2]. He continued the policy of demanding full submission from the Greek bishops, the insertion of the disputed clause in the Creed, and noted the astonishment felt in Rome that no Greek bishop had bothered to ask the Holy See to confirm him in his See. These reiterated demands only served to embitter the Greeks, and Michael's savage repression of all opposition did not help the cause of union. In 1281, Martin IV, a Frenchman, became Pope. He was not satisfied with the protestations of Michael Palaeologus that everything possible was being done to ensure the carrying out of Papal demands. Evasive though obsequious replies

[1] Patriarch Joseph had abdicated rather than submit to Rome. He lived to preside at the Synod which condemned Beccus.

[2] Peter III of Aragon was married to the daughter of Manfred, illegitimate son of Frederick II.

were all that Rome received. Besides, it seems that the Pope was devoted to the cause of Charles of Anjou. In any event, he decided to break with Michael. A Greek chronicler tells us that the Latins realized now that the ' Union ' was merely a comedy.

On 18 October 1281, the Pope excommunicated Michael, and twice in the following year repeated this. Michael was faithful to his sworn word, although he had the Pope's name removed from the list of those commemorated in the liturgy, as being a man hostile to the Greeks. Politically, Michael succeeded in seeing the end of the menace of Charles of Anjou. On the 20 March 1282, occurred the massacre of the French in Sicily known as the ' Sicilian Vespers ', followed by the landing of Peter of Aragon. With Michael's death at the end of 1282, the short-lived, official union of Lyons was at an end. There was a violent, anti-unionist reaction. The new Emperor, Andronicus, rejected the act of union, and the dead Emperor, who had already been excommunicated by the anti-unionist bishops, was refused ecclesiastical burial. It was a tragic end for the Emperor, who had tried hard to realize union with Rome, though his efforts may of course be regarded merely as manipulations of ecclesiastical affairs in order to strengthen his political position. His Patriarch Beccus fell with him. He was, however, a thorn in the side of the anti-unionists until his death in prison in 1297, ' the only man ', says Grumel, ' who could have saved the Union, had it been possible to save it.' [1]

It is easy to be wise after the event. But it was a pity that the Popes who succeeded Blessed Gregory X, and their advisers did not take to heart the advice given by Humbert of Romans, the fifth Master General of the Dominicans, in the programme he outlined for the Council of Lyons in 1274.[2] Humbert was milder in his approach to the problem of papal authority than were subsequent popes, and his tolerant attitude towards ritual differences was well in advance of his age. For instance, canon 1 of Lyons contains no explicit recognition of the Greeks' use of leavened bread for their Mass. On the question of authority, Humbert notes :

> ' Concerning this (third) point of disagreement, the remedy would seem to be that full obedience would not be demanded of them, provided that their Patriarch be confirmed (in his authority) by the Pope, and that they receive the Roman Legates with honour '.[3]

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[1] V. Grumel : ' Le II[e] Concile de Lyon et la réunion de l'Église Grecque ' in the *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique*, Vol. IX, cols. 1391–1410.

[2] Mabillon's summary of this book may be found in Mansi : *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio*, Vol. 24, col. 109–132.

[3] l.c. col. 129 : ' Contra tertiam discordiam videretur remedium, quod ab eis plenitudo obedientiae non expeteretur, dummodo patriarcha eorum a papa confirmaretur, et ab eis legati Romani cum honore reciperentur '.

But the main point of interest in Humbert's suggestions is that he outlines not so much a mode of procedure in Council as a method of apostolate—the development of the knowledge of the Greek language in the West, the translation of Greek dogmatic books into Latin and of the main Latin theological authors into Greek, frequent meetings with the Greeks, the sending of missioners to work among them, and even a policy of winning them by fostering inter-marriage, so that there would be a leaven working towards Union. Mutual ignorance was the main enemy, especially when the rank and file of the Greek Church depended for their spiritual guidance on the monks, who were fanatically zealous traditionalists, but as ignorant as the people about Latin theology and practice. This work of apostolate was to proceed, slowly enough but markedly, during the next century and a half, and we must pay tribute to the labours of the missioners, especially Dominicans and Franciscans, who devoted their lives to this task.

FROM LYONS TO FLORENCE

The years between the second Council of Lyons and the Council of Florence were years which saw the decline of the Papacy, accelerated at the end by the terrible Great Schism of the West. And in that period, the policy of the Popes towards the Greeks underwent a marked change. While the land route to the Holy Places was considered the only feasible route, papal policy, especially in the early days of the Avignon papacy, was to support the Latin Pretender, now a member of the Valois family by inter-marriage. This policy was seen as the only one likely to end religious disunion. A few attempts were made to carry out this policy but they ended in failure. Right up to the end of the fourteenth century we find staunch theoreticians of this type of Crusade. However, as the new century wore on, it became apparent that such a manner of conceiving a Crusade was an anachronism, a harking back to the days of Innocent III. This was the age of the mercantile powers—Venice and Genoa above all, but there were many others. The Valois, now on the throne of France, had plenty to occupy them in their Hundred Years War with England. And it became clearer that the sea route to the Holy Places was the most economic approach. So the capture of Constantinople, to prevent trouble in the rear, was, in this new line of thinking, not necessary.

Throughout these years, the Greeks kept in touch with the Popes, partly so as to ward off the dangers of a Crusade. The Emperors' policy in religious matters may be gauged from the advice which Manuel II Palaeologus, according to the chronicler Sphrantzes, gave to his son, who was later to attend the Council in Florence :

> Propose a council : open negotiations, but protract them interminably. . . . The pride of the Latins and the obstinacy of the Greeks will never agree. By wishing to achieve the union you will only strengthen the schism.[1]

As the century moved to its end, the Greeks needed to be able to persuade the Turks that an attack on Constantinople would bring swarms of Western enemies about their ears ; and the prospect of religious unity had to be held out to the West as a means of gaining this help. The position of the Byzantine Empire throughout the fourteenth century gradually worsened. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century had broken up the empire of the Seljuq Turks into separate states. Among these the Ottoman Turks became prominent, and although they were checked for a time by the Catalan Grand Company, a kind of Foreign Legion, they progressed steadily in their conquest of the Empire, which at the same time had to ward off the Serbs. Nicaea fell to the Turks in 1329, Nicomedia in 1337. By 1341, they controlled practically all Asia Minor. By 1354, they had captured Gallipoli in Europe and began to move north. In 1365, Adrianople became their capital, and Constantinople was virtually surrounded. In 1370, the Empire paid tribute to the Ottoman Murad I. There was a Mosque in Constantinople by 1391, and a Caid administered justice to his fellow-countrymen in the City. Serbia and Bulgaria were also overcome by the Turks, and Hungary was defeated in 1396. Three times in twenty years Constantinople was besieged, and was saved only by some more urgent engagement which called off the Turkish army. The treasury was empty, so it was found impossible to raise mercenary forces. During these dark years we may note the heroic help given by the little principality of Savoy, connected by marriage with the imperial family.

Many attempts to obtain help were made. But Europe in the fourteenth century had enough troubles of its own. England and France were at war for much of the time. Germany, which had produced another chapter in the centuries old Empire versus Papacy struggle in the reign of Ludwig of Bavaria, was occupied with its own difficulties. The Papacy could not control its own states, much less the rest of Italy. And to add to the general misery, from about 1350 on there were recurring outbreaks of plague, the ' Black Death ', which decimated the population of Europe. In the religious field, there was considerable trouble caused by the ' Spiritual ' Franciscans, and the emergence of secularist theories concerning Church government. With the schism of the West in 1378, the religious allegiance of the West was split in two. To take an example, England declared for the Roman Pope, and the French, naturally enough, supported the Pope residing at Avignon. In Ireland, while the

[1] Quoted by Father Joseph Gill : *The Council of Florence*, pp. 11–12.

Pale followed England's line, most of the rest of the country supported the French Pope. As the schism persisted, the various Conciliar theories, which began by seeing in a General Council the only hope of re-establishing unity in the government of the Church, ended by declaring the Council superior to the Pope. Indeed, it is easy enough to explain the inactivity of the West during this century; which saw the destruction and all but annihilation of Byzantine power; but that does not lessen the tragedy.

Nor was the Byzantine Empire without its own religious troubles at this time. The Palamite controversy divided the Greek Church, and tended to range the monks, the normal guides of the people, against many of the hierarchy. It was unfortunate, too, that the anti-Palamite group were branded as ' Latinizers ', mainly due to their use of the works of St Thomas Aquinas. The heresy remained, and so did the ignorant prejudice against the Latins. This was an ominous sign for the future.[1]

The threat which the Turks presented not merely to the Byzantine Empire but to Christendom as a whole was clearly perceived by the Popes, as early as Benedict XI in 1304. In this they were the statesmen of their period. They realized that the Byzantine Empire would have to be helped in the struggle, or Western Europe might pay the price of failure. And, on the Greek side, in the face of the growing peril, the old policy of keeping the Latins out of Constantinople would have to be reversed. So contact was renewed on political grounds. It was contact between two governments, rather than between two Churches. The Emperor, not the Patriarch takes the initiative. The Pope is approached not as the Head of the Church, but, at a period when religion and politics were so intermingled, as the one who has the monopoly of Crusades, envisaged as works of piety and religion. Practically, the Pope is visualized as the political centre of the West.

Under Clement VI there had seemed to be hope of settling matters satisfactorily, but dynastic troubles hampered the Greek Emperor. And, we must remember, trouble in Constantinople always led to an intensification of anti-Latin propaganda on one side or the other. Religious union had to be considered, and came to be looked on by the Popes as a necessary prerequisite for a Crusade. Yet religious union did not necessarily mean that help would be forthcoming. In 1365 Emperor John V Palaeologus made his submission to Rome, and promised that he would work for union of the Churches. But no help followed. And the expedition of John of Vienne with the Hungarians in favour of Constantinople was defeated by the Turks at Nicepolis in 1296. It did not necessarily follow

[1] Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) became the leader of the Hesychastic (or Quietist) group among the Greek monks. Their doctrine may be reduced to the following points : i. Contemplation is the highest end of man. ii. The contemplative using a special ascetic system sees the Divine Light, the same as that of Thabor. iii. This is not the Divine Essence but the Divine Operation (hence a real distinction in God between the two). This doctrine led to great division in the Greek Church, and developed fanatically anti-Latin overtones. It is still part of the Greek Orthodox background. Mount Athos was the centre of this doctrine.

that help would be effective. Hence, while there is a party in Constantinople which holds that union is useless even as a political weapon, the idea of union does tend to become disengaged from the political situation. The difficulty was that it was impossible to forget the political situation, with the Church of the first Council at Nicaea across the straits already become a mosque. Practically, we may say that at the beginning of the fifteenth century, true union was seen to be a political necessity. It would solve domestic and foreign difficulties better than any other solution. There were many factors working towards union in both East and West. Apart from some influences which have already been mentioned, the educated classes in Constantinople were sympathetic enough to the idea of union, although they looked on it as the lesser evil. In the West, the apostolic enthusiasm of Raymond Lull for the study of Greek, which led to the enactment of the Council of Vienne in 1312 that Chairs of Greek Studies should be set up in Rome, Paris, Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca, had not borne much fruit. However as the fourteenth century ended, Greek scholars made their appearances in the West, and the Emperor Manuel II in 1399 made quite an impression when he toured the courts of France, England, Germany and Italy asking for help.

But, in the preparation of men's minds for reunion,[1] there was a disastrous omission, which, at the risk of inducing boredom, must be stressed again. The monks in the East were not won over. And, ultimately, they were the key to union. John Beccos had noted years before—I translate summarily—' they are the guides of the people, not arguing logically but simply and blindly following the path of their prejudice, repeating that nothing must be changed in the faith as they have received it.'[2]

In the early part of the fourteenth century, the Greeks occasionally tried to have a Council held in which the differences between the two Churches might be fully discussed. But the Popes would have no discussion. Submission to the agreement of Lyons was their watchword. The Great Schism of the West changed all that. Much more sympathy was shown to the Greeks' demand. And, from another point of view, the Conciliar epoch was favourable to the idea of Reunion. After all, it was the problem of union in the West itself that a Council was to solve. Hence, the affair moved more rapidly, and under Martin V negotiations had proceeded to the point where the Pope had agreed to send representatives to a Council to be held in Constantinople. Later, because of the danger to travellers in the East, and the Turkish menace to Constantinople itself, the Pope urged the holding of the proposed Council

[1] The best treatment I have discovered of the complicated issues which swayed both sides on all levels is to be found in three articles published by Father Viller in the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* : La question de l'Union des Églises entre Grecs et Latins depuis le concile de Lyon jusqu'à celui de Florence '. 1921, pp. 260–305 ; pp. 515–532 ; 1922, pp. 20–60.

[2] Beccus : *De Unione Ecclesiarum.* Migne, P. G. 141. 20.

in Italy. Pope Eugenius IV, from 1431 on, worked with great energy for the holding of this Council. Providentially this was to be his salvation against the extreme Conciliarist position which more and more dominated the recalcitrant Council of Basel, in session since 1431. In fact, the presence of the Greeks at their Council became a point of contention between the Fathers of Basel and the Pope, who had decided to hold a Council not at Basel but elsewhere. The division between Pope and Council hardened. And the Greeks were solicited by the representatives of both parties, although they were not allowed a clear view of Western differences lest they be discouraged. In the event, they decided for the Pope. He had always been the Supreme Head of the Latin Church. Finally, on the arrival of the Greeks, the Pope's Council held its first session at Ferrara on 8 January 1438.

Barlaam, a most interesting personality and the dedicated opponent of Gregory Palamas, had come to Avignon in 1339 to enquire confidentially on behalf of the Emperor as to the possibilities of a Council being held. In the situation of the time, he was rejected and we may gather from the Latin accounts how prejudiced was Latin opinion at that time. Barlaam had pleaded for a Council to be held in Constantinople, not in the West:

> they (the Greek representatives), on their return to the East, having concluded an agreement with you, will not be able to induce our people to believe that what has been agreed upon is in accordance with the teaching of the holy Fathers. Others will rise against them through envy or vain-glory or even with the intention of doing good, who will say : Brethren, do not be seduced by these men, nor listen to them, for they say what they say, because they have been corrupted by gifts or vain-glory. Stand firm in the faith you hold.[10]

These were prophetic words.

FLORENCE AND AFTER

The Council of Ferrara-Florence was the only true Reunion Council held between Latins and Greeks. The main dogmatic differences were fully ventilated, with the one exception of the Palamite theology which taught a real distinction in God between the divine essence and operation. The Latins wanted this to be brought out into the open, but the Greeks closed ranks when the question was raised, and the Latins did not insist. The Greeks were fully representative of their Church. The Patriarch Joseph II was present as were representatives of the other Patriarchs, who were not themselves allowed to travel by the Turkish authorities.

[10] Theiner : *Annales Ecclesiastici* (Baronii-Raynaldi), Vol. 25, p. 160, col. 1.

At least twenty-five archbishops and bishops were present including Isidore of Kiev, with some hundreds of abbots, monks, court officials and other laymen. The Emperor John VIII Palaeologus presided at the sessions of the Council beside the Pope. To forestall the objection raised later by the anti-unionists, it may be remarked here that the Emperor did not interfere unduly with his ecclesiastics. Strictly ecclesiastical and theological discussion was left to them, although he had little patience for unreasonable and obstinate opposition to the decisions of the majority, once theological questions had been fully discussed. The fact that Mark of Ephesus was the official spokesman of the Greeks, even when his attitude became clear, is proof of this.

But there was an apparent weakness in the position of the Greek delegates from the beginning. The Pope had to support the cost of the transport and maintenance of the Greeks, and as the negotiations dragged on interminably, it became increasingly difficult to provide the sums of money agreed upon. Hence there was the suggestion that agreement on specific topics became the condition for an already overdue allowance. This line of propaganda was not unexploited by the anti-unionist faction later.

The Greeks, who seem to have come to the West convinced that, once they had explained their theology, the Latins would be brought to see the truth of the Greek position, were speedily disillusioned. Even Mark of Ephesus was not able to debate with Cardinal Cesarini and the Dominican Provincial of Lombardy, John of Montenero, without betraying his woodenness and lack of acquaintance with many patristic texts brought forward to support the Latin position. The dialectic of the Latins aroused the hostility of the Greeks in many cases, while they were not able to answer the arguments of their opponents. Syropoulus, a deacon and official of the Great Church in Constantinople, who later retracted his signing of the Act of Union, tells us in his *Memoirs* of the effect produced on one of the Georgian envoys, when Montenero appealed to the authority of Aristotle on some point :

> He said : 'What about Aristotle, Aristotle ? A fig for your fine Aristotle'. And when I by word and gesture asked : 'What is fine ?', the Georgian replied : 'St Peter, St Paul, St Basil, Gregory the Theologian ; a fig for your Aristotle, Aristotle'.[11]

The fact is that the Greeks had fallen sadly from their old tradition of learning. The Turkish wars had disrupted their centres of learning for a long time, and even apart from this, they were content to study Photius's old tract on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, and count that

[11] Quoted by Father Gill : *The Council of Florence*, p. 227. It need hardly be said that Father Gill's book is the best treatment of the Council of Florence which has yet appeared.

their theology of the Trinity. The charge of ignorance is not a ' calumny of the Latins ', but was made against them by their own Emperor and Bessarion. A simple passage from one of the Fathers, without commentary practically, sufficed to settle all questions in a most ingenuous manner.

Hence after some public debates, very long drawn out and detailed, at Ferrara and later at Florence, where the Council moved early in 1339, public sessions were replaced by private sessions of the theologians of both sides, or rather by two separate groups exchanging formulae, which expressed their opinions and decisions. This was not the fault of the Emperor or the Patriarch, who was apparently a most lovable character, and a very good influence working towards Union. Unfortunately, the Patriarch was a very sick man, and his death on the eve of the promulgation of Union, to which he had assented, robbed the pro-Union party of its most valuable support.

Briefly, let us outline some of the main points which emerge from the dogmatic discussions. The addition to the Creed, and the theology of the addition, were the two main points discussed at length. With agreement reached on these two points, the other points of difference, Purgatory—in which we note the different stages of development reached by both Churches—the use of leavened or unleavened bread for the Eucharist, and the Primacy of the Roman See, were soon agreed upon. On the Eucharist, as in the main ritual differences, a position of mutual tolerance was soon arrived at, and the Pope agreed not to insist on a statement about the strict ' form ' of the sacrament. These matters as well as the Primacy were not debated in public session. Although we are not fully informed of the details of discussion as regards the Primacy, the final agreement, which the Greeks signed at Florence, does not fall far short of the definition of the Vatican Council. The doctrine of Purgatory was agreed upon also at the private meetings which preceded the Act of Union, but it had been rather fully discussed in public and private at Ferrara.

As regards the addition to the Creed, it was simply a matter of explaining the prohibition of the Council of Ephesus, that no addition be made to the Creed, in the sense intended, namely, that unofficial or heterodox additions were prohibited, in view of the prevailing danger of Nestorianism. This was accepted, in the end, by most of the Greeks. The theological defence of the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son involved a detailed examination of patristic texts, and here the Latins proved their acquaintance not merely with the Latin Fathers, whom the Greeks did not know, but also with the Greek Fathers. The Greeks were taken aback at this display of erudition, and the few passages which they relied upon were subjected to a minute examination, and the point was made that indefinite passages should be explained by taking into account other passages from the Greek Fathers—a method which

John Beccus in the years that followed the Union of Lyons had used with great effect.

The Latins explained their position, that the Holy Spirit proceeded from Father and Son, but from the Son as Himself receiving from the Father, so that the two, Father and Son, are one principle in the spiration of the Holy Spirit, not two distinct principles, as the Greeks had understood the Latins to teach. The result was that many of the Greeks were shaken in their loyalty to their own exclusion of the Son in the spiration of the Holy Spirit. For they had, by their polemics, emptied their consecrated formulae of any intelligible meaning. In the conferences which they held among themselves at the bed-side of their dying Patriarch, a further point was made, although it would be difficult to defend theologically. But it would seem to have been the reason which moved the majority more than any Latin scholastic fireworks. It may be stated quite simply. All the Saints and Fathers of the Church are moved by the same Holy Spirit ; now the Spirit can not contradict Himself ; hence it follows that if the Latin Fathers clearly teach the Latin position, and doubts can be raised concerning the teaching of the Greek Fathers, then the true interpretation of the writings of the Greek Fathers must be sought from the Fathers of the Latin Church.

One man stood resolutely aside from this swing to the Latin position, Mark of Ephesus. His arguments were seen by his colleagues to be an obstinate repetition of a few passages from the Greek Fathers, with the minimum of explanation, and the calm statement that the passages adduced from the Latin Fathers were forgeries. Greek was a subtle language, perhaps too well equipped for theological debate, and many shades of meaning were possible, but Bessarion and Isidore and the other Greeks were in a position to evaluate his arguments, and they rejected them.

It is unfortunate that the Council had dragged on so long. The postponements and delays which filled the long days and months came from the Greek side. We may sympathize with them in those critical last days of the Council, when they longed to be home again, and one has the feeling that they discussed the final stages of the drafted Act of Union, looking over their shoulders, as it were, at the menace of the Turks and the fate of their country ; to some the end of the world seemed to be upon them. Mark of Ephesus stood apart from all these negotiations. He was entrenched in all his old opinions and prejudices. But agreement was arrived at between the other Greeks and the Latins. On Monday, 6 July 1439, the Union was publicly proclaimed with great rejoicing, and soon afterwards the Greeks departed for Constantinople, which they had left on 27 November 1437.

As is well known, the Union of Florence failed to produce lasting results. It was not so obvious, however, at the time that this would

happen, as it certainly had been after the Union of Lyons. There was much good will among the Greeks, and the Emperor had shown a proper appreciation of the importance of the work. But the death of Patriarch Joseph II had robbed the Greek bishops of a centre of concord and good will. His successor, elected in Constantinople, although faithful to the work of Union, had not the same influence. Nor was the Emperor in Constantinople the man he had been at Florence. On the day of his return to his capital, he was informed of the death of his wife. He retired into mourning, and from then on seemed to have no heart for any serious effort on behalf of Union. It is undoubted that his tolerant attitude towards Mark of Ephesus was decisive. Mark became the centre of a bitter anti-unionist intrigue, and the age-old prejudices were stirred up. More important, Mark succeeded in detaching from the Unionist party the learned Scholarius, who became the leader of the agitation against Union after Mark's death, and who finally, as the monk Gennadius, became the first Patriarch of Constantinople to be invested by the Sultan. Mark of Ephesus was the evil genius who worked against Union with unscrupulous propaganda, which seemed to be supported by his own personal asceticism and his unflinching record at Florence. Others who had supported the Union at Florence, once they were at home in their familiar environment, seemed to feel that they had betrayed their Church. And there was the great mass of the people, led by their monks, who were only too easily induced to follow Mark of Ephesus and Scholarius-Gennadius. Rome seems not to have envisaged any programme of popular preaching to counter this propaganda, which might have been foreseen ; and there was no personality among the Unionists to match Mark of Ephesus. Bessarion had left Constantinople in 1440, and Isidore of Kiev was occupied with his own troubles in Russia. In any event, the Unionists had the more difficult task—to persuade the people to turn their backs on history. Mark and his party had only to keep alive the old prejudices and confirm an already ingrained attitude.

Pope Eugenius IV worked hard for a Crusade to help Constantinople, and he had a land army assembled under Cardinal Cesarini, with Ladislas of Poland and Hunyadi of Hungary. A fleet was also gathered from the Venetians and the Burgundians. The rest of Europe sent no help. France and Germany remained neutral between the Pope and the remnant of Basel. Effective help would undoubtedly have forwarded the work of Union. But such help was not possible.

In 1444 at the battle of Varna, Murad II with about 80,000 men, ferried across the straits quite probably by the Genoese, defeated the Christian forces, about 20,000 in all, while contrary winds prevented the Papal fleet from offering support. Cardinal Cesarini and King Ladislas of Poland were killed ; of the leaders only Hunyadi escaped, to be again defeated at Kossovo in 1446. Constantinople made a treaty with the

Turks, but the end was not long delayed. At the end of 1452 the situation was desperate. The wrath of God seemed to be upon the city, interpreted by each party according to its lights. We have Gennadius's word for it that the enthusiasm for Union in the city was intense : to oppose it was ' like trying to put out a forest fire '.[1] Once again the Union was proclaimed by the Emperor, now Constantine XI, on 12 December 1452, at the insistence of Isidore of Kiev, who managed to escape after the fall of the city. No help could now arrive in time. On 8 April 1453, Mahomet laid siege to the city. On 29 May, Constantinople was captured. The Emperor Constantine XI fell in battle. The Great Church of the Hagia Sophia became a mosque. The anti-unionists were in power. The Union of Florence was at an end.

The subsequent history of the Greek Orthodox Church does not concern us here, except that we may remark that old prejudice remained entrenched. The official, Orthodox reaction to the Reformation assumed an anti-Catholic trend ; and the later setting up of the Uniate Melchite Church of Antioch at the beginning of the eighteenth century had a similar result. The negotiations for Union in the past failed, so far as we can see, because they remained too much on the official level. The future of true Union must lie in an approach to the ordinary people who cling obstinately to their traditions in the Orthodox Church.

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[1] Gill, *l.c.*, p. 386. Father Gill's discussion of the reasons for the failure of the Union of Florence is one of the best things in his book.

Book Reviews

ART

ENGLISH ART : 1800-1870. By T. S. R. Boase. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1959. Pp. 352. Illus. 50s.

THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT. Catalogue of Exhibition held at the Tate Gallery, London, 1959. London : Arts Council of Great Britain. Pp. 540. Illus. 15s.

It used to be fashionable, and perhaps it still is, to deride the art of nineteenth century England. With the evidence provided by the latest volume in *The Oxford History of English Art* we are able to form a better judgment, and a more favourable one. The first sixty years of the last century could not, it is true, boast of sculptors of the quality of Moore, Butler, Hepworth or Epstein. Architecture was often bizarre enough—but what has the twentieth century to put beside the work of Nash, Sloane, Barry, or, for that matter, Paxton or Pugin ? In painting there has certainly been no one comparable to Turner, Constable or Blake. The credits are negative, so to speak : lapses in taste have been less frequent and less gross ; but these lapses add to our enjoyment of the history of the period.

The unhurried pace of Dr Boase's narrative gives no hint of the labour involved in reducing a vast amount of material to a coherent story. At odd moments—in an allusion to Frith's *Derby Day*, for instance—we catch a glimpse of unexplored territory. We can be grateful for his generous quotations from contemporary criticism. He captures the mind and mood of the time with gentle irony. A little too gentle, perhaps ; we miss the astringency of Lytton Strachey. The rising middle class for whom this art was produced were too complacent by half, and they betrayed their vulgarity, their pride in wealth and technical achievement, and their idiotic notion of progress by their arrogant bad taste. Nothing could be left alone ; everything had to be embellished. Not content with building a fine suspension bridge at Conway, Telford had to mimic Conway Castle in his towers, and the castle has been laughing at them ever since.

It was a period of extraordinary diversity of styles and mixtures of styles : Neo-classical, Gothic, Grecian, Italianate, Egyptian, Moorish, Oriental. And yet through all art forms, painting, sculpture, design, architecture, from the Brighton Pavilion to the Crystal Palace, we find the same unifying spirit : romanticism. Dr Boase does not define what he means by romanticism, and wisely. In a sense he does not need to ; for in England romanticism was not a new, revolutionary movement, but a tradition. ' Scott's heroes sallied out from a fortress that had long been held by far more redoubtable figures, Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello and Falstaff, leaders of very anti-classical battalions.' The Romantic Movement exhibition in London last autumn has, if anything, left the term more obscure than ever. In the catalogue of

the exhibition Mr E. R. Meijer remarks that Victor Hugo's ' true definition ' of romanticism, ' liberty in art, liberty in society ', is not really a definition of romanticism but a condition required for its full development. The term is too wide and too vague. To become manageable it must be broken down into divisions such as those used in the exhibition (though not referred to in the otherwise admirable catalogue) : Legendary Past, Nationalism and the Cult of the Hero, Wild Animals and the Cult of the Exotic, Interpretation of the Poets, Pastoral, Horror, Death and the Supernatural. But this does not bring us any nearer to the root meaning. Perhaps Mr Meijer comes nearest to it when he defends Daumier's inclusion in the exhibition on the grounds that, though a satirist and realist, he was not detached ; he identified himself with people, as Friedrich identified himself with nature. Emotional involvement in reality or the projection of subjective states would seem to be at the basis of the notion of romanticism.

Nineteenth century romanticism did not attain the freedom Hugo postulated. Stylistically it was still the heir of Renaissance classicism and naturalism, but it was struggling to free itself. The battle of Romantics and Classicists was not so much a battle of two styles, as the struggle of a spirit against a style ; and the stylistic revivals were inspired by the desire to find an alternative to classicism. It was not until the present century that romanticism found its own means of expression. It is not surprising to find that Constable and still more Turner are forerunners of modern abstract painters. Romanticism, in so far as it emancipates itself from reality, must be in some measure abstract.

This lack of contact with reality has social consequences which Dr Boase does not consider, though they should come within the competence of an art historian. Disregard of the sufferings of their fellows on the part of the English middle classes in the last century must surely be explained in part by this spirit of romanticism which made it possible to look on a slum-dweller or factory-worker as something sordid—neither noble, like a medieval artisan, nor horrific, like a slave flung to the mercy of sea monsters—while mourning the death of a ' faithful ' horse or dog.

CYRIL BARRETT

L'ART ET L'HOMME, Tomes I et II. pp. 366, 464. Illustrated. Paris : Libraire Larousse. Nf. 53.85, 75.00.

A COMPENDIUM of art history which does all that is required of it and far more is something to be hailed, if only from a distance (the volumes on mythology and astronomy in the same series have already been translated). The first two volumes bring the history down to the end of the Renaissance. They contain nearly two thousand five hundred plates, maps and tables. Some of the plates are small but impeccably printed. The merely factual information (names, dates, works) is to be found in convenient summaries at the ends of chapters. The way is thus clear and the materials at hand for a general account of a period. This work has been entrusted to a team of international scholars, among them Abbé Breuil, Lionello Venturi, Georges Contenau, Christopher Hawkes, Basil Gray. The most remarkable quality of the book is its synthe-

sized view, at once sweeping and detailed. This is especially impressive in the first volume where the various aspects of complex periods, the prehistoric, protohistoric and the early civilizations, are treated in close relationship. One is able to fix a civilization in its correct historical context, and trace an artistic idea through its various modifications as it passes, for example, from Asia Minor to Persia, India, South East Asia, China and Japan.

Traffic in ideas is one of the main interests of the editor, René Huyghe. Not content with mere art history he wants his book to be a contribution to the history of ideas in so far as developments in art spring from and manifest developments in human thought—hence the title, *Art and Man*. That we can learn something about man from his works hardly needs proof. To make the correct illations is not easy, and, one might think, presumptious to attempt. But M. Huyghe, who has taken this task into his own hands, has, by and large, done a fine piece of work, and in doing it has opened up to the public a new aspect of art history, and an important one. He seems to be more at home in art history proper than in more general questions, and those who may have been disappointed by his recent book *The Discovery of Art* should not be put off reading this one.

The only period which M. Huyghe treats in detail is the period of early Christian art in Ireland. Here he has been at pains to be fair, and has restored to Irish artists much of what was misappropriated in the name of Northumbria by ' the learned Belgian, M. Masai '. Even if one cannot accept his suggestion that the flower of Irish art was produced by way of compensation for the defeat at Whitby, we can be grateful for his use of the term ' Hiberno-Northumbrian ', or better, ' Hiberno-English ', even for works which no one could claim to have been executed in Ireland.

CYRIL BARRETT

BIOGRAPHY AND MEMOIRS

RONALD KNOX. By Evelyn Waugh. London : Chapman and Hall. 1959. 358 pp. 30s.

THIS book has provoked considerable discussion—apart from the memoirs of generals and the life of Queen Mary perhaps more than any publication of the last year—and the late Monsignor Knox has emerged as an enigmatic and on the whole controversial figure. This is remarkable for though his achievement was great, most, if not almost all of his life was spent in quiet places, with little activity apart from occasional appearances as a preacher, usually on special occasions ; at the end it led to a monument, the translation of the Bible, to the praise or blame of which it yet remains for posterity to speak.

The enigma remains : of what sort was this reclusive figure, who could write the most vivacious and ingenious thrillers, biting satires, perfect Latin, introductions to the Mass for schoolgirls, and end with the surprisingly underestimated achievement of his one-man translation of the Bible. Was he a good mixer ? Mr Waugh would have us believe so, but holds that he was shy and melancholy and much relieved when his evening guests left—no midnight conversations there ! Was he a devout man, a man of prayer ?

Essentially so, Mr Waugh would have us believe, and there is every reason to do so, but the occasions when he pulls back the curtain are tantalizingly few and the curtain is only brought back a very little way. Was he happy as a Catholic ? Again the author's answer would seem to be ' yes ', but there is a faint shadow in the background, rather as in the case of Newman, but with far more reason. Newman, for instance, became almost immediately the Superior of a religious order ; not so Ronald Knox, he was to be a master at an obscure school, earning something catastrophically below Trade Union standards. It is true that, unlike Newman, his plans for translating the Bible were not prematurely capsized, but when the *magnum opus* was complete he had to undergo a barrage from the committee ; the labour alone entailed by this must have been very considerable. It is of interest that his most stalwart opponent on the committee was the scholarly Father Martindale, S.J.

Mr Waugh no doubt does not intend us to solve the enigma, but he takes us very pleasantly through this quiet but full life, whose chief events took place perhaps on paper, apart from the conversion and ordination. We start with the perhaps priggish boyhood of this son of an Evangelical bishop of pronounced views, soon followed by a brilliant career at Eton. This was in its turn to be followed by a brilliant career at Oxford in those patrician days before the first world war when the talent of the country seem to have found their way there, to be wiped out so soon in the great holocaust. A chaplaincy at Trinity College followed.

What a contrast with the austere student days of young Mr Newman, not yet fully emerged from the shadow of Calvinism. It was different with young Mr Knox, by then in the full swim of the Anglo-Catholic movement, which at that time was on the crest of the wave. As an elderly clergyman, who figures in these pages, said to the present reviewer : ' In those days it was really exciting. We believed we were leading a revolution.' With this period in Knox's life Waugh deals particularly well, and it is described with the vivacity it deserves.

Then came the first war, and shattered everything ; gone was the Oxford of those halcyon days, and the circle of friends was soon fighting in the mud of Northern France. Specially interesting is the account of these, of the mysterious ' C ' and of their attraction towards Catholicism. Meanwhile Knox found himself isolated at Oxford. It might be thought that the obvious thing was for him to volunteer as an army chaplain, and Mr Waugh does not sufficiently stress the reason why he could not do so, at this very important turning point in his life. At that time the Chaplain General on the Anglican side was a man of narrow opinions, who managed to question prospective chaplains so that it was impossible for an Anglo-Catholic to join ; there is an amusing little anecdote here about how to deal with a dying man. There would have been no place among the low church chaplains for the notorious young Mr Knox—or was he usually Father Knox ?

A period as a temporary schoolmaster at Shrewsbury under the wise and liberal Dr Alington followed, and Knox must have been a delightful schoolmaster. But he was unhappy all the time and deeply disturbed : the shadow of Peter had fallen on him, setting up a painful internal struggle, but there could be no question how it would end. It reached the point when he said

to his friend Vernon Johnson : ' It's Rome or nothing now '. On 22 September 1917 the first half of his life came to an end, and he was received into the Church at Farnborough Abbey.

It is in the Catholic side of the book that the author becomes interestingly controversial, and his subject perhaps more enigmatic. Mr Waugh clearly liked neither Cardinal Bourne nor Bishop Myers, and he makes his dislike felt, while his picture of St Edmund's College, Ware (the seminary for the archdiocese of Westminster) whither Ronald Knox was eventually sent, is a sombre one, different to the sparkling mischief of the Anglo-Catholic days. Here he was to spend seven and a half years before taking over the chaplaincy at Oxford. There are those who are offended at the way the author has treated them ; in his ignorance, the reviewer sympathizes with the author ; he thinks the story contrasts strangely with the welcome given to Newman by the generous, sanguine Wiseman who went even to the lengths of burning his throat with hot punch.

They are calm if at times dark waters over which we are led, and the enigma remains ; was Ronald Knox happy, was he lonely, in the pleasant though exacting life of the Oxford chaplaincy ? Gone were the friends of the brilliant days. The chapter on ' Chaplaincraft ' is excellent and one hopes it will be read by the chaplains of all universities, whether ancient or modern. The description of dinners at the Old Palace (the chaplain's residence) is a little depressing ; one suspects it is rather overdone.

There were the two long periods to follow, so quiet and calm in outward appearances, so active with the pen : at Aldenham as the guest of Lord and Lady Acton, at Mells, till the end of his life, as the guest of Mrs Raymond Asquith. To Aldenham a convent school was evacuated during the war ; Monsignor Knox, as he then was, became the chaplain of the school and was highly popular with the children, for whom he wrote *The Mass in Slow Motion*. There was nothing sombre about this period, cramped and uncomfortable and badly fed though it may have been ; one thinks the author exaggerates the Monsignor's troubles and discomforts ; war was very uncomfortable for everyone, and he had the advantage of living in a quiet part of England.

The Actons moved to Africa and the Monsignor moved to Mells, to what is perhaps the most beautiful manor-house in the country. The best part of the book deals with these retired, declining years, during which the author and his subject really came to know each other. They had been preceded by a minor though interesting battle over the *Manual of Prayers* which he had revised. There followed the struggle over the translation of the New Testament, here revealed to the public for the first time, but ' at long last, in October 1945, six years after it had been begun and three years after it had been finished', the great work appeared. After many misgivings and maybe misunderstandings, Ronald Knox had won. The chapter dealing with this controversy is a most valuable contribution to the annals of twentieth century Catholicism.

Mr Waugh leads us by placid stages to the peaceful ending at Mells, with the production of Ronald Knox's life-work, *Enthusiasm*, a singularly remarkable book, and the great swan-song of the Romanes lecture in the Sheldonian theatre at Oxford. He describes these last weeks with a restraint that is all the more telling for its simplicity.

This book is not merely a contribution to Catholic annals, as has been mentioned above: it is also a very valuable contribution to English biography : an enigmatic figure is made to live vividly, though in subtle and not vivid colours. Often he tells us of his life in his own words, usually Mr Waugh takes up the tale in his dignified and monumental prose. Often one may disagree with him, but one enjoys his freedom of mind and speech ; he has written an excellent life of one of the most fascinating Catholics of our day.

WICKLOW

THE PRUDENT DIPLOMAT

THE INNER CIRCLE : MEMOIRS OF SIR IVONE KIRKPATRICK. London : Macmillan. 1959. Pp. x, 275. 25s.

As Head of the British Chancery in Berlin from 1933 to 1938 and British High Commissioner for the Federal Republic from 1950 until 1953, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick had a grand-stand view of great events and swift developments. These memoirs reveal him—and not alone in retrospect—as a man of insight and wisdom. His judgments of Nazi intentions were realistic when others were lulling themselves into a mood of wishful security, and he did all he could to help restore independence and with it political responsibility to the West Germans. This book is the record of a happy life and a distinguished career, that has ranged from Gallipoli and Intelligence work in Holland, through minor appointments at Rio de Janeiro, Rome and the Vatican, to the twin centres between which his later years oscillated, the Foreign Office in London and Berlin or Bonn.

Unlike some recent *mémoiristes*, he does not obtrude himself forcibly and does not suggest that many, if not most, of his collaborators were blockheads. On the contrary, he is most appreciative of men, opponents as well as colleagues. Apart from a well justified comment on Hitler as a logical and ruthless criminal, a flash of contempt at Ribbentrop and a somewhat irate dismissal of Mr Pick of the Ministry of Information, he is unfailingly kind. He shows himself devoted to, and not critical of, Foreign Office traditions, as they were exemplified in Sir Eyre Crowe and Curzon, and he can express a personal affection for Sir Nevil Henderson from whom he differed radically in outlook. His heart goes out furthest to Ernest Bevin, who is characterized as ' robust and British ', a veritable ' rock ' ; of great natural kindness and real interest in persons ; yet shrewd and practical, certainly not—as has been hinted—in the hands of permanent officials, with the memory of an elephant and impossible to move or bounce once he had taken a decision. Sir Ivone attributes the Brussels Treaty and the formation of N.A.T.O. in considerable measure to Mr Bevin's persistence and declares that the success of the Petersberg agreement was due in the main to his patience and skill. Bevin had little sympathy with German Socialists—a sentiment that went back to their attitude to the first world war—and, he found Dr Adenauer far easier to deal with than Dr Schumacher. Sir Ivone has a similar admiration—and almost affection

—for Dr Adenauer, who remained confident and imperturbable through the troubled post-war years 'because he is a man guided by principles, clearly formulated in his mind, to which he clings with great tenacity'. He saw in the German Chancellor a 'redoubtable but charming adversary', always quick to detect any weakness in his opponent's armour but equally quick generously to acknowledge the strength in the opponent's case. With the one exception of Dr Schumacher, whom he found bitter and ultra-sensitive, he has a warm regard for the leading figures, C.D.U. and Socialist, in the new Republic.

I have called Sir Ivone 'a prudent diplomat'. His account of these critical years is factual and sober ; there is no attempt to create atmosphere or to dramatize situations. The result is a certain coldness of tone. Characters are named but not described ; there are no portraits or vignettes. The author could have told us much more about his work with the European section of the B.B.C. during the war and of his years as High Commissioner, for what he has given us is a factual survey. He has material for many good stories but they are told too briefly and with too little detail to be really good. He is no born *raconteur*, is rarely piquant and—oh, never indiscreet. It is perhaps a pity that the events he analyses most minutely are those already reasonably well known from previous memoirs, the meetings at Godesberg and Munich and the Hess affair.

The book casts an interesting light on a number of subsidiary questions. Diplomatic missions, the author declares, have three tasks : to negotiate with the foreign government concerned ; to explain Britain and British policy to that government and its people ; and finally, to interpret the country in which they work to the British government. He does not consider that the importance of such missions has been reduced by summit and other international meetings. In his opinion, based upon wide experience, Information Services in a democracy cannot be expected to function very well in peace time : and this on account of prevailing ignorance, the tendency of a Parliamentary administration to economize in educative and cultural matters and the public wish for a slick and hard-hitting service which would lean more towards effect than truth. He thinks that, in spite of these difficulties, the British and American Information Services are the best in the world. I have always myself felt that cultural information and propaganda are best handled by the French.

Reading through the earlier chapters of this book, I had the impression that, although the author knew Germany very well and was thoroughly familiar with the German situation and was also right in his assessment of the Nazis, he was wanting in general sympathy with the German people, identifying them too readily with the Nazi movement. Certainly, his chief experience of Germans found them in abnormal periods, before and after the war. But, as I read further, the impression faded even if it did not entirely disappear. It may have been a false one all the time but I record it as an impression. But, in the main, this is a very readable, informative and interesting book and it provides a valuable approach to several chapters, and important chapters at that, of modern history. It is also a worthy monument to nearly forty years of dedicated work.

JOHN MURRAY

A REFLECTIVE TRAVELLER

MAINLY IN WONDER. By Desmond Fennell. London : Hutchinson. 1959. Pp. 272. 21s.

Mr Fennell has the disarming Irish habit of taking the reader by the sleeve right from the start. He tells him he is of Irish country stock and is venturing into the twentieth century world to which, in his opinion, his Irish forebears have contributed very little. This may be another injustice to Ireland for I can recall the line of monasteries built by the Celtic monks from the North Sea down to Central Italy—I remember one Carinthian shepherd boy with the name of Killian—and the Irish officers in the service of France, Spain and Poland. A Catholic Irishman is in many a respect more at home on the Continent than an English Protestant. But, having won your sympathies, the author expresses his wish to see things and people as they are with a fresh eye ; he wants neither *parti pris* nor prejudices and is travelling *mainly in* the spirit of *wonder*, that healthy imaginative curiosity which is the beginning of personal experience and a basis for human understanding. It is a claim that is well substantiated in the book.

He has the advantage of several years' contact with the Continent, four in Spain and Germany and a fifth at a radio station in Cologne. His present, more ambitious tour—the theme of the book—takes him from Vienna across Yugoslavia, since it was then impossible to travel through Hungary, to Italy, thence via Burma to Japan and India. This is not, he claims quite fairly, a travel book though it has most of the qualities a good travel book ought to possess. The author has a keen eye for colour and backgrounds and his power of narrative grows as the book develops. Some charming vignettes linger in memory as I write : the Fresco gallery at Belgrade, Zagreb in winter, a fleeting glimpse of the Malayan coastline, and at greater length, a Japanese shrine at midnight, a *noh* play, the *ojhas*' exorcisms on the eve of Durga's festival, the ascent by night of Mount Fuji. Some of the descriptions have the clarity of a line drawing against a delicate *sfondo* and are reminiscent of Chinese or Japanese art. The author confesses to a serious interest in painting and stage presentation, devoting several pages to discussion about art and the theatre in Japan and Yugoslavia.

He has a sense of rhythm too and, when not too deliberate and self-conscious, a Celtic lilt gives quality to his writing. But now and then, the rhythm breaks down into an untidy syncopation and a string of curt and choppy sentences or phrases gives the impression of being hammered out artificially so as to produce a strong, almost violent style, and afterwards, one is made aware of the return to everyday prose. One small mannerism I found rather irritating, a habit of commenting in brackets on the opinions expressed by other persons—a kind of literary ' sez you ', but again it disappears as the book progresses. Otherwise, this is an admirable book, fresh and vivid with a constantly changing scene, episodic rather than continuous narrative.

I have spoken of the author as a *reflective* traveller. He appears to have spoken with people of every sort and in widely different surroundings. *Nil humani* might have been an appropriate sub-title, for his approach is one of

sympathy not criticism, and he realizes that understanding demands a measure of friendliness. He discusses and reflects upon a number of vital themes, in the main those of the relations of East and West ; the presence of Socialism in Asia, the possibility or otherwise of reconciling the traditional way of life with the new ideas, the ' two ' Indias and the ' two ' Japans. With some of his judgments one might quarrel, for example when he suggests that Eastern European events have now an internal logic and a set of premises of their own, as though nothing could be done, and little hoped for, about it, or when he states that there is no basic ideological difference in India between the Congress Party and the Communists. He draws some rather facile distinctions, between India, for example, and Spain and the parallel he outlines between Hindusim and Islam, in Asia, and Catholicism and Protestantism in Europe might have been thought of by a Belfast Presbyterian. But, in the main, this is a thoughtful as well as vividly descriptive book which ends with a note of appreciation for what he has seen and met and at the same time for the Europe from which he came—the Europe which ' injected the whole earth with her own hungers for belief and love . . . and gave doctrines for the beliefs to cling to and ethics that enabled love to expand '.

JOHN MURRAY

HISTORY

THE SENSE OF HISTORY. By. M. C. D'Arcy, S.J. London : Faber & Faber. 1959. Pp. 309. 30s.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By Jacques Maritain. London : Geoffrey Bles. 1959. Pp. xi+143. 15s.

HELLENISM. The History of a Civilization. By Arnold J. Toynbee. London : Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. ix+256. 7s. 6d.

After reading *The Sense of History*, you feel as though you have spent several days with Fr D'Arcy in his own library, in which over the years he has collected all that has appeared on the philosophy of history ; and you have been watching and listening while that remarkable person takes book after book from his shelves, waves it at you, tells you the author and sometimes the title, and then *talks* about it, as only he can. He gives you the background of the author's thought, his attitudes and aims, and then his thesis ; and then Fr D'Arcy adds his own comments. It seems at first a random talk, discursive to the *n*th degree, and dictated largely by whatever book comes to hand. Then you realize that the books are classified in some order, and that there is a shape and a purpose to Fr D'Arcy's talk. In his own rich and rambling way he defines historical knowledge as distinct from the knowledge of the physical sciences, establishes its validity, and then indicates how historicism, the philosophy of history, differs in its aims and methods from history. Unlike history, historicism has never been established as a valid science, but the search for a pattern in man's story has been a perennial temptation, and that not merely for small inquisitive minds, but for the greatest. Fr D'Arcy

traces the growth of a philosophy of history from Augustine to Toynbee, but does not try to offer his own interpretation of history. Rather he suggests tentative answers to the question : Can Christianity make any contribution to the understanding of history ?

His suggestions are three : first, that the temporal order and the cultural values in it need not be overlooked by Christians as a waste product ; secondly, the Christian's realization of the outstanding importance of each person, with the consequent cosmic quality of his choices, must colour our view of history ; and thirdly, he is confident that history revolves round Christ, not merely as a chronological point of reference, but as a living presence : ' Not only personal experience, but the historical movements, which must have some law and meaning, however elusive and vagrant they may seem at times to be, take their place in the expansion of the Sacred Humanity throughout the ages, the dry wood turning into the green.'

The first of these suggestions broaches a desire that is being echoed everywhere today, the desire for a theology of the temporal order, if such a thing be possible. Can theology prepare man for more than release from this vale of tears, can it exhort him not merely to do good, but to make the world a better-fed, better governed, healthier, more attractive place of exile ? Or is such humane ambition irrelevant to theology ? Has Christianity no earthly hope, no earthly plan, with which to counter the hope and promise which is the very core of Marxism, and which is today helping to trigger off the gigantic 'revolution of expectation' in Asia and Africa ? Gandhi said that, to a starving man, the only acceptable form in which God can appear is that of bread. Can Christianity offer him more than the promise of the beatitudes without betraying its mission ? Fr D'Arcy explores how far Christian theology can go while preserving its essentially other-worldly character, and without falling into the false optimism and deceitful promises of the Marxists.

The second suggestion, that each person in history has an importance all his own, is the more precious for being rare. Philosophers of history can operate only by stressing the general, the typical, and overlooking the man in the street. The speculative mind brushes past the individual and contingent in its urge to set up a system, to see what it calls the ' broad lines of development '. But the Christian recognizes each man's life as an end in itself. He is not just a pawn in the evolution of Absolute Spirit, nor a stepping-stone on mankind's way to a brave new Marxian world. ' No theory of religion or philosophy which has to liquidate nine-tenths of the human race for the benefit of a select few can be called Christian or human.'

It is easier, and probably wiser, to criticize other philosophies of history than to venture any positive theory. Christian thinkers agree that outside the perspective of the Incarnation, human history has no ultimate meaning. Within that perspective, it means the growth of the Body of Christ to its full stature. This gives us a new attitude to time, to death, to human freedom, and to evil in history. But it should not make us any bolder in offering ' explanations ' of specific events in history. Providence does not let us into the divine secrets to the extent demanded by Bossuet, or by those who read judgements and retributions of God in every major event.

If this book leaves you with more cautions than clarifications, if its pattern

is devious, and you feel at times that Fr D'Arcy needs a Plato to give shape to his dialogues, or at least an editor (and a more fastidious proof-reader) to make straight his paths, it is still a precious book. It is a chance to commune with an intelligent man who has read widely and thought deeply about his subject for more than twenty years.

To turn from this to M. Maritain's reflections is like going from a library to a laboratory, where an old and slightly pontifical master is applying a well-tried method to new material. Where Fr D'Arcy illumines his insights by constant poetic quotations or allusions, M. Maritain illumines his by geometrical diagrams. He gives the philosophy of history its place in his general scheme : ' It pertains to moral philosophy adequately taken, that is to say to moral philosophy complemented by data which the philosopher borrows from theology, and which deal with the existential condition of man, not only his human nature, but also original sin, grace, etc.'. M. Maritain establishes six ' axiomatic formulas, i.e. which manifest the stability, in the course of history, of certain basic relations or fundamental characteristics ' ; and eight ' typological formulas, i.e. more particularised statements which deal with the very growth of history and the variety of its ages or phases, and which manifest such and such typical direction in the historical development '.

In both sets of laws (which form the content of this philosophy of history) M. Maritain covers much the same ground as Fr D'Arcy, but with less of the murmur of books and more concentration on *quomodo se habeat veritas rerum*, in the best Thomist tradition. But he is not above descending from timeless truths to a topical warning, such as the timely one (p. 47) against the temptation to be subservient worshippers of history, to think, as the Marxists would have us think, that the only evil is to resist history, the only doom, to be rejected by history. The fascinating predictions of the state of the world in 1990, and estimates of future population, future school problems, scientific progress, and international changes and tensions, tend to blind us to the fact that the world in 1990 will have been shaped by our free selves, not by irresistible historical movements.

M. Maritain's language does not flow like Fr D'Arcy's, and he or his editor overuses the three dots at the end of a sentence to imply, apparently, that something unusually impressive has just been said. Also the use of the Douai text in several long quotations makes St Paul unnecessarily difficult. But the few true things that can be said on the philosophy of history are unlikely to be presented by anyone in shorter or clearer form than they are by M. Maritain in this meaty little book.

The Home University Library has published a work first drafted by Dr Toynbee in 1914, when he was still just a fine classical scholar. In its present form he tells the story of Greco-Roman civilization using his own categories of challenge and response. Dr Toynbee is never shy of the prophet's or moralist's role, and he shifts so easily from careful history to highly personal interpretation that he always arouses the historian's suspicions. However, the unusual range and fluency of his learning give this history a special value, not for university work, but as a general reader's survey of Hellenistic civilization.

PAUL ANDREWS

ADAMNAN'S DE LOCIS SANCTIS. Edited and translated by Denis Meehan. Dublin: The Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. 1958. Pp. 154.

The publication of this volume, the third in the series *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*, provides an opportunity to comment on the timeliness and significance of the series. Its significance was brought home to me by a geologist friend who fears that the humanities are likely to vanish in a pan-scientific world : ' You arts men ', he said, ' are pricing yourselves out of the market. You can't expect us to go on taking your products if it means our investing years of effort in dead languages and learned jargon. We don't *have* to take your stuff, you know ; it's your job to make us *want* it '. On this score my friend can have no grumble with Fr Meehan, who has produced a text that is attractive to the layman and contains the minimum of professional jargon. The timeliness of this series arises from the fact that it coincides with the similar series of Nelson's medieval classics which are making the English and Scottish medieval worlds less impenetrable to the layman. The Dublin Institute volumes seem likely to render a like service for medieval Ireland ; and if they were followed by a series of Irish texts on the same plan there might be a good chance that the educated foreigner would enjoy a truer picture of Irish history than he has at the moment.

If these are the objects that the editors have in mind then Fr Meehan's work fulfils them admirably. To begin with, he comes fresh to the period—as he himself tells us, with admirable candour, the early medieval period was quite unfamiliar to him when he was suggested as editor of Adamnan's work. Far from being a disadvantage, this saves him from being worn out by the eyes of his fellow-scholars peering through the back of his skull for possible errors ; it also means that he grasps clearly what a person approaching the *De Locis Sanctis* for the first time wants to know. We are given an outline of the political situation in Europe and the Near East at the time of Arculf's voyages, with plenty of useful information economically displayed ; e.g. ' The popes of the period were Agatho (678–81), a Greek, and Leo II (682–3), a Sicilian '. There are similar terse sentences on the caliphs of the day and their doings.

Nor does the editor's simple language prevent him from advancing the cause of scholarship. He proposes a different period of time for Arculf's journeys through the Holy Land from that favoured by Geyer (the previous editor of *De Locis Sanctis*) ; though Fr Meehan's dating does not remove all the puzzles, his solution seems to me the more sensible. Also, he makes interesting observations on the background of Adamnan's scholarship, such as that (p. 16 n^1) on the concerted attempt to provide a Christian ' literature ' in the later Roman period which would supplant the pagan literature then uniformly studied in the schools. It is pleasing, moreover, to find that Fr Meehan has not been hypnotized by Adamnan ; he has no very high opinion of his Latin style.

When one goes on to say that the section on the Text Tradition has very sensibly been entrusted to Dr Bieler, and that the reproductions of Arculf's drawings of various buildings in the Holy Land are first-rate, it will be seen that Fr Meehan's work is going to be extremely useful both to students and to teachers. There is, however, one criticism I would venture, and that is of the

translation. I tested this by trying to read the English text straight through as I would read a text composed in English. For the most part it went perfectly smoothly but occasionally I found myself stumbling and instinctively putting my hand out to the Latin for support—when I came to the words, ' versed in divers far-away regions ', (p. 37) for instance, or ' concerning the special honour in Christ of this city '. (p. 41). What has happened, I suspect, is that Fr Meehan has been trying to reproduce the complexity of Adamnan's Latin, trying to give his non-Latinist reader some notion of the tortuousness of the original. I must plead guilty to having made the same mistake myself in translating, and so have several contributors to the Nelson series. But it can't be done ; the tortuousness of one language is different from the tortuousness of another and cannot be duplicated in another. In a series where the original is provided for comparison I think one has to aim ruthlessly at clarity.

Donald Nichol

ARCHIVIUM HIBERNICUM : Irish Historical Records. XXII. Catholic Record Society of Ireland. Maynooth. 1959. 25s.

COLLECTANEA HIBERNICA : Sources for Irish History. No. 2. Dublin : Clonmore and Reynolds. 1959. 12s. 6d.

ANALECTA HIBERNICA. No. 21. Irish Manuscripts Commission. 1959. 20s.

These three volumes bring a welcome addition to the published sources for Irish history, more especially in the seventeenth century. In *Archivium Hibernicum* Father Brendan Jennings prints (pp. 28-139) a series of extracts from the Acts of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. They cover the years 1622–1650, a time when the Catholic Church was seeking to reorganize its hierarchy after the Tudor wars and persecutions, and also a time when many of the older religious orders were striving to regain what had been lost, whilst the Capuchins, Jesuits and (towards the end of this period) the Vincentian Fathers were bringing new forces to a sorely tried Catholic army. Father P. Corish prints (pp. 140–162) two reports by Bishop John Roche of Ferns on the state of the Catholic Church in Ireland between 1625 and 1629. Mr Gearóid Mac Niocaill prints (pp. 1–27) transcripts made by Father M. A. Costello, O.P., concerning the payment of annates from the medieval diocese of Elphin (1426–1548), with short, workmanlike notes of his own at the foot of the page.

In *Collectanea Hibernica* Father Brendan Jennings gives us the text of 12 letters concerning ecclesiastical appointments in Ireland (1643–49) ; and also a selection of 25 letters written by Luke Wadding (1623–1657). The most interesting of these is a letter of the year 1654, in which Luke Wadding, writing to the Minister General of the Franciscan Order, defends himself vigorously from attacks on his life's work, made by brethren of the Irish province. Father Benignus Millett gives us the text of a report made by Archbishop Edmund O'Reilly on the state of the Catholic Church in Ireland in 1662 ; and Father Bartholomew Egan gives us some valuable notes on the polyglot printing press which the Congregation de Propaganda Fide set up at Rome in 1622 and which

continued its work throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This press had an Irish fount, and Father Francis Molloy's Irish grammar and catechism were printed in this way. Father Canice Mooney gives us an unexpected group of five hitherto unpublished letters of Innocent IV concerning Irish affairs, written in 1246.

Analecta Hibernica, No. 21, contains the text of letters to and from the French military authorities in Paris concerning the war in Ireland from December 1688 to August 1691. These letters have been edited by Miss Lilian Tate ; they come from the Dépôt de la Guerre, Paris. A further series of similar letters, preserved in the Archives Nationales and covering the same period, are being prepared for publication by Dr Sheila Molloy.

AUBERY GWYNN

QUEEN'S, BELFAST 1845–1949. *The History of a University*. By T. W. Moody and J. C. Beckett. Published for the Queen's University of Belfast by Faber and Faber Ltd. London. 1959. Vol I. Pp. lxvii, 451. Vol. II. Pp. xv, 530. 63s.

THIS book was commissioned by the authorities of Queen's University, Belfast, in 1940, the intention being that it should be published in connexion with the centenary celebrations of 1949. War conditions and the magnitude of the task delayed publication, which finally came in time to mark the jubilee of the granting to Queen's on 2 December, 1908, of its charter as a university. The university has given access to its records and has borne the responsibility of publication. To this extent, the history may be regarded as official, but the authors, the professor of Modern History in the University of Dublin and the professor of Irish History in Queen's, have been given complete freedom to write it in their own way.

The two handsome volumes present at first sight a somewhat formidable appearance. The history proper runs to 550 pages and it is followed by some 440 pages of documents and statistics. The authors, however, are fully justified in their detailed treatment of the matter at their disposal. The history of a university is a work which, as a rule, must be done once for all and must therefore contain all the information that is ever likely to be sought by subsequent enquirers. Furthermore, the history of Queen's is inextricably connected with the history of university education in Ireland since the middle of the last century and of the social and political developments which so largely influenced it. The present work shows evidence of much original investigation in this only partially explored field, the results of which deserve to be set out at some length.

The first hundred pages give a full account of the tangled skein of events which led up to the opening in 1849 of the Queen's Colleges at Belfast, Cork and Galway and their incorporation in the Queen's University in the following year. The fortunes of Queen's, Belfast, are then followed under the long tenure of the first president, the Reverend Pooley Shuldham Henry, until the passing of the bill of 1879 which established the Royal University of Ireland and led to the dissolution of the Queen's University in 1882. At this stage Queen's, Belfast, ceased to be a constituent college of a university and became a college

' of indeterminate status ' having a loose connection with the Royal University. The effects of this change and the subsequent development of the college are traced until the Irish universities act of 1908 replaced Queen's College, Belfast, by the Queen's University, Belfast, the progress and expansion of which are then chronicled up to the centenary year 1949.

In the main, the plan followed is to treat as units the terms of office of the succeeding presidents (who, after 1908, also held the office of vice-chancellor). The tenure of one of these, the Reverend Thomas Hamilton, was remarkable both for its length and for the developments that took place during it. ' Appointed in 1889 president of a provincial college of some 400 students whose very existence seemed to lie at the mercy of conflicting politicians, he lived not only to guide that college, through twenty chequered years, to security as an independent university, but also to preside over the university for almost fifteen years more '.

It is impossible to give more than a general indication of the wealth of information that is contained under these general headings, the organization and development of the various academic courses, the systems of studies and examinations, the growth of the major schools of learning, the varieties in administration, the recruitment of the teaching and student bodies, the material expansion of the university. At times the detailed treatment necessitates the recital of regulations and statistics which must be of interest only to those intimately conversant with academic life. However, the authors have contrived to introduce a fair element of the personal and lighter side of university life which helps to make their story live, whilst the fact that their work is based so largely on unpublished or not easily accessible sources brings to light many curious and interesting details.

It is, for instance, piquant to learn that among the unsuccessful candidates for professorships in the Queen's Colleges on their opening in 1849 were Arthur Hugh Clough, J. A. Froude, Mark Pattison and Alexander Bain. When one recalls the exclusive splendour of the Irish vice-regal court, as pictured, for instance, in the memoirs of Lord Frederic Hamilton, it is certainly astonishing to find that the examinations of the old Queen's University were, up to 1877, held—of all places—in St Patrick's Hall, Dublin Castle. A recent book by Miss Vera Brittain has reminded us how late was the success of the weaker sex in battling their way into the older English universities. As far back as 1873 and succeeding years, we read of the valiant but unsuccessful efforts of a Miss Mary Edith Pechey to gain admission to the degree of M.D. in Queen's College, Belfast. A majority of the senate of the university, including the Duke of Leinster, Sir Dominic Corrigan and Sir Robert Kane, were in her favour, but the Council of the college blocked her attendance at the lectures necessary for qualification. Women were finally admitted to all classes in 1882, but only in 1896 became eligible for prizes and scholarships. It is pleasing to note that the indomitable Miss Pechey succeeded eventually in becoming a licentiate of the King and Queen's Colleges of Physicians in Ireland, and had a distinguished record of public service in India. Coming to more modern times, it is generally known that Sir Edward Carson supported the establishment of the National University of Ireland in generous terms, but perhaps not so well known how severely he was taken to task for his action by the Ulster unionists

whose leader he was later to be. The *Belfast News-letter* declared : ' Sir Edward spoke from his brief with all the loyalty and devotion of a lawyer who views the ermine and the woolsack from afar '.

The reader who finds himself somewhat befogged by the mass of material in the body of the book will be grateful for the illuminating last chapter, ' Queen's : The First Century ', in which a survey of the history of the university is given under broad aspects. It is pointed out that it is divided ' into two major phases by the universities act of 1908 '. Prior to that act ' the growth of Queen's was hampered and, in a sense, distorted by the fact that it formed part of an Irish university system that was almost constantly the subject of political controversy '. The act had three main results : ' it freed Queen's from the political entanglements of the Irish university question ; it strengthened the tendency to development along the same lines as universities in Great Britain ; it both strengthened and modified the special position of Queen's in the north of Ireland '. These three themes are developed in detail. The authors hold, and no doubt they are at least partly right, that the influence of British universities has shown itself in certain features, ' the rise in importance of science and technology, the decline in the classics and the fragmentation of subjects in the faculty of arts '. It may be remarked, however, that these phenomena are apparent in universities everywhere and are due not merely to the example of other institutions, but also, and more fundamentally, to radical changes in the character of our civilization.

I have already said that the authors have been at pains to place the story of Queen's in its proper setting in the general history of university education in Ireland. Allusion has already been made to the Introduction dealing with the university question up to 1845. At different stages throughout the work, accounts are given of the numerous solutions subsequently proposed. The history of these various proposals has already been frequently told, but the authors' account of them is valuable for the new light thrown on certain points, as for instance, the part played in the originating of Gladstone's ill-fated bill of 1873 by George Johnstone Stoney, secretary of the Queen's University.[1] Attention is focused mainly on developments which influenced more directly the fortunes of Queen's, Belfast, which no doubt explains some omissions. There is no mention, for instance, of the bills of Isaac Butt (1877) and the O'Conor Don (1879), and only passing references to the parts played by Archbishop Walsh and Fr William Delany in bringing about the establishment of both the Royal University and the National University. For a full understanding of the Irish university question up to 1908, the authors' account, excellent though it is from many points of view, needs to be supplemented from such other sources as the Life of Dr Walsh or the able set of essays in the volume *Struggle with Fortune*, edited by the President of University College, Dublin.

The various controversial issues, political and religious, which are intimately connected with the history of Queen's are dealt with in an admirably objective

[1] Stoney is identified as the writer of a confidential memorandum, dated 1858, concerning the Catholic University of Ireland, which is preserved in the State Paper Office, Dublin Castle. The authorship of this document had baffled the present reviewer, and he congratulates the authors on this successful bit of literary detection.

spirit. One minor criticism may be offered. In chronicling the events which led to the establishment of the Queen's Colleges in 1845, the authors constantly describe the supporters, whether Protestant or Catholic, of undenominational education as 'liberals'. It may be granted that many of these were liberal in the sense that they were influenced by the honest though debateable belief that undenominational education would promote religious and national concord. But there is an inevitable suggestion that the system of education which they advocated was in itself peculiarly liberal, and this it certainly was not. A liberal, in this context, is presumably one who wishes to grant as much liberty as possible to those whose opinions differ from his. The supporters of undenominational education in 19th century Ireland not only wanted it for themselves but were determined to force it on those who did not share their belief in it. In this they may have been sincere, but it cannot be said that they were liberal. In this connexion, it is interesting to note that the recent action of the British government in granting increased assistance to denominational schools in England has been generally acclaimed, and not merely by those directly concerned, as a liberal measure.

This scholarly, well-written book, showing evidence of wide and accurate research, is a notable addition to the comparatively small number of works dealing with the history of university education in Ireland.

FERGAL MCGRATH

THE PROPHET UNARMED. Trotsky 1921–1929 by Isaac Deutscher. London : Oxford University Press. 1959. 38s.

'IN Russia, all that strikes the eye, everything that passes around, bears the impress of a regularity that is startling ; and the first thought that enters the mind of the traveller, when he contemplates this symmetrical system, is that a uniformity so complete, a regularity so contrary to the natural inclinations of men, cannot have been established, and cannot be maintained except by violence. . . . In Russia, the government interferes with everything and vivifies nothing. In that immense empire, the people are mute, death hovers over all heads.'[1]

These words were not written by a liberal observer of present-day Russia or even of Stalinist Russia, but by a French traveller, the Marquis de Custine in 1839. It was against this power which crushed and stifled the people that the revolutionaries and reformers of nineteenth century Russia struggled ; and when it was overturned in 1917 it seemed that freedom was born at last. Mr Deutscher's book shows us, if it were not already only too clear, how illusory this idea was.

On a superficial level, the book makes fascinating reading, showing as it does the mounting struggle after Lenin's death among the leaders of the Bolsheviks, with Trotsky and Stalin emerging as the supreme antagonists. On a more profound level, Mr Deutscher analyses the problems which confronted the revolutionaries. His statement of their dilemma is masterly :

[1]Quoted by Wacklaw Ledniki in *Russia, Poland and the West.* Hutchinson, 1954.

' In its dream the Bolshevik Party saw itself as a disciplined yet inwardly free and dedicated body of revolutionaries, immune from corruption by power. It saw itself committed to observe proletarian democracy and to respect the freedom of small nations, for without this there could be no genuine advance to socialism. In pursuit of their dream the Bolsheviks had built up an immense and centralised machine of power to which they then gradually surrendered more and more of their dream : proletarian democracy, the rights of small nations, and finally their own freedom. They could not dispense with power if they were to strive for the fulfilment of their ideals ; but now their power came to oppress and overshadow their ideals. The gravest dilemmas arose ; and also a deep cleavage between those who clung to the dream and those who clung to the power '.

He goes on to tell us that this cleavage was not clear cut, because dream and power were up to a point inseparable ; those who clung to the dream could not take the extreme step of smashing the machine of power, and those who demanded power did not altogether abandon the dream. Even Trotsky, who in Mr Deutscher's view is, after Lenin, the Saint of the Revolution, one of the few who tried to uphold the dream, was bound by the inexorable Marxist dialectic. The Bolsheviks in the early years of the Revolution in order to realize their dream of socialism were forced by the logic of the situation they found themselves in to demand absolute power for themselves. The masses of the people could not understand the issues involved ; only the Bolsheviks knew what was good for them, and they could effect that good only if they retained absolute power. Trotsky recognized this, and claimed for the Bolsheviks a monopoly of power. He claimed also for them a monopoly of freedom. He did not see, as Mr Deutscher points out, that the two privileges were incompatible. If the Bolsheviks wished to preserve their power they had to sacrifice their freedom. In protesting against this irrational self-suppression, he failed to appreciate that it followed ineluctably from the suppression by Bolshevism of all its enemies.

Trotsky protested against the monolithic system whereby the inner core of the Old Guard exercised dictatorial power over the whole Bolshevik Party ; he demanded that the 400,000 members of the party be allowed freedom to criticize and to shape policy. His opponents replied logically that if he granted that freedom be withheld from the uninitiated masses, he must also grant that it be withheld from the general body of the party which was liable to infiltration from alien elements and turncoats of all kinds. Only the select members of the Old Guard who alone understood the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in its purity were entitled to freedom, and even their freedom was a restricted one, subservient to the strict application of the party line. It was this ruthless logic which broke Trotsky and which later resulted in the acquiring of unlimited power by Stalin.

Bolshevism has often been compared to Shigalovism, but even Dostoevsky failed to appreciate the relentless logic of the socialist dialectic which was to enslave the Russian mind. One recalls the scene in *The Possessed* when Shigalov, ' the man with the long ears ', slowly rises from his seat to address the meeting at Madame Virginsky's house :

' I've come to the conviction that all makers of social systems from ancient

times up to the present year, 187–, have been dreamers, tellers of fairy tales, fools who contradicted themselves, who understood nothing of natural science and the strange animal called man . . . I am perplexed by my own data and my conclusion is a direct contradiction of the original idea with which I start. Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrive at unlimited despotism. I will add, however, that there can be no solution of the social problem but mine '.

There is an outcry amongst Shigalov's audience at his apparent illogicality, and a lame teacher present arises to his defence. He has read Shigalov's thesis, and outlines its main tenets :

' He suggests as a final solution of the question the division of mankind into two unequal parts. One-tenth enjoys absolute liberty and unbounded power over the other nine-tenths. The others have to give up all individuality and become, so to speak, a herd, and, through boundless submission, will by a series of regenerations attain primaeval innocence, something like the Garden of Eden. They'll have to work, however. The measures proposed by the author for depriving nine-tenths of mankind of their freedom and transforming them into a herd through education of whole generations are very remarkable, founded on the facts of nature and highly logical '.

It is true that the Bolsheviks did not possess the cold-blooded prescience of Shigalov. No doubt some, if not all, of them were inspired by the loftiest ideals of human freedom ; they did not see until it was too late and they themselves were corrupted that the logic of their doctrine would drive them to accept something worse than Shigalovism. Shigalov's system, after all, posited absolute liberty for one-tenth of the population ; under Bolshevism the powerful minority was far less than one-tenth, and even they were granted but a restricted liberty. How restricted that liberty was Trotsky was to learn before the new Bolshevik state was many years old. In his speech to the thirteenth Party Congress in 1924 he defends himself against the charge of ' factionalism ', but in doing so acknowledges his lack of personal liberty :

' Comrades, none of us wishes to be or can be right against the party. In the last instance the party is always right, because it is *the only historic instrument which the working class possesses for the solution of its fundamental tasks* . . . one can be right only with the party and through the party because history has not created any other way for the realization of one's rightness '.

To one who does not accept the Marxist view of history, this is the merest rubbish. The fact remains that Trotsky, and not only he but Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Radek and all those others of the Bolshevik Old Guard whom Stalin overthrew, would not have succumbed if they did not believe that ultimately the party alone could be right and that their liberty must yield to the demands of the party.

These men who allowed their minds to be enslaved by a narrow and mechanistic view of life were originally inspired by a hope for mankind which was not a mean one. Trotsky gave expression to their ideals in his writings :

' It is as difficult to say beforehand what are the limits of self-mastery that man may be able to reach as it is to foresee how far he can develop his technical mastery of nature. Social constructiveness and psychophysical self-education will become the twin aspects of a single process. All the arts—literature, theatre, painting, sculpture, music and architecture—will impart

to that process a divine form . . . man will grow incomparably stronger, wiser, subtler ; his body will become more harmonious ; his movements more rhythmical ; his voice more musical. The forms of his existence will acquire a dynamic theatrical quality. The average man will rise to the stature of Aristotle, Goethe, Marx. And above those heights new peaks will raise '.

Allowing for a certain stridency in its tone, it is possible to concede that this thesis presents a high ideal of man. It may even be admitted that in his conquest of space the new Russian man has realized something of the ideal. But it cannot be denied that it is a purely mechanical view of man, embodying a refusal to accept the spiritual, stripped of which man becomes a mere thing, capable of being perfected as a machine can be made perfect, but possessing no inner life, without which man remains passive and enslaved.

The tragedy of Trotsky and his fellow revolutionaries is the tragedy of men without God. Entertaining the highest hopes for man's future development, they yet, all of them, were guilty of the most barbaric inhumanity. Alexander Uralov in his *The Reign of Stalin* tells us that between 1821 and 1906 the number of criminals executed in Russia (murderers of tsars, parricides, persons condemned for a triple murder) was 997, whereas between 1917 and 1923 in the U.S.S.R. 1,861,568 people were shot. Trotsky cannot be absolved from responsibility for this vast shedding of blood. He, with Lenin, as architect of the Revolution ordered, or at least acquiesced in, the holocaust. It is customary nowadays to brand Stalin as the megalomaniac butcher of the Russian people, to assert that all the evil in Communism was a Stalinist evil. This is a naive viewpoint. While his guilt was undoubtedly enormous, Stalin merely applied the principles of Leninism in dealing with his enemies and his recalcitrant subjects. Under given circumstances, Trotsky would have acted as Stalin did in Georgia—as, indeed, he proved when he ruthlessly crushed the Kronstadt rebellion. Trotsky no doubt considered that the lives of the Kronstadt sailors were of little importance beside his ideal of a proletarian democratic Russia.

Russia has not yet become a proletarian democracy, and few believe that under its present rulers it will ever become one. Mr Deutscher is one of the few. He sees the communism of the future Russia abandoning the worst of its Stalinist legacy, and embracing all that was best in Trotskyism. Whether we agree with him or not, it must be confessed that few have written so well about the U.S.S.R., or analysed so profoundly the dilemmas of its leaders.

The present book is the second of a trilogy based on Trotsky's life. The first part, *The Prophet Armed*, covered the period from 1917 to 1921. The last twelve years of Trotsky's life will be dealt with in the next volume, *The Prophet Outcast*.

The prospective reader of *The Prophet Unarmed* may be assured that it can be read as an independent work, requiring no knowledge of the previous volume. I shall be surprised, however, if his reading does not make him seek out the earlier book, and wait with impatience for the appearance of the last of the trilogy.

J. F. Reynolds

MANY LANDSCAPES, ONE LANGUAGE

THE PENGUIN BOOK OF CANADIAN VERSE. Edited by Ralph Gustafson. London: Penguin Books. 1959. 3s. 6d.

THE PENGUIN BOOK OF AUSTRALIAN VERSE. London: Penguin Books. 3s. 6d.

A BOOK OF SOUTH AFRICAN VERSE. Selected and introduced by Guy Butler. Oxford University Press. 1959. 18s.

FIRES OF NO RETURN. By James K. Baxter. Oxford University Press. 1958. 12s. 6d.

NEW ZEALAND LITERATURE. A Survey by E. H. MacCormick. Oxford University Press, 1959. 22s. 6d.

REVIEWING these books, I should like to introduce a problem, hoping to return to it more fully at another time, i.e. the growth of a world literature in the English tongue.

Friends inform me that the English Department of at least one major American University now offers a course in colonial literature. Opportunism or a portent? Anyone who reads novels will be able to suggest the names of several capable prose writers: Nadine Gordimer and Jacobsen in South Africa; Doris Lessing from Rhodesia; Patrick White in Australia. Even the amiably curious Narayan from India; but that raises the further problem of colonial, Commonwealth, or ex-British Empire. All of these writers have one present advantage—' strong ' politically relevant subject matter. Where talent flags the reader has the conscious compensation of gaining background knowledge about major twentieth century problems like imperialism, race etc. It would be pointless to sneer however, for most good writing has sprung from a politically ' alive ' context, which underlines major human conflicts; the Elizabethan age, for example, or the reforms and political confusions of nineteenth century Russia as seen in Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Turgenev.

Poetry, however, is another matter, unless explicitly revolutionary like Blok or Mayakovsky. No point in stressing relevance of subject if it is contained within the tight structure of a good lyric; most common readers still regard verse as celestial crochet-work. But both Oxford and Penguin have been organizing a series of Commonwealth anthologies, some of which are very interesting. *The Penguin Book of Australian Verse*, in particular, contains a good deal of distinguished work; enough at any rate, to make one revise any rash predictions about the inevitable cultural sterility of such a background. Indeed, the better Australian poets seem to capitalize on the bleakness—no easy spiritual symbols there, from lake or mountain. ' They call her a young country, but they lie: She is the last of lands, the emptiest . . . ' says A. D. Hope.

A nation of trees, drab green and desolate grey
In the field uniform of modern wars
Darkens her hills, those endless, outstretched paws
Of Sphinx demolished or stone lion worn away.
'Australia'

For Irish readers there is the additional interest of seeing the Irish connection adapted to a different context—many of the poets are of Irish ancestry, and occasionally consider that part of their heritage.

Ireland and its long tale of troubles
were far away now: the Chancery suit,
famine, the black religious squabbles,
bankruptcy. But a tree might fruit
torn up and transplanted in such a giver
of growth as new soil . . .
Robert D. Fitzgerald: 'Transaction'

The problem is a continuing one, as Vincent Buckley, the best of the younger poets, shows in his 'Walking in Ireland' (not included here):

How can I find my fathers in this darkness?
Remote and blank as on a heraldic stone
I see them enter their converging lives.
The peasant with his dung-encrusted boots . . .
The veteran speaking of forgotten wars . . .

'Unhappy country, you are mine as well as theirs', says Buckley, and it is fascinating to see how strong a hold Ireland has on the Australian imagination; it was never a theme in even the earliest of American anthologies.

The Oxford Book of South African Verse presents the same effort to subdue the harsh colours of a landscape alien to the pastoral images of English verse; a bleak thought in a land *without* shade.

Reading
Keat's *Lamia* and *Saint Agnes' Eve*
Beneath a giant pear tree buzzing with bloom
I glanced at the galvanized windmill turning
Its iron sunflower under the white hot sky
And wondered if a Grecian or Medieval dream
Could ever strike root . . .

Thus, Guy Butler, probably the best of the younger South African poets. His sensitive introduction suggests most of the problems peculiar to South African verse. There is the fact that English-speaking South Africans are in the minority; Afrikaans poetry, which seems to be flourishing, has more claims to be an indigenous product. There is a continual uneasiness, a hint of the ominous as in Roy Campbell's 'Rounding the Cape' . . .

The land lies dark beneath the rising crescent,
And Night, the Negro, murmurs in his sleep.

Although a much less interesting anthology than the Australian, this selection of South African verse does reflect another major problem of the South African as opposed to the Australian poet: exile. The best of the South African poets (Campbell, William Plomer, David Wright) moved to England—but the best

of their poems are about South Africa. William Plomer, for instance, appears here as a minor but lethal chronicler of local fauna.

> Romantic subject of the Great White Queen,
> See him advancing, whiskered and serene,
> With helmet, spectacles, and flask of brandy,
> (That useful stimulant, he always keeps it handy),
> Unmoved by cannibals, indifferent to disease,
> His black frock-coat rocks sadly in the tropic breeze.
> 'The Explorer'

James K. Baxter, introduced as the most distinguished of the younger New Zealand poets, is readable, without being in any way remarkable. There is the inevitable problem of the unwritten-about landscape:

> Damn this dry shingle country,
> Old Jack the swagger cried . . .

And the unrecognized Irish Empire:

> Barney Flanagan, sprung like a frog
> From a wet root in an Irish bog . . .

But his work, like the existence of a survey called *New Zealand Literature*, shows that literary development is keeping pace with political development in the newer areas of the English-speaking world. Already the level of the Australian anthology is at least as high as that of contemporary British verse; while poets like Irving Layton and Jay MacPherson in the *Penguin Anthology of Canadian Verse* indicate a possible similar development in Canada. In fact, one might expect better work (more modern, less encumbered) from the Dominions than from the mother country in the future. A good parallel would be any good anthology of contemporary Spanish poetry, which would include Mexicans like Octavio Paz and Reyes, the Chilean Neruda, the Nicaraguan Ruben Dario. We are on the verge of a world literature in English, and while there will always be a more intense and special sympathy between local reader and writer, modern experience will soon show roughly the same contours in Sydney as Los Angeles, Dunedin as Dundee. Where Ireland comes in one hesitates to say; it is, in many ways, the least modern of the English-speaking areas. But that in itself may be a destiny.

JOHN MONTAGUE

POETRY AND MORALITY

POETRY AND MORALITY. Studies in the criticism of Matthew Arnold, T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis. By Vincent Buckley. With an Introduction by Basil Willey. London : Chatto & Windus. 1959. Pp. 239. 25s.

Before going into details about this exacting and strenuously written book it is important to be quite clear as to its nature. For while Mr Buckley pursues with unremitting tenacity the frequent, and sometimes metamorphic moral emphasis in the works of Arnold, Eliot and Leavis, he makes no attempt

whatever to generalize on his findings. In his first chapter he qualifies his purpose thus :

> My title should really be something like the following : Poetry and Morality : An Approach to the Question thro' an examination of the work of three Modern Critics. And it might, if this were not enough, carry the sub-title : Is there a problem at all ?

This is an honest and accurate indication of the book's trend and limitations : the author not only refuses to excogitate a personal standpoint on the relationship between poetry and morality, he does not even attempt to summarize the views of the three critics he so brilliantly interprets.

In the first chapter he explains, with a slight suggestion of apology, the reasons for his apparent inconclusiveness ; why he is content with mere ' essays in exposition ' :

> It could hardly have been otherwise ; for it was, as I have said, a matter of fixing the *status questionis*, of fixing it by a slow patient exploration of suggestions, nuances, alternative meanings. And because this approach seemed to me necessary, it was also necessary to let the whole study remain, in a sense, a preliminary one. It is a matter of preliminaries, not of conclusions.

Not only does the author decline to give an answer, he is not, in fact, prepared to ask the question. Now Mr Buckley's reasons for confining himself to preliminaries—239 pages of them to be precise—are generally cogent and acceptable and very much in tone with the disciplined and erudite humility of his investigations. Yet one cannot help feeling a little vexed and frustrated at following him on such an arduous journey with little or no tangible destination in view. The incidental beauties by the wayside are fascinating, but they tend to erase each other rather than add up to a unified impression. It is true that Eliot and Leavis have been ' chary of making formulations which can be taken as definitive ' on this subject. (If they hadn't been, the necessity for a book like this would have been considerably reduced). But Mr Eliot did, in fact, say such things, as ' literary criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint '. And while Mr Buckley successfully challenges the adequacy of this view, he never really states anything as clearly and uncharily himself ; and after all he is making an extensive and formal study of the problem entitled *Poetry and Morality*. This, at least to one reader, is a limitation in the book ; a limitation which the author recognizes though he exhibits no guilt at the recognition.

However, it is substantially compensated for by the expository diligence and penetration of the individual studies. In fact, they gain in objectivity by not being deployed in support of any personally held view of the author. Arnold has all his faults relentlessly exposed ; his neo-Romantic stress on ' consoling sentiment ' in poetry, his demand that it ought to celebrate the vital social currents of its time, his insistence that it should give a sort of moral example, and arising out of that, his pragmatism or reliance on presumed effects. Yet even in the act of finding him guilty of quasi-religious didacticism Mr Buckley conveys a reverent awareness of his greatness. Eliot presented a more difficult problem, with the gradual transition from his early autonomous

view of poetry to the ' pastoral ' attitudes of his Christian period. There was also the ambivalence and confusion of his terminology. To deal with one of his constant associations Mr Buckley coins a rather cabalistic phrase ' Feeling/Thought ', which should have a great success with the Americans.

Leavis's highly organized critical terminology is deftly examined ; ' enactment of moral values ', ' revitalising recourse to the concrete ', ' registering of valuations ', ' sense of health ' are skilfully clarified. He is pursued through every nuance of his poetic criticism and finally convicted of a religious view of art, on the grounds of his analysis of D. H. Lawrence's novels. I hope to be forgiven for not, in turn, analysing this analysis, having none of Mr Buckley's almost athletic skill in dealing lucidly with constant obliquities.

The two appendices at the end, ' Criticism and Theological Standards ' and ' Poetry and Sanctions ', do not yield the sort of positive thought that their titles suggest. They are taken up with a devaluation of S. L. Bethell and the School of Christian Discrimination, and the study ends as it began, on a note of vigorous and clear exposition.

The greatest single merit of this book is that it brilliantly demonstrates how complex the relationship between literature and morality is ; how oversimplified and inadequate is any attempt to explain it either in terms of didacticism or of *l'art pour l'art*. It shows that Arnold's ' high poetic truth ', Eliot's ' sense of orthodoxy ' and Leavis's ' sense of health ' all spring from a desire to arrive at a satisfactory moral-poetic stance. And their diverse notions as to what that stance ought to be are further evidence of how essentially personal criticism must remain, even in its most strenuous attempts to become objective and universal.

To all those who are interested in the complex preliminaries of this question, this book is highly recommended ; but to those, perhaps, more naive people who want simple or even complex conclusions, it is out.

AUGUSTINE MARTIN

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

DISTINGUISH TO UNITE OR THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE. By Jacques Maritain. Newly translated from the fourth French edition under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan. London : Geoffrey Bles. 1959. xix and 476 pp. 50s.

PHILOSOPHERS suffer much from those necessary but incorrigible followers of Procrustes, the historians and the manualists. The great—Augustine or Aquinas, Kant or Hegel—simply cannot be trimmed to scale. They must be read for themselves. The present work has claims to perform a similar service for M. Maritain ; those who know him only as a distinguished Catholic writer on philosophy are given the opportunity of seeing his true stature in what is universally recognized to be one of the outstanding contributions to modern scholastic philosophy. *Distinguish to Unite*, which has stood for almost thirty years as Maritain's *magnum opus* (a fact that excuses the reviewer in keeping to generalities), now appears in its second English dress. It is finely presented by a team of Toronto graduates, all ex-students of Maritain's,

under the supervision of Dr Gerald B. Phelan. For the first time the important nine Appendices, some of them quite lengthy, are translated. No translation can be perfect ; but, in his Foreword, M. Maritain states that the present one realizes his dream. His style, as he freely admits, is difficult. He has a penchant for ' parenthetical incidental clauses and carefully articulated but interminable sentences '. In the circumstances the former translation, by Bernard Wall, is dismissed a little ungraciously as marred by ' a great many misinterpretations and oversights '.

The aim of the book is to study the mind, not by flattening it out upon a single plane of intellection, but by exploring its length and breadth, its height and depth ; and not only the structure and dimensions of the mind but its *élan*. It falls into two parts. The first, after an introductory chapter on ' The Majesty and Poverty of Metaphysics ', deals with the degrees of rational knowledge. Beginning with the thorny questions of the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, the author conducts his reader by degrees to the problems of the nature of metaphysical knowledge and of the supreme object of metaphysical knowledge, the God of the *Divine Names*. The journey is not an easy one ; the path is strewn with obstacles represented by the controversies about necessity and contingency, causality, mechanism and—above all—the epistemology of critical realism. The second part, taking up where the first leaves off, deals with the degrees of suprarational knowledge. Here the sceptic about the genuineness of scholastic philosophy may raise a critical eyebrow, for M. Maritain begins with a study of mystical experience and philosophy and follows with chapters on Augustinian wisdom and on St John of the Cross, ' Practitioner of Contemplation '. The final chapter, forming the conclusion to the whole book, is on St John of the Cross's teaching on *Todo y Nada*.

M. Maritain is not unaware of the possibility of his being accused of dabbling in theology, worse still in mystical theology, under the guise of making a philosophical investigation. He forestalls the criticism. The fact is, he says, that man has sources of knowledge other than the purely natural, and realism demands that the thinker should take cognizance of the fact. When we study ' something which impinges upon the existential conditions of man and his activity as a free person ' we can only proceed scientifically if we respect ' the integrity of the object and, consequently, the integrity of those realities of the supernatural order which are, as a matter of fact, implied in it '. One admits into the investigation items from biology or physics. One need not, then, be a believer, Maritain suggests (rather optimistically), in order to accept the methodological reasons, if not the actual reasonableness of admitting items from theology.

Before this is dismissed as special pleading a long tradition can be urged in M. Maritain's favour. The technical distinction between philosophy and theology does not go back beyond the thirteenth century. Were the philosophers before St Thomas merely camouflaged theologians ? Pythagoras was a religious reformer and a mystic as well as the philosopher-scientist of the square on the hypotenuse. Was Plato a philosopher or a theologian ? The last flowering of Greek thought in Neo-Platonism, that most potent and pervasive influence on Western culture, made no distinction. Why should the

early Schoolmen ? At a particular juncture, when dialectic and the arts had begun to diverge seriously from the scriptures and theology, the distinction between philosophy and theology was found to be useful. But to distinguish is not necessarily to establish ' a great chaos so that they who would pass from hence . . . cannot, nor from thence come hither '. M. Maritain can argue that his opponents incline to make a fetish of a useful distinction ; he has taken care to say, in the title of his book, that he, at least, distinguishes to unite.

Why is M. Maritain a Thomist ? Because, he tells us, Thomism is true. Selecting a philosophy is not like choosing a pair of shoes where you try one pair after another and take the one that pinches least. (It is interesting to recall that M. Gabriel Marcel used an almost identical metaphor to explain the choice of a philosophy—cf. *Studies*, Summer, 1959, p. 158.) One of the indications that Thomism is true and irrepressibly vital is that it has resisted and still resists ' the treatment it gets at the hands of a pedagogy bent upon short-changing it '. M. Maritain cannot be accused of short-changing Thomism in his present work. On the contrary he provides what must be the ideal of all Thomists, the re-thinking of the sane principles of St Thomas in terms of the twentieth century.

M. B. CROWE

PRINCIPALITY AND POLITY—AQUINAS AND THE RISE OF STATE THEORY IN THE WEST. By Thomas Gilby, O.P. London : Longmans. 1958. xxvi+358 pp. 30s.

THE wide range of his subject, indicated in the sub-title of his book, has left Fr Thomas Gilby undaunted. His exuberant style carries the reader on. He may make a foray here and there, venture down an alluring boreen, stop to discuss an interesting but minor question or introduce a piece of recondite information ; but he never loses sight of the main goal of describing St Thomas's contribution to State theory in the West.

An Introduction sets the stage of the medieval revival of political theory, nourished from the Roman law and from the new translations of Aristotle. This political theory is grouped about four principles. Firstly, political authority is natural and not merely a consequence of original sin ; secondly, it is distinct, at least in the abstract, from ecclesiastical authority and ' not of itself beholden to the authority of the Church ' ; thirdly, the temporal power is concerned immediately only with temporalities ; and, finally, government and legislation are more directly ' functions of art than of ethics '. These positions were advanced in various parts of the philosophical and theological writings of the twenty years of St Thomas's teaching career. The difficulty is to set them out fairly, in all their historical associations and implications, a difficulty not noticeably eased by St Thomas's approach to moral questions in general. He did, on occasion, praise a ' certain obliqueness in discourse ' (II-IIae, q. 180, a.6) and Fr Gilby wryly comments that his ideas ' move more like knights than rooks and are no less difficult to corner '.

The body of the book is divided into two parts—' The Influences at

Work ' and ' The Development in St Thomas '. Nowadays there can be little temptation to neglect the sources—even if St Thomas is Fr Gilby's nimble plagiarist who often ' improved on the original and on occasion, taking an argument from its context and placing it in his own, changed it almost out of recognition '. The influences are listed as the theologians, the jurists (canonist and civilian), ' landed men and wanderers ' (i.e. the figures in the social scene and, in particular, the new mendicant orders of the thirteenth century) and, finally, the philosophers. Fr Gilby considers each in turn, stepping warily among the specialist monographs that have proliferated in the past generation or so. He considers them again in the second part of the book, where he examines what St Thomas made of his sources. If the plan allows some repetitiousness it is, perhaps, in a good cause.

The canvas is broad and Fr Gilby fills it with bold, and sometimes adventurous, strokes. Private property, slavery, sovereignty, legalism, equity, sanction, bureaucracy, tyranny, citizenship—these are only some of the subjects of his lightning sketches. He has been criticized for a rather cavalier handling of authorities. He does indeed tend to stay an opinion or a statement with what is almost a short essay in bibliography,—very useful and informative, but not quite the chapter and verse justification of the text that is the work of a footnote. But in fairness it must be added that the references to St Thomas, who is the principal subject of the book, are as detailed as could be wished ; they are evidence of the extremely careful and extensive reading that went into the making of this book. It would be a pity if the verbal fireworks were to obscure this capital fact. The concrete images and vivid comparisons, the amusing comments and devastating judgments have their uses. There would have been *longueurs* had not Fr Gilby made up his mind that his subject—to adapt one of his own phrases—was ' like a woman, not quite tractable by cold argument '.

M. B. Crowe

RELIGION

THE DISCOVERY OF GOD. By Henri de Lubac: Translated by Alexander Dru. London : Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd. 1960. Pp. 212. 18s.

Whatever one may think of Father de Lubac as a theologian or historian of religion and thought, one cannot deny that he has always been brilliant and arresting in his approach. The opening of his latest book is in the order of Blondel's salvo at the beginning of *L'Action :* ' Yes or No ? Has life any meaning ? ' Fr de Lubac starts with : ' Was Moses right, or Xenophanes ? Did God make man in his image, or is it not rather man who has made God in his ? ' We recognize at once that this is not going to be just another set of answers to questions that nobody is asking, as is only too often offered in scholastic theodicy. This book not merely asks and answers the question which everybody puts to himself some time—according to St Thomas, at the first use of reason—but debates it in the terms that are on the lips of everyone who has read even the *Readers' Digest* or listened to the BBC Brains' Trust.

Fr de Lubac opposes the affirmation of God, and the rational process by which it is expressed and justified, to the various rationalizations which have been offered since Kant to explain away the idea of God. The adversary, he says, is legion. 'Turn by turn it assumes the masks of ethnology, of sociology, of psychology and of the history of religion. It has invented a hundred different systems, from the animism of Tylor' (now, by the way, being given a new notoriety through paper-backed editions), 'to the lucubrations of a certain school of psychoanalysis which denounces the grand illusion from which humanity needs to be liberated. It explains the whole idea of God in human consciousness by a series of transformations starting from dreams, belief in spirits, the mystification of language, cosmic fear, social alienation, etc., and confident that it has in this way established the 'genesis' of the idea, concludes to its nonentity'. Fr de Lubac argues that the occasion on which an idea arises, tells us little about its validity. He quotes the distinguished historian of religions, M. Eliade : 'It is not very easy to see how the discovery that the primal laws of geometry were due to the empirical necessities of the irrigation of the Nile Delta can have any bearing on the validity or otherwise of those laws'.

Fr de Lubac is rich and apt in quotation, ranging over many fields of literature and philosophy to sharpen the points he makes. They are concerned with the 'Proof of God', 'The Knowledge of God', 'The Ineffable God', 'The Search for God', 'God in our Time'—to quote the chapter headings of the main sections of his book, which indicate very well its compelling interest. His basic contention, urged vigorously and with surprising wealth of traditional backing, is that our knowledge of God is an immediate affirmation of the mind, prior to all concepts and all reasoning, an experience and an impulse common to the philosopher and to all men. Like a word on the tip of the tongue which is already active before it is found, stimulating the mind to search for the right word and to discard inadequate alternatives : so this pre-conceptual knowledge of God impels men, if believers, to speak of God, to make inventories of proofs of his existence, to try to define his nature. At the same time, it awakes the need of endlessly criticizing every representation of God—a need which may be manifested in the would-be atheist as well as in the professional theologian. Fr de Lubac hastens to say that this does not mean that all atheists are unconscious believers.

The approach lends itself obviously to criticism. Is the idea of God supposed to be innate ? Is this fundamental affirmation a sort of ontologism ? Are the proofs of God's existence an afterthought, evoked by wishful thinking ? Are we being urged to a blind faith that would not be much different from despair ? Is the line between natural and supernatural revelation drawn sharply enough ? The author must be allowed to speak for himself, as he does very trenchantly in this book. The reviewer contents himself with congratulating the new firm of Darton, Longman and Todd on having found so distinguished and stimulating a piece of writing to head their book-list.

Kevin Smyth

NEW TESTAMENT INTRODUCTION. By Alfred Wikenhauser. Translated by Joseph Cunningham. New York : Herder and Herder ; Edinburgh and London : Thomas Nelson and Sons. xviii and 560 pages. 50s.

THE word ' Introduction ' has a special meaning when used of Biblical studies. It does not promise to ease beginners into the subject, but offers a post-graduate survey of all relevant problems. Such a comprehensive study of the New Testament has been missing in English, though some outline studies were available on the Protestant side. Catholic students had to plough through the Latin of Merk or wade through the wordiness of the French Introductions. When Wikenhauser appeared in German in 1953, the fruit of a good scholar's life-work, it was clearly an outstanding work in its field. The Oxford *Journal of Theological Studies* called for a translation of it at once, and the announcement of a translation of the second (1956) edition raised high hopes.

These hopes have unfortunately been dashed by the reality. There still remain some errors and defects of the first German edition which were not corrected in the second. For instance, the legend that codex *k* of the Old Latin translation of the Gospels was brought to Bobbio from Ireland by St Columbanus is still recorded as ' credible tradition '. The testimony of Clement of Alexandria to St Matthew's Gospel is still omitted, with the surprising statement that Origen is the next witness after Irenaeus. The Two-Sources Theory of the Synoptic Gospels still receives preferential treatment, with no adequate presentation of the difficulties it raises. There is still too much made of Gnostic influences in the choice of Joannine expressions such as ' Logos '. In the presentation of Form-Criticism, and Bultmann on the Fourth Gospel, it is sometimes hard to know when Bultmann leaves off and Wikenhauser begins.

But these points do not raise insuperable difficulties. A professor lecturing from the book, or an alert student who looks up his references, can manage them comfortably. What makes this translation impossible is its sheer badness as a translation. Rarely has such a good book been so badly handled. The main reason seems to be the haste with which the translator worked, or perhaps had to work to fulfil his contract. Difficult sentences are often dodged, by the substitution of something resembling, but not really rendering the original. Nuances are frequently missed : the German *zwar* (a concessive or emphatic particle) is often just skipped, to the detriment of the general sense. Many German words are just wrongly translated, and not at unimportant points only. ' Herrlichkeit ' is rendered as ' Lordship ' ; it means ' majesty ', in fact, the divine majesty of Christ. ' Lehrhaft ', ' didactic ', ' containing instruction ', becomes ' learned '. ' Peshitta', translated as ' Einfach ' by Wikenhauser, meaning ' simple ' (the obscure designation of the Syriac translation of the Bible) becomes the impossible ' single '. Whole sentences are sometimes wrongly translated, in a way which affects the process of the argument. Two examples must suffice. Apropos of St Matthew's Gospel, the translation reads ' it would be strange if one who was not an Apostle related the call by Jesus '. What Wikenhauser wrote was ' it would be strange if the call of one who was not an Apostle were narrated ' etc. Apropos of St John's Gospel, the translation reads : ' John was published in Middle

Egypt shortly after 100 A.D.' Wikenhauser of course wrote something crucially different : ' John was *circulating* ' etc.

Another set of defects come from the translator's lack of acquaintance with the technical terms of New Testament studies. The excellent pages of Wikenhauser on textual criticism are marred by the misuse of ' forme ' or ' form ' to translate a quire of sheets. ' Leaf ' (two pages) and ' page ' are hopelessly confused. Standard terms such as ' doublets ' and ' the great interpolation ', take on the unfamiliar form of ' duplications ' and ' insertion '. The simple ' working hypothesis ' becomes the formidable ' Work Theory '.

To the defects of the translation, the printers (German !) have added even worse. Apart from frequent misprints, the book is disfigured by major displacements. The footnote on p. 19 breaks off suddenly, and only close detective work can find that it is completed half-way down the small print of p. 20. The fourth line from the bottom of the actual text of p. 24 is followed by three lines which have nothing to do with the preceding. They belong to the top of p. 26. The sequence of thought from p. 24 to p. 25 is in the present printing impossible. Another fault is that large sections which were in small print in the original now appear in the same large type as the body of the book. This makes for disjointed reading and often throws the argument of the book out of proportion.

One wonders how such famous and experienced publishers as Nelson of Scotland and Herder of Germany can have combined to foist such a poor production on the public. At any rate, the would-be buyer of the book should take notice that he will not get his fifty shillings worth. And anyone who has already bought it should be allowed to trade in his copy, no depreciation reckoned, for the new model which is urgently called for.

KEVIN SMYTH

THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST. An Anthology of Texts and Pictures. J. B. Pritchard (ed). Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xx and 380, including 197 illustrations. 40s.

ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE OLD TESTAMENT. By J. B. Pritchard. Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. xvi and 264, including 77 illustrations. 30s.

The Ancient Near East is an abridgment of two monumental volumes put together by Professor Pritchard, which have proved of great value to students of the Old Testament, but which have been too expensive to find their way into many private libraries. These were, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* and *The Ancient Near East in Pictures*. The texts are translated by specialists in the various fields. The most important are re-printed here, each with brief introduction and notes. The collection includes myths and stories, legal, sapiential and historical texts, hymns, rites and letters, and the most important inscriptions. Marginal references call attention to passages of the Bible where the texts may be illuminating. They are illustrated by a

choice of pictures from the companion volume. They include all the standard pieces, and are well chosen and beautifully reproduced. The handsome book which results is cheap at 40s. and will be a prized addition to any library.

Archaeology and the Old Testament may be read as a sort of introduction to the above. Much vivid detail helps to recall the stirring work of the pioneer excavators and map-makers, like Flinders Petrie and the British Army's Ordnance Survey of Palestine, and the history and techniques of archaeological finds are presented most attractively. The marginal references to the Bible in the other book are expanded into commentaries on a number of important texts, such as the Mesopotamian epics of cosmogony and flood, and a final chapter assesses their relevance to the Bible. Professor Pritchard, an active archaeologist with valuable field work to his credit, has produced here a very sound and informative book, and many students will be grateful to him for having put such a fine instrument of work within their reach.

KEVIN SMYTH

RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENT EAST. By Etienne Drioton, Georges Contenau and J. Duchesne-Guillemin. London : Burns and Oates. Pp. 164. 7s. 6d. 1959.

WHAT IS THE BIBLE ? By Daniel-Rops. London : Burns and Oates. 1959. Pp. 128. 7s. 6d.

WHY WE BELIEVE. By Léon Cristiani. London : Burns and Oates. 1959. Pp. 128. 7s. 6d.

WHAT IS THE TRINITY ? By Bernard Piault. London : Burns and Oates. 1959. Pp. 156. 7s. 6d.

THE PAPACY. By Wladimir d'Ormesson. London : Burns and Oates. 1959. Pp. 142. 7s. 6d.

THIS present selection of Faith and Fact Books offers most interesting reading, and in themselves these five books are a good advertisement for the whole series.

Religions of the Ancient East, produced by acknowledged experts, is a competent presentation of Egyptian religion, the ancient religions of western Asia and Iranian religion. In Duchesne-Guillemin's treatment of Iranian religion, the last chapter, on external relationships, is so allusive and compressed that it is unlikely that the general reader will derive many clear ideas from it.

M. Daniel-Rops is at his best in this book on the Bible. It is rather surprising, however, to read, on page 107, as an example of a 'lesson of a scientific character' which can be drawn from the Bible, that 'Scripture asserts that the Creation did not take place " ex nihilo ". . . .' Possibly the translator is at fault.

Mgr Cristiani's contribution on Apologetics is not a simple straight-forward text-book for the convert, but a solid and interesting discussion of apologetics, with a sound and sympathetic criticism of some modern approaches.

Abbé Piault's book on the Trinity is an excellent book, although the general reader will find it hard to follow the section where the mystery of divine personality is investigated, pp. 138–146. And on page 109 there seems to be some confusion in terminology, where the followers of Acacius are described as ' Homoeans ', and those of Basil of Ancyra as ' Homoians '. Surely the two terms are synonymous ? The followers of Basil are usually described as ' Homoiousians '.

The book on the Papacy is of interest, if for no other reason than that it is not written by a professional theologian. Count Wladimir d'Ormesson, after a distinguished career as a journalist, served in the French diplomatic corps, and from 1948 to 1955 was ambassador to the Holy See. The aim of his book is to study the Papacy in action through the centuries, from apostolic times down to the present day. In this aim he does succeed to an extent, with the help, which he gratefully acknowledges, of Mgr Cristiani. In general, he concentrates on presenting the positive case for the Papacy, but, at times, this method leads to a certain ingenuousness. Thus, St Cyprian is quoted in favour of his thesis, with no indication of Cyprian's later struggle with Rome. This lack of criticism marks the book throughout, and is especially to be regretted when Boniface VIII's ' Unam Sanctam ' is mentioned. The remarks made by Pope Pius XII in his Allocution to the 10th Congress of Historical Sciences in 1955 might have helped to assess the statements made by the extreme proponents of the theory of papal power in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

PATRICK O'CONNELL

RELIGIOUS MEN AND WOMEN IN CHURCH LAW. By Joseph Creusen, S.J. Sixth English edition, revised and edited by Adam C. Ellis, S.J. The Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee. 1958. Pp. xvi + 380. $6.50.

PRIESTS' PROBLEMS. By Canon E. J. Mahoney, D.D. Selected and edited by Rev L. L. McReavy, J.C.D., M.A. Burns & Oates, London. 1958. Pp. xix + 468. 42s.

Fr Creusen's book is already well known to students of Canon Law. Published originally in French in 1918 as a brief summary of the legislation of the new Code on religious life, it has since been revised and considerably enlarged. The seventh French edition was brought out by the author in 1957, shortly before he retired from his professorship of Canon Law in the Gregorian University, Rome. The present English translation is the sixth edition in English, revised and edited by Fr A. C. Ellis (who until recently was professor of Canon Law in the Jesuit theologate of St Mary's, Kansas, U.S.A.) to conform with the seventh French edition. The book follows the order of the canons on religious life in the Code and explains them, always with a view to their practical application. It includes all recent legislation of the Holy See on the religious life. Thus, for instance, a section has been added on Secular Institutes, which, though not religious institutes in the strict sense, constitute a new state of perfection in the Church and were approved by Pope Pius XII in 1947. Also

the part dealing with the cloister of nuns has been revised and brought up to date in accordance with the latest documents of the Holy See. A valuable feature is the long Appendix containing translations of a number of documents not otherwise easily obtainable in English, e.g. the Instruction of the Congregation of Religious *Inter cetera* (25 March 1956) on nuns' cloister, the Apostolic Constitution of Pius XII *Sedes sapientiae* (31 May 1956) on the training of religious destined for the priesthood, a letter of the Congregation of Religious regarding the use of radio and television (6 August 1957). All those who have to be *au courant* with the Church's legislation on religious life will welcome this new and up-to-date edition of Fr Creusen's book.

Canon Mahoney, professor of moral theology for about thirty-four years at St Edmund's College, Ware — up to the time of his unexpected death in 1954 — needs no introduction to English-speaking priests. His replies to the moral and canonical questions sent in by the clergy were a most popular feature of the *Clergy Review* ever since its foundation in 1931 and earned for him a widespread reputation. Some time before his death Canon Mahoney published two volumes of classified selections from these replies in the *Clergy Review* : one in 1944, *Questions and Answers* : *The Sacraments*, and another in 1948, *Questions and Answers* : *Precepts*. But he continued to answer questions in the *Clergy Review* and consequently between 1948 and the time of his death the makings of a third volume had accumulated. These replies of the 1948-54 period have now been sifted and classified by Dr McReavy and published in *Priests' Problems*, together with a small number of replies from 1945-47 which, being concerned with sacramental topics, were outside the scope of the second volume of *Questions and Answers*. The subtitle gives an indication of the wide range of the matter dealt with : ' answers to a large variety of questions on points of moral, canonical, liturgical and rubrical interest.' In all there are 335 answers, arranged more or less in the order of the Code of Canon Law, divided into sections on general principles, clerics, religious, the Sacraments (nearly 200 answers), churches, funerals, divine worship, judicial processes, crimes and punishments. The ' problems ' are not theoretical ones thought up by some savant seated in his study ; on the contrary, they all come straight from every-day life. And E. J. M. brings his sound judgment and long experience—and not seldom his delightful sense of humour—to bear on them and gives clear and practical solutions. Dr McReavy's selection and arrangement are excellent and he has provided the book with ample indices : a table of contents, a subject index and an index according to the canons of the Code. We can sincerely recommend *Priests' Problems* to all priests.

P. C. Barry

ST. JOHN CLIMACUS : THE LADDER OF DIVINE ASCENT. Translated by Archimandrite Lazarus Moore, with an Introduction by M. Heppell. London : Faber and Faber. 1959. Pp. 270. 25s.

Here we have one of the classics of the contemplative life in the Eastern Church. Its popularity is well attested by the enormous number of manuscripts, which reproduce this work, many of them containing lengthy scholia on various topics. It has been translated into many languages, and Faber and Faber

deserve our gratitude for this new addition to their spiritual library. No definitive text has yet appeared, and the present translation into English is based on the 1883 edition of the text. The translation reads very smoothly. Some of the early *Vitae* which are found in the early manuscripts are also translated, but they are of doubtful value. The details of John Climacus's life are very obscure. In general M. Heppell follows the theory of Fr Petit, who identifies the author with John Scholasticus or Rhetor. John had been the disciple of Eulogus, Patriarch of Alexandria from 580 on, before his elevation to the Patriarchate. He came with Eulogus from Antioch, already a married man. His wife died and John retired to the monastery of Sinai, where he became abbot. His apparently wide acquaintance with Egyptian monastic tradition, and the curious mixture in his writing of precise definition and popular style, which is claimed by Fr Petit to be distinctive of the school of Antioch, would seem to support this theory.

The Ladder of Divine Ascent, the ' Klimax ' from which his name is derived, was written towards the end of his life, most probably before 640. The title is descriptive of the Ladder of Jacob. The ascent to God is described in thirty ' Steps ',—the first twenty-three outlining the method of ridding oneself of certain vices, and the last seven being concerned with the acquisition of virtue. The number thirty is selected to honour the thirty years of Our Lord's hidden life at Nazareth. At appropriate stages throughout, edifying anecdotes are added to confirm the lesson being taught. The reader should not expect a logically worked out thesis : he will find lists of aphorisms, loosely connected, but brightly written. Most manuscripts have, in conclusion, the ' Homily to the Pastor ' (Abbot), which was intended to be read with *The Ladder*, but it does not appear in this translation.

PATRICK O'CONNELL